Judge: Lynette Gridiron Winston, Case: 22PSCV02862, Date: 2024-01-04 Tentative Ruling



Case Number: 22PSCV02862    Hearing Date: January 10, 2024    Dept: 6

CASE NAME:  Lightking America Technology (L.A.) LTD. v. Arbor CPA, APC, et al.

Motion to Quash Subpoena, and/or for Protective Order 

TENTATIVE RULING

The Court DENIES the motion to quash subpoena, and/or for protective order. 

             Plaintiffs are ordered to give notice of the Court’s ruling within five calendar days of this order. 

BACKGROUND

This is a breach of contract action. On December 13, 2022, plaintiff Lightking America Technology (LA), LTD filed this action against defendants Arbor CPA, APC, Hui Heidi Liu, CPA, (collectively, Defendants) and Does 1 through 50. On May 9, 2023, Lightking America Technology (L.A.) LTD. And Lightking American (L.A.), LTD (collectively, Plaintiffs) filed the operative First Amended Complaint against Defendants, alleging causes of action for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty. 

On November 20, 2023, non-party Zeming Qi (Qi) filed a motion to quash subpoenas, and/or for protective orders. On December 27, 2023, Plaintiffs opposed the motion. No reply was filed. 

LEGAL STANDARD

If a subpoena requires the attendance of a witness or the production of books, documents, electronically stored information, or other things before a court, or at the trial of an issue therein, or at the taking of a deposition, the court, upon motion reasonably made by any person described in subdivision (b), or upon the court's own motion after giving counsel notice and an opportunity to be heard, may make an order quashing the subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon those terms or conditions as the court shall declare, including protective orders. In addition, the court may make any other order as may be appropriate to protect the person from unreasonable or oppressive demands, including unreasonable violations of the right of privacy of the person. 

(Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.1, subd. (a).) 

DISCUSSION

            Meet and Confer

            Although a meet-and-confer declaration is not required for a motion to quash a subpoena, the Court appreciates Qi’s efforts to meet and confer before bringing this motion. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.1; Shambaugh Decl., ¶ 5.)           

            Analysis

Courts look to the following factors to determine whether good cause has been shown to enforce a subpoena: (1) if the defendant satisfied the burden of showing a plausible justification for acquiring documents from a third party, (2) whether the material sought is adequately described and not overly broad, (3) whether the material is reasonably available to the entity from which it is sought and not readily available to defendant from other sources, (4) whether production of the requested materials would violate a third party's confidentiality or privacy rights or intrude upon any protected governmental interest, (5) whether defendant's request is timely, (6) whether time required to produce the requested information would necessitate an unreasonable delay of defendant's trial, and (7) whether production of records containing the requested information would place an unreasonable burden on a third party. (See Facebook, Inc. v. Superior Court of San Diego County (2020) 10 Cal.5th 329, 345-347; 50A Cal. Jur. 3d Process, Notices, and Subpoenas § 102.) 

            Here, non-party Qi seeks to quash a Deposition Subpoena for Production of Business Records recently served on East West Bank (the Subpoena). (Shambaugh Decl., Ex. A.) The Subpoena seeks various banking records and documents as they relate to Lightking America Technology (L.A.) LTD from the time period of September 27, 2016 to the present. (Id.) Qi contends the Subpoena should be quashed because the scope of requested documents may include personal records of Qi. As with Qi’s prior motion to quash, the Court finds Qi’s arguments unpersuasive. 

            “The party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious.” (Williams v. Superior Ct. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 552.) Qi’s motion to quash is speculative, as it only contends that the Subpoena “seeks records which may include personal records of Mr. Qi.” (Memorandum of Points and Authorities, 4:18-19, italics added.) Qi presents no evidence that the Subpoena will include Qi’s personal records and thereby violate Qi’s privacy rights. 

Moreover, as Plaintiffs correctly argue, Qi does not demonstrate that the requested bank records relate to his personal interests or that they are protected by any privilege. The declaration submitted by Qi’s attorney only indicates that Qi was “previously involved with Plaintiff corporation, and that his personal records may be a part of the documents responsive to” the Subpoena. (Shambaugh Decl., ¶ 3.) This statement lacks foundation and is based on hearsay. (Evid. Code § 702; Id. § 1200.) 

Furthermore, even if Qi was involved with Plaintiffs, it is unclear how this would confer a reasonable expectation of privacy upon Qi. It does not follow that someone who was involved with a corporation has a reasonable expectation of privacy for personal records contained within bank records of that corporation, which is treated as a separate person under the eyes of the law, (see Curci Investments, LLC v. Baldwin (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 214, 220), and where third-party banks possess those records, (see Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 36-37 [plaintiff must have had a reasonable expectation of privacy under the circumstances, which includes the customs, practices and physical settings surrounding the particular activity.]) 

             Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES the motion to quash subpoena, and/or for protective order. 

CONCLUSION

The Court DENIES the motion to quash subpoena, and/or for protective order. 

             Plaintiffs are ordered to give notice of the Court’s ruling within five calendar days of this order.