Judge Lynette Gridiron Winston, Case Number: 22PSCV01082, Date: 2024-08-06 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Lynette Gridiron Winston, Case: 22PSCV01082, Date: 2024-08-06 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22PSCV01082 Hearing Date: August 6, 2024 Dept: 6

CASE NAME: Good Faith Investments, Inc., et al. v. General Motors, LLC

Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel the Deposition of Defendant’s Person Most Qualified

TENTATIVE RULING

The Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion to compel the deposition of Defendant’s person most qualified on categories 5-6, 8-13, 15-16, 18-19, 21-22, and 24-27, but modifies the following categories:

- Categories 5, 10, 26, and 27 are limited to Defendant’s lemon law policies and procedures within California, and are otherwise limited to the subject vehicle and vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the subject vehicle;

- Categories 6, 11, 18, and 24, which address communications and correspondence regarding the alleged electrical defect and engine defect should be limited to the subject vehicle and vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the subject vehicle regarding the same or similar complaints that are the subject of this action; and

- Categories 8, 12, 15, 16, 21, and 22 are limited to dealers in California, and are otherwise limited to the subject vehicle and vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the subject vehicle regarding the same or similar complaints that are the subject of this action.

Defendant’s person most qualified must appear for deposition within 30 days of the Court’s order.

Plaintiffs are ordered to give notice of the Court’s ruling within five calendar days of this order.

BACKGROUND

This is a lemon law case. On September 20, 2022, plaintiffs Good Faith Investments, Inc. and Cindy Portillo (collectively, Plaintiffs) filed this action against defendant General Motors, LLC (Defendant) and Does 1 through 50, alleging causes of action for violation of subdivision (d) of Civil Code section 1793.2, violation of subdivision (b) of Civil Code section 1793.2, violation of subdivision (a)(3) of Civil Code section 1793.2, breach of express written warranty, and breach of the implied warranty of merchantability.

On June 18, 2024, Plaintiffs moved to compel the deposition of Defendant’s person most qualified on categories 5-6, 8-13, 15-16, 18-19, 21-22, and 24-27 set forth in Plaintiff’s amended notice of deposition. On July 24, 2024, Defendant opposed the motion. On July 29, 2024, Plaintiffs replied.

LEGAL STANDARD

(a) If, after service of a deposition notice, a party to the action or an officer, director, managing agent, or employee of a party, or a person designated by an organization that is a party under Section 2025.230, without having served a valid objection under Section 2025.410, fails to appear for examination, or to proceed with it, or to produce for inspection any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the deposition notice, the party giving the notice may move for an order compelling the deponent's attendance and testimony, and the production for inspection of any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the deposition notice.

(b) A motion under subdivision (a) shall comply with both of the following:

(1) The motion shall set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the production for inspection of any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the deposition notice.

(2) The motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040, or, when the deponent fails to attend the deposition and produce the documents, electronically stored information, or things described in the deposition notice, by a declaration stating that the petitioner has contacted the deponent to inquire about the nonappearance.

(Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.450.)

DISCUSSION

Meet and Confer

Per Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.450, subdivision (b)(2), a motion to compel attendance at a deposition requires the moving party to meet and confer before bringing the motion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.450, subd. (b)(2).) The Court finds Plaintiffs’ meet-and-confer efforts satisfactory. (Oliva Decl., ¶¶ 31-34.) However, the Court requests the parties going forward to meet and confer in person, by telephone, or video conference, as those methods tend to be more effective than emails and letters. (Dept. 6 Courtroom Information [“Parties are required to meet and confer in person, by telephone, or by video conference before filing any motion.”]) The Court also requests that parties engage in an informal discovery conference before filing motions to compel depositions. (See Dept. 6 Courtroom Information, italics added [“Should the parties wish to file a motion to compel further responses to discovery, or other discovery motions regarding depositions or subpoenas, at any time during the pendency of this case, counsel must first meet and confer in good faith either in person, telephonically or by video conference. If the parties are unable to resolve their discovery disputes, the Court requests that counsel schedule an Informal Discovery Conference (IDC).”])

Summary of Arguments

Plaintiffs seek to compel Defendant to produce the person most qualified (PMQ) to appear for deposition regarding categories 5-6, 8-13, 15-16, 18-19, 21-22, and 24-27 set forth in Plaintiff’s amended notice of deposition served on March 18, 2024. Plaintiffs indicate that Defendants served boilerplate objections and refused to produce a PMQ on those categories. Plaintiffs contend that Defendant already produced documents on these topics, and therefore good cause exists to order Defendant to produce a PMQ for deposition on these topics.

Plaintiffs contend that the desired testimony is highly relevant. Plaintiffs indicate that they seek a deponent regarding Defendant’s Lemon Law Policies and Procedures, and its internal investigations into electrical and engine defects. Plaintiffs contend these categories are reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of the nature and duration of defects in the subject vehicle, Defendant’s awareness of those defects, and Defendant’s knowledge and inability to repair those defects. Plaintiffs contend the desired testimony is probative of nonconformities with the subject vehicle and Defendant’s ability to repair it within a reasonable number of opportunities, and that it will include technical information Plaintiffs’ expert needs in rendering an expert opinion.

