Judge Lynette Gridiron Winston, Case Number: 22PSCV02241, Date: 2024-05-21 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Lynette Gridiron Winston, Case: 22PSCV02241, Date: 2024-05-21 Tentative Ruling

Defendant Chart Oak Unified School District’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

Plaintiff is ordered to give notice of the Court’s ruling within five calendar days of this order.

This is a childhood sexual assault case. On December 2, 2022, plaintiff Omolara Osinowo (Plaintiff) filed this action against defendant Doe 1 and Does 2 through 25. On January 10, 2023, Plaintiff filed the operative First Amended Complaint (FAC), in which defendant Charter Oak Unified School District (Defendant) was substituted for Doe 1, alleging causes of action for negligence (Defendant), negligence (Does 2 through 25), negligent hiring, retention, and supervision (Defendant), and negligent hiring, retention, and supervision (Does 2 through 25).

On March 7, 2024, Defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings. On April 25, 2024, Plaintiff opposed the motion. On May 1, 2024, Defendant replied.

A defendant may move for judgment on the pleadings when the “complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that defendant.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subds. (b)(1), (c)(1)(B)(ii).)

A motion for judgment on the pleadings tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint and is analyzed in all material respects as though it were a demurrer. (Wise v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 725, 738; Kapsimallis v. Allstate Insurance Co. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 667, 672.)

“A motion for judgment on the pleadings performs the same function as a general demurrer, and hence attacks only defects disclosed on the face of the pleadings or by matters that can be judicially noticed.” (Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 999 [citations omitted].)

The Court GRANTS Defendant’s request for judicial notice submitted with its moving papers and reply papers. (Evid. Code § 452, subds. (a)-(d).)

The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice. (Evid. Code § 452, subds. (a)-(d).)

The Court takes judicial notice of the foregoing documents only as to “the existence, content and authenticity of public records and other specified documents”; it does not take judicial notice of the truth of the factual matters asserted in those documents. (Dominguez v. Bonta (2022) 87 Cal. App. 5th 389, 400.)

Per Code of Civil Procedure section 439, subdivision (a), Defendant was required to meet and confer in person, by telephone, or by video conference before bringing this motion for judgment on the pleadings. (Code Civ. Proc., § 439, subd. (a).) The Court finds Defendant’s meet-and-confer efforts sufficient. (Gibbs Decl., ¶¶ 3-4.)

Defendant moves for judgment on the pleadings as to the First and Third Causes of Action in the FAC for negligence and negligent hiring, retention, and supervision, on the grounds that AB 218, which amended Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41 to revive previously barred childhood sexual assault claims, is unconstitutional for violating Article XVI, § 6 of the California Constitution, i.e., the “Gifts Clause.” Defendant notes the amendments to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41 opened a three-year window for plaintiffs to file suit regardless of when the assaults occurred, and that the claims presentation requirement was also retroactively eliminated.

Defendant contends Plaintiff never had an enforceable claim against Defendant at any time before the passage of AB 218 because Plaintiff never complied with the claims presentation requirement for public entities. Defendant contends that, notwithstanding the lack of specific date allegations in the FAC regarding the alleged assaults, the latest Plaintiff had to present her claims was in approximately 1999. Defendant contends that before 2009, Plaintiff was required to comply with the claims presentation requirement, that the law was clear then that the timely claim presentation requirement was a substantive element of any claim against a public entity, and that Plaintiff could never allege all of the substantive elements necessary for her claim.

Defendant cites to multiple cases to support the argument that the California Supreme Court has repeatedly held the legislature has no power to impose liability on a public entity for a past occurrence where there was no enforceable claim before the law was passed. Specifically, Defendants cites the cases of Bourn v. Hart (1982) 93 Cal. 321, Conlin v. Board of Supervisors (1893) 99 Cal. 17, Powell v. Phelan (1903) 138 Cal. 271, and Heron v. Riley (1930) 209 Cal. 507.

