Judge: Lynette Gridiron Winston, Case: 22PSCV00964, Date: 2023-12-14 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22PSCV00964    Hearing Date: December 14, 2023    Dept: 6

CASE NAME:  Puente Hills Business Center, L.P. v. A211 Incorporation, et al.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment 

TENTATIVE RULING

            The Court DENIES the motion for summary judgment. 

            Plaintiff is ordered to give notice of the Court’s ruling within five calendar days of this order. 

BACKGROUND

This is a breach of contract action pertaining to the rental of commercial real property. On September 1, 2022, plaintiff Puente Hills Business Center, L.P. (Plaintiff) filed this action against Defendants A211 Incorporation (A211), Jung Il Jang (Jang) (collectively, Defendants), and Does 1 to 10, alleging causes of action for breach of written lease agreement (as against A211), breach of written guaranty (as against Jang), and for common counts as to all Defendants. 

On September 27, 2023, Plaintiff filed the instant motion for summary judgment, which also included a request for dismissal as to the third cause of action for common counts. On November 27, 2023, Jang opposed the motion. No reply has been filed. 

Trial is scheduled for February 23, 2024. 

LEGAL STANDARD

The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119, italics in original and quoting Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.” (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381-382.) 

            “On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.” (Scalf v. D.B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) A plaintiff moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that there is no defense to a cause of action if that party has proved each element of the cause of action entitling the party to judgment on the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(1).) “Once the plaintiff . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the defendant . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto. The defendant … shall not rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists but, instead, shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(1).) “[A] plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion that ‘each element of’ the ‘cause of action’ in question has been ‘proved,’ and hence that ‘there is no defense’ thereto.” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850, citing Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (o)(1).)” 

Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.) 

DISCUSSION

            First Cause of Action – Breach of Written Lease Agreement

            To prevail on a cause of action for breach of contract, the plaintiff must prove (1) the contract, (2) the plaintiff's performance of the contract or excuse for nonperformance, (3) the defendant's breach, and (4) the resulting damage to the plaintiff.” (Richman v. Hartley (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1182, 1186.) “As damages are an element of a breach of contract cause of action [citation], a plaintiff cannot obtain judgment on a breach of contract cause of action in an amount of damages to be determined later.” (Paramount Petroleum Corp. v. Superior Ct. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 226, 241.) 

            Plaintiff moves for summary judgment on the grounds that A211 has no defense to the First Cause of Action for breach of contract as to the subject lease agreement. The following is a brief summary of Plaintiff’s proffered undisputed material facts:

             
1.      Plaintiff leased the subject property to A211 per a lease dated November 13, 2020. (SSUMF 1.)

2.      Jang executed the lease agreement on behalf of A211 and also executed a guaranty for A211’s performance under the lease agreement. (SSUMF 3.)

3.      Plaintiff complied with its obligations under the lease agreement. (SSUMF 6.)

4.      A211 owed additional monthly rent in the amount of $147.64 from May 2022 through March 2023. (SSUMF 7.)

5.      A211 owed additional monthly rent in the amount of $148.59 from April 2023 through June 2023. (SSUMF 8.)

6.      A judgment for possession of the subject property was entered against A211 on June 30, 2022, in a separate unlawful detainer action (LASC Case No. 22WCUD00811.) (SSUMF 9.)

7.      Plaintiff retook possession of the subject property on August 4, 2022. (SSUMF 10.)

8.      Plaintiff obtained a money judgment in the unlawful detainer action against A211 in the amount of $13,826.94 for rental damages through the date of the judgment. (SSUMF 11.)

9.      Aside from one rental payment for April 2022, Defendants did not make rent payments after February 2022. (SSUMF 12.)

10.   A211 owes Plaintiff $28,680.85, based on monthly base rent from February 2022 to June 30, 2023, comprised of $41,258.00, less the rental damages recovered in the unlawful detainer action. (SSUMF 13.)

11.   A211 owes Plaintiff $2,369.82 for unpaid additional monthly rent for the period of February 1, 2022 through June 30, 2023. (SSUMF 14.)

