Judge Lynette Gridiron Winston, Case Number: 23PSCV00084, Date: 2023-12-04 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Lynette Gridiron Winston, Case: 23PSCV00084, Date: 2023-12-04 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23PSCV00084 Hearing Date: December 4, 2023 Dept: 6

CASE NAME: John Barrera v. Ford Motor Company, et al.

Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, Costs, and Expenses

TENTATIVE RULING

The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses in the amount of $11,160.30.

Plaintiff is ordered to give notice of the Court’s ruling within five calendar days of this order.

BACKGROUND

This is a Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act case. On January 11, 2023, plaintiff John Barrera (Plaintiff) filed this action against defendants Ford Motor Company (FMC), Puente Hills Ford, and Does 1 through 10, alleging causes of action for violation of subdivision (d) of Civil Code section 1793.2, violation of subdivision (b) of Civil Code section 1793.2, violation of subdivision (a)(3) of Civil Code section 1793.2, breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, fraudulent inducement – concealment, negligent repair, violation of Consumer Legal Remedies Act, and violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.

On August 30, 2023, Plaintiff filed a notice of settlement. On September 5, 2023, Plaintiff filed the instant motion for attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses. On November 17, 2023, FMC opposed the motion. Plaintiff did not file a reply.

LEGAL STANDARD

“If the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney's fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.” (Civ. Code § 1794, subd. (d).)

“A trial court assessing attorney fees begins with a touchstone or lodestar figure, based on the ‘careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney ... involved in the presentation of the case.” (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1321.) “The reasonableness of attorney fees is within the discretion of the trial court, to be determined from a consideration of such factors as the nature of the litigation, the complexity of the issues, the experience and expertise of counsel and the amount of time involved. The court may also consider whether the amount requested is based upon unnecessary or duplicative work.” (Wilkerson v. Sullivan (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 443, 448.)

OBJECTIONS

The Court rules as follows regarding FMC’s evidentiary objections:
- Declaration of Breita Linnell

o SUSTAINED: Objection Nos. 1-5

o OVERRULED: Objection No. 6

- Declaration of Payam Shahian

o SUSTAINED:

o Objection No. 33, but only as to the following language: “As reflected, Approving SLP and associated counsel attorney and law clerk rates ranging from $295 to $595 is reasonable because [t”]his [sic] conclusion is further corroborated by Plaintiffs evidence of multiple other cases in which similar fee awards” and distinguishing both Morris and Mikhaeilpoor because a “large number of attorneys is not on its own reason to reduce a fee award, and both [Morris and Mikhaeilpoor] upheld lodestar reductions based on the ‘duplicative’ and ‘inefficient’ billings that resulted from the number of attorneys employed. (Mikhaeilpoor supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 255; Morris, supra, 4l Cal.App.5th at p. 40.) Here the number of attorneys employed does not indicate a systemic inefficiency of litigation in this matter; it rather appears from the billing records produced that different attorneys were employed to address different aspects of the case, such as drafting the complaint, preparing discovery, responding to a demurrer, and preparing motions to compel. (Shahian Decl. Exh. 31.) have been approved.’) Order at pages 2-3.” OVERRULED in all other respects.

o Objection No. 36, but only as to the following language: “Defendant makes several arguments in support of its contention that Counsel's compensated hours should be significantly reduced including arguing that Counsel should not be compensated for work that was not actually performed. Counsel sought $3,500 for work it anticipated performing on the reply in support of this motion. However, Counsel actually spent a combined 10 hours for a total of $3,830 on its reply, which is less than the $3,500 Plaintiff requests. (Dkt. No. 50-1, ¶¶ 4, 6, 7.) Second, Defendant argued that Plaintiff's motion for fees and costs was a “cookie-cutter template” and that Counsel's fees should be reduced. The Court found that while Counsel may have used some of the language and legal citations from a prior motion, Plaintiff's current motion is not a replica of Counsel's prior motion in a different case filed in a different District. (Compare Dkt. Nos. 41, 42, 43, and 44 with Dkt. No. 48-3.) and that time spent was not excessive amount of time to prepare a motion for fees and its supporting documents. Third, Defendant argued that the Court should reduce Counsel's time entries for inefficient, unnecessary or redundant billing but failed to provide any examples of redundant billing. Instead, Defendant made the same invalid argument that Counsel's “boilerplate” work should be reduced. The Court found that that the time spent hours related to Plaintiff's complaint, opposing the motion to compel arbitration, and Plaintiff's motion to remand were not excessive. Fourth, Defendant also argues that Counsel overstaffed this case based on the number of attorneys who billed time but fails to point to any duplicative work. Fifth, Defendant argued that the Court should deduct time for block billing, without identifying which entries purportedly contained blocks of unspecified tasks. Upon review of Plaintiff's documentation, the Court finds that Counsel did not inappropriately engage in block billing. (Dkt. No. 52, Corrected Ex. 31.) In addition, with the exception of the $900 billed for drafting discovery requests, the Court had reviewed the billing documentation and, combined with all the factors above, found that the hours expended by Counsel were well-documented and reasonable. The Court awarded nearly 100% of Plaintiff’s lodestar.” OVERRULED in all other respects.

o Objection No. 57, in its entirety.

o OVERRULED: Objection Nos. 1-32, 34, 35, 37-56, 58.

