Judge: Lynette Gridiron Winston, Case: 22PSCV00456, Date: 2023-10-05 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22PSCV00456    Hearing Date: April 11, 2024    Dept: 6

CASE NAME:  Gabriela Cabrera v. Bost Land, LLC 

Defendant’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees 

TENTATIVE RULING           

The Court DENIES Defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees. 

              Plaintiff is ordered to give notice and provide proof of service of same within five calendar days of the Court’s order. 

BACKGROUND 

This is an Unruh Civil Rights Act case. On May 16, 2022, Plaintiff Gabriela Cabrera (Plaintiff) filed this action against Defendant Bost Land, LLC (Defendant) and Does 1 to 10, alleging one cause of action for violations of the Unruh Civil Rights Act. 

Following a bench trial, the Court issued its Statement of Decision on December 19, 2023, in favor of Defendant and against Plaintiff. 

On March 4, 2024, Defendant filed a motion for attorney’s fees. On March 28, 2024, Plaintiff opposed the motion. Defendant did not reply. 

LEGAL STANDARD 

            “The following items are allowable as costs under Section 1032:… (10) Attorney's fees, when authorized by any of the following: (A) Contract. (B) Statute. (C) Law.” (Civil Code, § 1033.5, subd. (a)(10). “A trial court assessing attorney fees begins with a touchstone or lodestar figure, based on the ‘careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney… involved in the presentation of the case.” (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1321.) “The reasonableness of attorney fees is within the discretion of the trial court, to be determined from a consideration of such factors as the nature of the litigation, the complexity of the issues, the experience and expertise of counsel and the amount of time involved. [Citation.] The court may also consider whether the amount requested is based upon unnecessary or duplicative work. [Citation.]” (Wilkerson v. Sullivan (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 443, 448.) 

DISCUSSION 

            Summary of Arguments 

            Defendant moves for attorney’s fees on the grounds that Plaintiff’s three claims were frivolous, unreasonable, and without foundation. Defendant contends that the ADA governs, which provides prevailing defendants with the right to recover attorney’s fees against losing plaintiffs where the claims were frivolous, unreasonable, and without foundation. Defendant argues Plaintiff’s citations to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) within the complaint mean that Defendant is therefore entitled to recover attorney’s fees since it prevailed at trial in this action. Defendant also contends the case was made in bad faith. Defendant alternatively seeks to recover attorney’s fees on the grounds that Plaintiff denied certain requests for admission, which denials Defendant later disproved at trial. 

            In opposition, Plaintiff contends that her claims were brought under the Unruh Civil Rights Act (UCRA), which only provides attorney’s fees to prevailing plaintiffs. Plaintiff contends that the UCRA’s incorporation of the ADA does not change the outcome here with respect to attorney’s fees. Plaintiff also contends that even if the ADA applied, Defendant would not prevail here because Plaintiff’s action was well grounded in law and fact, well supported by expert testimony, well supported by the evidence, and Defendant remediated all the barriers of which Plaintiff complained. Plaintiff further argues that Plaintiff’s responses to Defendant’s requests for admission were reasonable, and that Defendant did not properly show which fees were incurred in response to which specific request for admission. Plaintiff also argues that Defendant’s requested attorney’s fees and costs are inflated and internally inconsistent. 

            Analysis – Attorney’s Fees Under the UCRA v. ADA 

Whoever denies, aids or incites a denial, or makes any discrimination or distinction contrary to Section 51, 51.5, or 51.6, is liable for each and every offense for the actual damages, and any amount that may be determined by a jury, or a court sitting without a jury, up to a maximum of three times the amount of actual damage but in no case less than four thousand dollars ($4,000), and any attorney's fees that may be determined by the court in addition thereto, suffered by any person denied the rights provided in Section 51, 51.5, or 51.6. 

(Civ. Code, § 52, subd. (a).) 

            The Court agrees with Plaintiff that the UCRA does not permit Defendant to recover attorney’s fees here. The Court first notes that neither party cites any authority that specifically addresses this situation, and the Court was not able to find any. Plaintiff’s citation to Molski v. Arciero Wine Group (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 786 is unpersuasive because that case involved a preceding action in federal court based on an ADA claim and a subsequent action in state court based on a UCRA claim vis-à-vis the Disabled Persons Act, plus other unrelated statutes. (Id., at p. 789.) The state court action in that case did not address how attorney’s fees are determined when a UCRA claim is predicated on an ADA violation. (See generally Id.) Defendant’s citation to Garcia v. Zarco Hotels (2023) 2023 Cal. Super. LEXIS 47319 is also unavailing because that is an unpublished superior court decision and is not binding precedent. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1115, subd. (a); Aixtron, Inc. v. Veeco Instruments, Inc. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 360, 399.) 