12.   Plaintiff incurred commission fees of $5,037.88 in leasing the subject property to A211, and $3,218.65 of that is recoverable under the default provision of the lease agreement based upon the number of months during which A211 did not pay rent. (SSUMF 15.)

13.  Plaintiff leased the subject property to a new tenant starting July 1, 2023. (SSUMF 19.) 

The Court finds Plaintiff has not established every element of its claim for breach of contract against A211. The main issue here is the amount of damages. It is unclear from the evidence presented how Plaintiff calculated its alleged damages. First, Plaintiff’s Separate Statement fails to identify the term, i.e., duration of the lease agreement, which is a material term. (See In re Guardianship of Carlon’s Estate (1941) 43 Cal.App.2d 204, 209.) Plaintiff should have included this in its Separate Statement. (See United Community Church v. Garcin (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 327, 337, italics in original and superseded by statute on other grounds [“This is the Golden Rule of Summary Adjudication: if it is not set forth in the separate statement, it does not exist.”]; Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (b)(1); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1350, subd. (d).) 

Second, Plaintiff’s Separate Statement fails to state the base rent of the lease agreement. Base rent is a material term of a lease agreement. (See Enlow v. Irwin (1926) 80 Cal.App. 98, 101.) At most, Plaintiff contends A211 owes Plaintiff $28,680.85 in unpaid base rent, but it is unclear how that amount was determined. $41,258.00 minus $13,826.94 (i.e., the unlawful detainer judgment) is $27,431.06, not $28,680.85. It is further unclear how the amount of $41,258.00 was determined, as the tenant ledger Plaintiff submitted does not show $41,258.00 anywhere, nor does the Declaration of Cherie Igo fully explain how this amount was determined. (Appendix of Exhibits, Ex. 2; Igo Decl., ¶ 9.) In fact, the tenant ledger shows a total base rent of $43,905.00. (Appendix of Exhibits, Ex. 2.) 

Third, Plaintiff’s Separate Statement does not state the amount of unpaid rent damages, holdover damages, or the period of time that was covered in the judgment from the unlawful detainer action. Fourth, none of the evidence cited supports Plaintiff’s contention that the amount of the unlawful detainer judgment was $13,826.95. In fact, it all states that the amount was $12,577.15. (Igo Decl., ¶ 7; Burton Decl., ¶ 4; Appendix of Exhibits, Ex. 6.) 

Fifth, the additional rent of $2,369.82 appears to overlap with some of the judgment amount from the unlawful detainer judgment, as it appears to be for the whole period from February 2022 to June 2023. (Appendix of Exhibits, Ex. 2.) Sixth, it is also unclear how the amount of $3,218.65 vis-à-vis commissions was determined, as the lease agreement does not clearly provide any sort of formula for charging A211 for those commissions. (See Igo Decl., ¶ 11.) In fact, it is unclear whether Plaintiff is even entitled to charge A211 for the initial commission charge it incurred when leasing the subject property to A211. It is unclear where in Articles 23 or 24 of the lease agreement it states that Plaintiff is entitled to so charge A211. (SSUMF 15.) 

Finally, absent an agreement to the contrary, a lessor like Plaintiff generally cannot recover unpaid rent after the termination of the lease. (See Civ. Code § 1951.2, subd. (a); Welcome v. Hess (1891) 90 Cal. 507, 514; Maurice Mercantile Co. v. American Employers’ Ins. Co. (1934) 140 Cal.App. 354, 359.) Rather, unpaid rent is the measure for calculating Plaintiff’s remaining damage claims. (Civ. Code § 1951.2, subd. (a).) 

              Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. The Court further notes that Plaintiff only moved for summary judgment and did not also move for summary adjudication in the alternative. Therefore, the Court declines to consider Plaintiff’s motion with respect to the Second Cause of Action for breach of the written guaranty. However, the same deficiencies would apply to the Second Cause of Action as well. 

CONCLUSION

The Court DENIES the motion for summary judgment. 

              Plaintiff is ordered to give notice of the Court’s ruling within five calendar days of this order.