In opposition, Defendant contends its objections to Plaintiffs’ deposition notice were valid because Plaintiffs seek unnecessary information, it already produced documents directly responsive to Plaintiffs’ discovery requests, and it offered to produce a witness to testify about the subject vehicle and the repairs performed under warranty. Defendant contends Plaintiffs fail to explain why the requested testimony is discoverable, or essential to their claims or Defendant’s defenses. Defendant contends breach of warranty claims are unique to the consumer and the vehicle, and that the vehicle either conformed to its warranty or it did not, or that Defendant was able to repair the vehicle within a reasonable number of attempts or it was not. Defendant contends testimony and documents concerning other consumers or their vehicles is irrelevant. Defendant further contends Plaintiffs do not need information concerning Defendant’s internal investigations or analysis of the defects alleged in the complaint, and that information regarding Defendant’s policies and procedures regarding customer complaints for repurchase or replacement of their vehicles is irrelevant. Finally, Defendant contends Plaintiffs’ requests impermissibly seek production of trade secret material.

Analysis

Deponents who object to discovery requests bear the burden of justifying those objections on a motion to compel. (See Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255; Coy v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220-221 (Coy); San Diego Professional Ass’n v. Superior Court of San Diego County (1962) 58 Cal.2d 194, 199.)

On balance, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have the more persuasive arguments here, and that Defendant has generally failed to justify its objections to Plaintiffs’ deposition notice. First, objections as to irrelevancy cannot be used to deny discovery. (Coy, supra, 58 Cal.2d at p. 217.) In determining the relevancy of discovery to the subject matter in a pending action, the discovery statutes must be construed liberally in favor of disclosure unless the request is clearly improper by virtue of well-established causes of denial. (Darbee v. Superior Court, San Mateo County (1962) 208 Cal. App. 2d 680.) Defendant’s arguments that Plaintiff’s designated categories and requested documents are not relevant are therefore unavailing. The categories sought are reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, including Defendant’s knowledge of the alleged defects and whether Defendant’s conduct was willful. The Court similarly rejects Defendant’s argument that Plaintiffs failed to explain why the requested testimony is discoverable. (See Motion, 6:16-7:26.)

Second, Defendant’s previous production of documents does not exempt it from having to provide testimony on matters related to those documents. Third, Plaintiffs are not strictly limited to discovery regarding the subject vehicle, as Defendant’s general policies regarding lemon law buybacks and repurchases are relevant and reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of admissible evidence. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.)

Fourth, it is not enough that Defendant agreed to produce a PMQ witness on other categories. If Plaintiffs properly designated categories for a PMQ witness, then Defendant must produce the witness on all properly designated categories, not just the ones Defendant unilaterally determines to be proper. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.450, subd. (a).) Fifth, the Court finds that testimony and documents regarding other consumers or their vehicles, and Defendant’s internal investigations or analysis of the defects alleged in the complaint, are relevant. (See Donlen v. Ford Motor Co. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 138, 154; Kwan v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 174, 185-186; Oregel v. Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1105; Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.) Finally, to the extent any trade secret information is implicated, Plaintiffs indicate in their reply papers that the parties already executed a protective order. (Reply, 3:4-8.) This should adequately address Defendant’s concerns.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Court does agree to some extent that some of the categories are overly broad. (Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Superior Court for Los Angeles County (1968) 263 Cal.App.2d 12, 19 [trial court may refuse to order discovery responses answered where the disclosure provides little practical benefit compared to the burden and expense it would impose on the responding party].) Categories 5, 10, 26, and 27 concern policies and procedures for evaluations and repurchases of vehicles under Civil Code section 1793.2 and the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. While these categories are limited to California by virtue of referencing California law, for the sake of clarity, the Court finds these categories should be limited to Defendant’s lemon law policies and procedures within California, and should otherwise be limited to the subject vehicle and vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the subject vehicle.

Categories 6, 11, 18, and 24, which address communications and correspondence regarding the alleged electrical defect and engine defect should be limited to the subject vehicle and vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the subject vehicle regarding the same or similar complaints that are the subject of this action.

Categories 8, 12, 15, 16, 21, and 22 concern fixes, repairs, and repair documents made available to Defendant’s dealers. These categories should be limited to dealers in California. These categories should also be limited to the subject vehicle and vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the subject vehicle regarding the same or similar complaints that are the subject of this action.

Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion, except as modified herein.

The Court also notes that neither party requested monetary sanctions. Accordingly, no sanctions will be award.

CONCLUSION

The Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion to compel the deposition of Defendant’s person most qualified on categories 5-6, 8-13, 15-16, 18-19, 21-22, and 24-27, but modifies the following categories:

Defendant’s person most qualified must appear for deposition within 30 days of the Court’s order.

Plaintiffs are ordered to give notice of the Court’s ruling within five calendar days of this order.