            But, the authority is generally clear that only prevailing plaintiffs may recover attorney’s fees in a UCRA claim. (Civ. Code, § 52, subd. (a); Turner v. Ass'n of Am. Med. Colleges (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1060, italics in original [“The statutory language [in Civil Code § 52] authorizing fee awards only to prevailing plaintiffs reflects a determination that prevailing defendants should not receive a fee award for hours spent defending such claims.”]) The UCRA only provides that a violation of the ADA also constitutes a violation of the UCRA; it does not say that the same remedies necessarily apply. (See Civ. Code, § 54.1, subd. (d).) The complaint here clearly only pleads a single cause of action under the UCRA. Plaintiff also specifically disclaimed injunctive relief under Civil Code section 55. (Compl., Prayer, ¶ 2; Molski, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 791 [plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief under Civil Code § 55 denied at trial court which undermined claim for attorney’s fees].) Thus, Defendant is not entitled to recover attorney’s fees as the prevailing party. 

The ADA includes a bilateral attorney fee provision that allows the prevailing party in an ADA action to recover reasonable attorney fees. (42 U.S.C. § 12205.) However, under established precedent, a prevailing defendant can only recover attorney fees if the ADA claim was frivolous. (Jankey v. Lee (2012) 55 Cal.4th 1038, 1047-1048; 42 U.S.C. § 12205; Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC (1978) 434 U.S. 412, 416-417 (Christianburg).) Thus, even under the ADA, "prevailing defendants may receive fees only when the trial court finds that a plaintiff's claim is 'frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so . . . .'" (Jankey, supra, at p. 1048.) Here, the Court does not find that Plaintiff’s claim was frivolous, unreasonable or groundless. The Court only found that Plaintiff failed to meet its burden of proof. Thus, even if the ADA applied, Defendant cannot recover its attorney’s fees. 

            Accordingly, the Court DENIES the motion for attorney’s fees based on the ADA. 

            Requests for Admission 

(a) If a party fails to admit the genuineness of any document or the truth of any matter when requested to do so under this chapter, and if the party requesting that admission thereafter proves the genuineness of that document or the truth of that matter, the party requesting the admission may move the court for an order requiring the party to whom the request was directed to pay the reasonable expenses incurred in making that proof, including reasonable attorney's fees. 

(b) The court shall make this order unless it finds any of the following: 

(1) An objection to the request was sustained or a response to it was waived under Section 2033.290. 

(2) The admission sought was of no substantial importance. 

(3) The party failing to make the admission had reasonable ground to believe that that party would prevail on the matter. 

(4) There was other good reason for the failure to admit. 

(Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.420.) 

            Defendant alternatively seeks to recover attorney’s fees based on Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420. Defendant contends Plaintiff failed to admit the truth of matters specified in Requests for Admission Numbers 8, 9, 13, 14, and 15, and that Defendant proved the truthfulness of those matters at trial, therefore entitling Defendant to recover attorney’s fees. 

            In opposition, Plaintiff contends her responses to those requests for admission were reasonable because she had a reasonable belief she would prevail. Plaintiff contends Defendant failed to specify which fees and costs applied to which specific request for admission. Plaintiff also contends that Defendant misrepresented Plaintiff’s response to Request Number 8, that Plaintiff provided proof she encountered difficulty when at the subject property for Request Number 9, and that she provided proof she was deterred from returning to the subject property for Request Numbers 13, 14, and 15. 

            The Court finds Defendant’s arguments unavailing. First, Request Number 8 is limited to a purported visit in April 2022, which Plaintiff denied having done and does not appear to have been an issue at trial. (Stillman Decl., Ex. 3; Statement of Decision (12/19/23).) It is unclear what relevance April 2022 has when the incident in question occurred on November 18, 2021. (Id.) Second, Request Number 9 is not entirely clear as to what Defendant meant by the phrase “experience difficulty as a result of any condition at the Property.” (Stillman Decl., Ex. 3.) Notwithstanding, Plaintiff presented evidence at trial regarding her difficulty entering the premises. (Fitzgerald Decl., Ex. A, 28:24-30:25.) The fact that the Court found Defendant not to be in violation of the ADA does not mean Plaintiff did not encounter some form of difficulty when she visited the subject property. Nor did Defendant prove that Plaintiff did not experience difficulty as a result of the conditions at the property. 

Third, Request Numbers 13, 14, and 15 are focused on deterrence. (Id.) Plaintiff testified at trial that she felt she had been deterred from returning to the subject property because she was not informed the purported barriers had been removed. (Fitzgerald Decl., Ex. A, 33:9-27.) Just because she was ultimately wrong about the existence of the barriers does not necessarily mean she lacked a reasonable ground for the belief at the time she made the denials. (See Grace v. Mansourian (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 523, 532.) 

Finally, Defendant did not provide sufficient information to tie the work performed to the particular Request for Admission at issue. (See Orange County Water Dist. v. The Arnold Engineering Co. (2018) 31 Cal.App.5th 96, 113.) All Defendant provided was a billing summary. (Stillman Decl., Ex. 1.) The Court is not going to parse through each billing entry to determine the work tied to the applicable Requests for Admission. 

Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees based on Plaintiff’s response to the Requests for Admission.

CONCLUSION           

The Court DENIES Defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees. 

             Plaintiff is ordered to give notice and provide proof of service of same within five calendar days of the Court’s order.