Judge Lynette Gridiron Winston, Case Number: 22STCV18128, Date: 2024-03-12 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Lynette Gridiron Winston, Case: 22STCV18128, Date: 2024-03-12 Tentative Ruling

The Court GRANTS the motion for summary judgment of Defendant Adeel M. Popalzai, D.O.

Defendant Popalzai is ordered to give notice of the Court’s ruling within five calendar days of this order.

This is a medical malpractice case. On June 2, 2022, plaintiff Beth Browne, an incompetent person, by and through her Guardian Ad Litem, Phillip Browne, filed this action (LASC Case No. 22STCV18128) against defendants Pomona Valley Hospital Medical Center, Phillip Lopez, RN, Janice Valledor, RN, Alan M. Wong, D.O., Kevin Goldman, M.D., Adeel M. Popalzai, D.O. (Defendant or Popalzai), Daniel R. Heitz, M.D., and Does 1 through 30, alleging one cause of action for medical malpractice/professional negligence. Plaintiff Beth Browne passed away on September 24, 2022.

On March 8, 2023, plaintiffs Phillip Browne, Ryan Browne, Chad Browne, and Allan Delabest filed a separate action (LASC Case No. 23PSCV00680) against defendants Pomona Valley Hospital Medical Center, Phillip Lopez, RN, Janice Valledor, RN, Alan M. Wong, D.O., Kevin Goldman, M.D., Adeel M. Popalzai, D.O. , Daniel R. Heitz, M.D., and Does 1 through 30, alleging one cause of action for wrongful death. Both actions were later consolidated, with Case No. 22STCV18128 being designated as the lead case.

On December 26, 2023, Defendant Popalzai filed a motion for summary judgment. On February 21, 2024, Plaintiffs[1] filed a notice of non-opposition.

The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119, italics in original and quoting Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.” (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381-382.)

“On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.” (Scalf v. D.B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); see also Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.)

Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff “to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion “shall not rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists but, instead, shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Id.; see also Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)

Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)

On April 8, 2021, at approximately 8:36 p.m., decedent Beth Browne (Decedent) was admitted to Pomona Valley Hospital Medical Center after having been involved in a car accident. (UMF 1.) Upon arrival, a neurological exam was performed, and Decedent was documented as being alert and oriented, moving all extremities, and having no focal deficits. (UMF 2.) A CT scan was performed around 11:00 p.m. later that evening, in which there was no evidence of a stroke. (UMF 3.) The following morning on April 9, 2021 at 2:02 a.m., Dr. Wong indicated in a note that Decedent has no evidence of an acute traumatic process requiring surgery or further workup and Decedent was to be discharged later that morning. (UMF 4.) At 6:33 a.m., Decedent opened her eyes, answered questions but was drowsy and had pain of 7/10 on the pain scale. (UMF 5.) At 9:49 a.m., Decedent had slurred speech and was unable to open her eyes upon command. When Decedent did wake up, she was too sleepy to drink water as instructed and fell back asleep. (UMF 6.) These findings were discussed with an emergency room physician who reviewed the records and suggested Narcan. (UMF 6.) At 10:15 a.m., a stroke alert was called when Decedent was unable to move the left side of her body, and her NIK stroke scale value was 22, at which point a consultation with Defendant Popalzai, a neurologist, was requested. (UMF 7.) Defendant Popalzai was contacted within 10 minutes and was advised of what had occurred and ordered labs and imaging studies. (UMF 8.) Following another CT scan, Defendant Popalzai concluded Decedent had suffered a stroke, the timing of which was not clear, but may have occurred overnight after Decedent’s arrival. (UMF 10.) Defendant Popalzai directed Decedent to be transferred and admitted to the ICU. (UMF 11.) Popalzai prescribed treatments for Decedent to help stabilize her condition, and continued to monitor Decedent’s condition for a few weeks thereafter until she was discharged. (UMF 12.)

Defendant Popalzai’s expert witness, Dr. Sanossian, is of the opinion that the evidence reflects Popalzai was timely notified regarding Decedent’s stroke, and that his response was appropriate. (UMF 14.) Dr. Sanossian agrees with Popalzai’s assessment that, based on the record, it is unclear when the stroke occurred. (UMF 15.) Dr. Sanossian agrees that Popalzai’s recommended treatment was appropriate given the record. (UMF 18.) Dr. Sanossian further agrees that, to a reasonable degree of medical probability, there was nothing Popalzai did or did not do that caused or contributed to Decedent’s injuries, and that the stroke had already progressed to a point where other interventions, such as a thrombectomy, would not have changed the outcome here. (UMF 19.)

“The elements of Plaintiff's medical negligence cause of action allege ‘(1) the duty of the professional to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as other members of his profession commonly possess and exercise; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a proximate causal connection between the negligent conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage resulting from the professional's negligence.’ [Citation.]” (Belfiore-Braman v. Rotenberg (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 234, 238 fn. 3.) “As in medical malpractice cases, standards of due care and competence are commonly established by the generally accepted practices and procedures within the professional community. [Citations.]” (Milligan v. Hearing Aid Dispensers Examining Com. (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 1002, 1006.)

Defendant Popalzai argues that the expert testimony from Dr. Sanossian establishes there are no triable issues of material fact, as Popalzai met the standard of care and did not cause or contribute to Decedent’s injuries. The Court agrees.

Dr. Sanossian’s expert testimony clearly provides that Popalzai did not breach the applicable standard of care within the relevant professional community, and that Popalzai did not cause or contribute to Decedent’s alleged injuries. (See Sanossian Decl., ¶¶ 2-14; UMF 14-19.) “Expert evidence in a malpractice suit is conclusive as to the proof of the prevailing standard of skill and learning in the locality and of the propriety of particular conduct by the practitioner in particular instances because such standard and skill is not a matter of general knowledge and can only be supplied by expert testimony.” (Willard v. Hagemeister (1981) 121 Cal.App.3d 406, 412, quoting Starr v. Mooslin (1971) 14 Cal.App.3d 988, 999.) The burden of proof now shifts to Plaintiffs to establish the absence of a triable issue of material fact.

Plaintiffs expressly indicated that they do not oppose Defendant Popalzai’s motion for summary judgment. (Notice of Non-opposition, 2:1-8.) Accordingly, Plaintiffs have not established the existence of a triable issue of material fact as to Defendant Popalzai.

Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Defendant Popalzai’s motion for summary judgment.

The Court GRANTS the motion for summary judgment of Defendant Adeel M. Popalzai, D.O.

Defendant Popalzai is ordered to give notice of the Court’s ruling within five calendar days of this order.

[1] The term “Plaintiffs” collectively refers to the plaintiffs of both actions, i.e., Beth Browne, Phillip Browne, Ryan Browne, Chad Browne, and Allan Delabest.