Judge Lynette Gridiron Winston, Case Number: 22PSCV01908, Date: 2024-08-13 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Lynette Gridiron Winston, Case: 22PSCV01908, Date: 2024-08-13 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22PSCV01908 Hearing Date: August 13, 2024 Dept: 6

CASE NAME: Yin Chieh Chuang v. Jay Hooper

Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment

TENTATIVE RULING

The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff is ordered to submit a proposed judgment within five calendar days of the Court’s order.

Plaintiff is also ordered to give notice of the Court’s ruling within five calendar days of this order.

BACKGROUND

This case is a business dispute. On November 18, 2022, plaintiff Yin Chieh Chuang (Plaintiff) filed this action. On May 19, 2023, Plaintiff filed the operative Second Amended Complaint (SAC) against defendant Jay Hooper aka Jay Ho Hooper (Defendant) and Does 1 to 10, alleging the sole cause of action for breach of contract.

On April 22, 2024, Plaintiff moved for summary judgment. On July 24, 2024, Defendant opposed the motion. On July 25, 2024, Plaintiff replied.

LEGAL STANDARD

The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119, italics in original and quoting Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.” (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381-382.)

“On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.” (Scalf v. D.B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) A plaintiff moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that there is no defense to a cause of action if that party has proved each element of the cause of action entitling the party to judgment on the cause of action. Once the plaintiff ... has met that burden, the burden shifts to the defendant ... to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto. The defendant … shall not rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists but, instead, shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(1).) “[A] plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion that ‘each element of’ the ‘cause of action’ in question has been ‘proved,’ and hence that ‘there is no defense’ thereto.” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850, citing Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (o)(1).)”

Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)

PRELIMINARY ISSUES

The Court notes that the primary document upon which this contract is based is partially written in Chinese. (Chuang Decl., Ex. A.) Even though the other half of the contract appears to be its English translation, Plaintiff should still have provided a certified translation per Rule 3.1110, subdivision (g), of the California Rules of Court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1110, subd. (g).) The Court will still consider the documents, but admonishes Plaintiff to comply with the requirements of the California Rules of Court going forward.

EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

The Court OVERRULES all of Defendant’s objections. The Court also notes that Rule 3.1110, subdivision (g), of the California Rules of Court is not a rule of evidence. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1110, subd. (g).)

The Court OVERRULES Plaintiff’s first objection to the Declaration of Defendant Jay Hooper. The Court SUSTAINS in part Plaintiff’s second objection to the Declaration of Jay Hooper on the grounds that it contains a legal conclusion with respect to the conclusion that Hooper owes nothing with respect to the alleged agreement. (Snider v. Snider (1962) 200 Cal.App.2d 741, 749 [conclusions of law or fact in a declaration on summary judgment are insufficient as evidence].)

DISCUSSION

Summary of Material Facts

Plaintiff invested $400,000.00 in a company called TRC International Corp., of which Defendant was a principal. (Plaintiff’s SSF 1). On November 18, 2024, the parties entered into a written agreement wherein Defendant agreed to pay Plaintiff $234,000.00 according to the schedule set forth in the agreement in exchange for Plaintiff’s claims and interest in TRC International Corp. (Plaintiff’s SSF 2.) Defendant signed the agreement, acknowledged its validity, and Plaintiff’s only obligation thereunder was to receive full payment in exchange for his claims against and investment in TRC International Corp. (Plaintiff’s SSF 2.) Defendant only paid $103,000.00 and owes Plaintiff $131,000.00. (Plaintiff’s SSF 3.)

Analysis

“To prevail on a cause of action for breach of contract, the plaintiff must prove (1) the contract, (2) the plaintiff's performance of the contract or excuse for nonperformance, (3) the defendant's breach, and (4) the resulting damage to the plaintiff.” (Richman v. Hartley (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1182, 1186.)

Plaintiff contends he is entitled to summary judgment because he has shown the existence of the contract, Plaintiff’s performance thereunder, Defendant’s breach, and Plaintiff’s damages resulting from that breach. Plaintiff contends he and Defendant entered into a written agreement wherein Defendant would pay Plaintiff $234,000.00 according to the schedule set forth therein (the Contract). (Plaintiff’s SSF 2.) Plaintiff contends Defendant signed and acknowledged the Contract’s validity, and that Plaintiff’s only obligation thereunder was to receive payment. (Plaintiff’s SSF 2.) Plaintiff contends Defendant breached the Contract by only repaying $103,000.00 out of the $234,000.00 promised. (Plaintiff’s SSF 3.)

The Court finds Plaintiff has met his moving burden. The undisputed evidence shows that Plaintiff and Defendant entered into the Contract for Defendant to repay Plaintiff $234,000.00 for Plaintiff’s investment in TRC International Corp. (SSF 2.) The undisputed evidence further shows that Defendant failed to repay Plaintiff $131,000.00 of that $234,000.00 balance. (SSF 3.) Moreover, none of the language in the Contract shows that Plaintiff was obligated to transfer his ownership in TRC back to Defendant as a condition of the repayment as Defendant contends. (See Chuang Decl., Ex. A; Hooper Decl., ¶ 5.) Accordingly, the burden now shifts to Defendant to establish the existence of a triable issue of material fact.

The Court finds Defendant has failed to establish the existence of a triable issue of material fact. None of the evidence Defendant has presented here shows that the parties modified the Contract as Defendant contends. (See Defendant’s Separate Statement, SSF No. 3.) “Modification is a change in the obligation by a modifying agreement which requires mutual assent.” (Wade v. Diamond A Cattle Co. (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 453, 457.) Defendant has presented no evidence of mutual assent to support a modification to the Contract, but instead has only provided legal conclusions, which are insufficient to establish the existence of a triable issue of material fact. (See Hooper Decl., ¶ 6; Trujillo v. First Am. Registry, Inc. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 628, 635, disapproved on other grounds by Connor v. First Student, Inc. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 1026 [“To avoid summary judgment, admissible evidence presented to the trial court, not merely claims or theories, must reveal a triable, material factual issue. [Citation.] Moreover, the opposition to summary judgment will be deemed insufficient when it is essentially conclusionary, argumentative or based on conjecture and speculation. [Citation.]”) It is not enough to simply say the parties agreed to suspend and terminate the Contract; rather, Defendant needed to present specific facts showing that Plaintiff agreed to the purported modification. Defendant did not do that, and therefore fails to establish the existence of a triable issue of material fact here. Defendant also contends that Plaintiff did not return any of the partial monies paid to Plaintiff pursuant to the agreement. (Hooper Decl., ¶ 5.) Thus, there is no evidence of any executed oral agreement to cancel the November 18, 2018 written agreement. There is also no evidence of any consideration given to support an alleged oral agreement to cancel the written agreement.

Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and GRANTS the motion for summary judgment.

CONCLUSION

The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff is ordered to submit a proposed judgment within five calendar days of the Court’s order.

Plaintiff is also ordered to give notice of the Court’s ruling within five calendar days of this order.