Defendant then contends the legislature did not have a reasonable basis to waive sovereign immunity as the imposition of liability for an unenforceable claim serves no public purpose. Defendant contends that while the Legislature clearly has the authority to extend and revive statutes of limitations against private actors, public entities are different. Defendant contends the only inquiry regarding whether something entails a public purpose is whether the underlying legal claims were valid at the time the Legislature made the appropriation, citing Orange County Foundation v. Irvine Co. (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 195. Defendant then cites Jordan v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 431 for the contention that there is no public purpose as to any payments beyond a public entity’s maximum exposure. Defendant contends the legislative history shows a motive for these retroactive amendments, but it does not show discussion of a public purpose. Defendant argues Plaintiff never had the elements to sue on these claims against Defendant and therefore Defendant’s maximum exposure was zero. Defendant also argues that liability of current school districts for former public school district students does not support a public purpose of preventing future abuse.

Defendant further argues that the Legislature’s attempt to compel public entities to pay legal claims previously barred is an abrogation of public entities’ rights under the California Constitution. Defendant contends that by retroactively removing the claims presentation requirement for all public entities in California, the Legislature appropriated public money to pay past legal claims where no enforceable claims existed under the law, and therefore constitutes an unconstitutional gift. Defendant anticipates that Plaintiff will cite the case of Coats v. New Haven Unified School District (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 415 and preemptively argues that that case is inapposite here because it was decided before the passage of AB 218 and never raised the issue of AB 218’s constitutionality under the Gift Clause. Defendant also argues Coats is factually distinguishable since it involves abuse in 2014, i.e., after the Legislature had amended Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1 and prospectively eliminated the claims presentation requirement in 2009, whereas Plaintiff’s claims are from decades ago.

Finally, Defendant argues the courts are precluded from carrying out legislative intent where the Constitution forbids such action, citing Perez v. Roe 1 (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 171 and decisions rendered in other superior courts in California agreeing with Defendant’s position.

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the retroactive elimination of the claims presentation requirement in AB 218 is constitutional and does not violate the Gift Clause because it has a clear and established public purpose. Plaintiff argues that an appropriation of public funds that benefits particular individuals does not violate the Gift Clause if it is found that the funds are to be used for a public purpose. Plaintiff contends that the legislative history for AB 218 makes clear that it was enacted for a public purpose, namely that it enables victims of childhood sexual assault to seek compensation from private and public entities. Plaintiff cites to various changes in Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1 over the years, wherein the rights of childhood sexual assault survivors has been expanded through the years, such as in 1986 when the statute of limitations was extended and in 2008 when the Legislature eliminated the claims presentation requirement.

Plaintiff contends the public purpose in AB 218 is further reflected in its legislative history by helping to prevent future assaults through raising the costs for this abuse and applying this law equally against all types of entities, whether public or private. Plaintiff then contends it has been held that retroactive relief from a government claims filing requirement does not violate the Gift Clause. Plaintiff also cites Coats for the contention that the courts have already determined that the Legislature’s motives were to alleviate the hardships of victims of childhood sexual assault by enabling them to bring their claims, as well as preventing future childhood sexual assaults, and that these motives present a public purpose and reasonable basis.

At the time this action was filed, Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1, subdivision (q), provided that:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any claim for damages described in paragraphs (1) through (3), inclusive, of subdivision (a) that has not been litigated to finality and that would otherwise be barred as of January 1, 2020, because the applicable statute of limitations, claim presentation deadline, or any other time limit had expired, is revived, and these claims may be commenced within three years of January 1, 2020. A plaintiff shall have the later of the three-year time period under this subdivision or the time period under subdivision (a) as amended by the act that added this subdivision.

There shall be presented in accordance with Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 900) and Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 910) all claims for money or damages against local public entities except any of the following…

(m) Claims made pursuant to Section 340.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault…

(p) The changes made to this section by the act that added this subdivision are retroactive and apply to any action commenced on or after the date of enactment of that act, and to any action filed before the date of enactment and still pending on that date, including any action or causes of action that would have been barred by the laws in effect before the date of enactment.

The Court finds that AB 218 is constitutional and does not violate the Gift Clause. First, Defendant’s arguments regarding Coats are unpersuasive. While the Court agrees that Coats does not address the Gift Clause, that does not necessarily change the outcome here. Coats explicitly states that the Legislature has the power to revive claims previously barred by the claim presentation requirement, not just the statute of limitations. (Id., at p. 428, italics added [“The present case, of course, involves revival of a cause of action barred by a claim presentation requirement, not a statute of limitations. But we are aware of no reason the Legislature should be any less able to revive claims in this context, as it expressly did in Assembly Bill 218…”]) Coats is on point since it addressed Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1, subdivision (q)[1], which expressly provided that the claims presentation requirement was not required for a childhood sexual assault claim under section 340.1. (Id.)

Second, the cases Defendant cites in support of the contention that the Gift Clause invalidates Plaintiff’s claims are inapposite and distinguishable. In Conlin v. Board of Supervisors (1893) 99 Cal. 17, the plaintiff had waived his claim, and the effect of the statute would have been to pay him for that which he had waived. (Id., at p. 23.) In Bourn v. Hart (1892) 93 Cal. 321, the state could not be sued at the time of the plaintiff’s injuries. (Id., at p. 327.) In Powell v. Phelan (1903) 138 Cal. 271, the law at the time the plaintiff performed juror services did not provide for the payment of such services. (Id., at p. 276.) As for Heron v. Riley (1930) 209 Cal. 507, the California Supreme Court specifically stated that the State can consent to liability, which it did when the Legislature enacted the Government Tort Claims Act in 1963, i.e., after Heron was decided and well before Plaintiff’s claims arose. (Id., at p. 517; see Stats. 1963, c. 1681, p. 3268, § 1.) Heron also held that appropriations to pay judgments after due process requirements were met are not gifts of public money. (Id., at p. 517.)

Other cases Defendant cited, such as Jordan v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 431 and Orange County Foundation v. Irvine Co. (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 195, are similarly unavailing since they are cited primarily for the argument that the legislature may not use public monies to compensate for an unenforceable claim. As noted above, the Court finds that the Legislature has the power to revive claims previously barred by the claims presentation requirement, which it did when enacting AB 218, so Plaintiff’s claim is not unenforceable for lack of complying with the claims presentation requirement. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 340.1, subd. (q); Gov. Code, § 905, subd. (m).) Perez v. Roe 1 (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 171 is inapplicable because it dealt with a prior version of Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1, which revived claims where a final judgment had been entered based on the statute of limitations. (Id., at p. 188.)

Finally, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that AB 218 was enacted for a public purpose and that it had a reasonable basis for doing so, namely, to benefit victims of childhood sexual assault, prevent further assaults, and hold accountable perpetrators and enablers of abuse who benefit from statutes of limitations. (See Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice, Ex. 1 [“AB 218 would also confront the pervasive problem of cover ups in institutions, from schools to sports league… This reform is clearly needed both to compensate victims who never should have been victims- and would not have been if past sexual assault had been properly brought to light- and also as an effective deterrent against individuals and entities who have chosen to protect the perpetrators of sexual assault over the victims.’”].) Just because Plaintiff may benefit personally and Defendant may be held liable does not necessarily mean AB 218 was enacted without a public purpose.

It is generally held that in determining whether an appropriation of public funds is to be considered a gift, the primary question is whether the funds are to be used for a ‘public’ or ‘private’ purpose; the benefit to the state from an expenditure for a public purpose is in the nature of consideration and the funds expended are therefore not a gift even though private persons are benefited therefrom. [Citation]. The determination of what constitutes a public purpose is primarily a matter for the Legislature to determine, and its discretion will not be disturbed by the courts so long as that determination has a reasonable basis.

Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES the motion. The Court notes, however, that there are cases currently pending before the First and Second District of the Court of Appeal, which may reach a different conclusion on the constitutionality of AB 218, i.e., West Contra Costa Unified School District v. Superior Court, Case No. A169314, and Roe # 2, A Public Elementary School District v. The Superior Court of Santa Barbara, Case No. B334707.) Accordingly, the Court will deny this motion without prejudice to Defendant refiling it if the Court of Appeal finds AB 218 unconstitutional.

Plaintiff is ordered to give notice of the Court’s ruling within five calendar days of this order.

[1] The Court notes that an updated version of Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1 went into effect on January 1, 2024, and subdivision (q) differs significantly from the version that was in effect when Plaintiff filed this action. Nonetheless, the applicable language addressed in Coats is the same as when Plaintiff filed this action.