REQUESTS FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s requests for judicial notice. (Evid. Code § 452, subd. (d).) However, the Court only takes judicial notice of the foregoing documents as to “the existence, content and authenticity of public records and other specified documents”; it does not take judicial notice of the truth of the factual matters asserted in those documents. (Dominguez v. Bonta (2022) 87 Cal. App. 5th 389, 400.)

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff seeks $21,404.00 in attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses following Plaintiff’s acceptance of a Code of Civil Procedure section 998 Offer (998 Offer). This amount is comprised of $12,282.00 in attorneys’ fees for Plaintiff’s counsel, a multiplier of those attorneys’ fees by 1.35 equaling $4,298.70, $1,323.30 in costs and expenses, and an estimate of $3,500.00 for fees incurred in connection with this motion, including the drafting of the motion, reviewing the opposition, drafting the reply, and appearing at the hearing on the motion. The Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to recover attorneys’ fees and costs here, but in a reduced amount as set forth below.

The Court agrees that Plaintiff is entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs per Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d), since FMC agreed to pay Plaintiff $196,000.00 plus attorneys’ fees and costs per the 998 Offer. (Linnell Decl., Ex. 2, ¶¶ 1-2.) FMC also does not dispute in its opposition that Plaintiff is entitled to recover attorneys’ fees and costs. (See Opp., 2:12-15.)

The Court also finds that the majority of Plaintiff’s legal fees and costs incurred are reasonable, with the exception of the following entries:

· 5/31/23: Prepare for & attend hearing re CMC and POS in LASC Dept L.; prepare hearing outcome memo to the file re same; 1.6 hours by Sanam Vaziri at the hourly rate of $610.00 for a total of $976.00.

· 6/26/23: Draft and finalize P’s opposition to D’s MJOP; 8/20 hours by Jacob Lister at the hourly rate of $495.00 for a total of $4,059.00.

The 5/31/23 entry is block billed, as it combines multiple tasks into one entry and does not specify the amount of time spent within each task. (Shahian Decl., Ex. 17; Jaramillo v. Cnty. of Orange (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 811, 830 [“block billing is not objectionable ‘per se,’ though it certainly does increase the risk that the trial court, in a reasonable exercise of its discretion, will discount a fee request.”]) The Court also finds the amount of time spent in connection with this entry, i.e., 1.6 hours, to be unreasonable since it was all for a Case Management Conference, which generally does not take much time to prepare for or attend. Therefore, the Court reduces the time spent to 1 hour, and awards $610.00 in connection with this entry. The Court otherwise finds FMC’s contentions of block billing to be conclusory and unsupported by the evidence.

The 6/23/23 entry is excessive and unreasonable. The Court agrees that the opposition, other than the specific factual summary, was in large part identical to another opposition Plaintiff’s counsel filed in another action. To spend 8 hours drafting an opposition that was cut and pasted from prior pleadings is excessive. The Court reduces the time spent to 4 hours, and awards $1980.00 in connection with this entry.

With the exception of these 2 entries, the Court otherwise finds the amount of time Plaintiff’s attorneys expended and the hourly rates they claim are reasonable. (See Shahian Decl., Exs. 1-16; see also Howard v. Howard (1956) 141 Cal.App.2d 233, 238 [judge’s knowledge and experience are sufficient for determining the reasonableness of a request for attorneys’ fees, even in the absence of specific evidence on the subject].) Plaintiff’s attorneys are sufficiently experienced and expended reasonable time over a six-month period in preparing and filing the lawsuit, preparing and propounding discovery requests, and successfully opposing a motion for judgment on the pleadings. (Shahian Decl., Ex. 17.)

As for a 1.35 multiplier, the Court does not find that it is warranted here. The factors the Court may consider in determining whether to award a multiplier in the context of a contingency fee case are: “‘(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill displayed in presenting them; (2) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys; [and] (3) the contingent nature of the fee award, both from the point of view of eventual victory on the merits and the point of view of establishing eligibility for an award.’ [Citation.]” (Mikhaeilpoor v. BMW of N. Am., LLC (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 240, 248.)

The Court agrees with FMC that this was not a particularly complex case, there were no novel issues, and Plaintiff’s counsel did not expend a significant amount of time on it. Plaintiff also has not presented any evidence indicating the extent to which Plaintiff’s counsel was precluded from other employment by agreeing to represent Plaintiff in this action. While the Court agrees that Plaintiff’s counsel obtained a strong result for Plaintiff with a settlement of $196,000.00 plus attorneys’ fees and costs compared to the $64,546.20 cost of the subject vehicle, (Id., at p. 247; Linell Decl., Exs. 1-2), this result occurred because FMC made an early 998 Offer, which Plaintiff accepted; it was not necessarily a victory on the merits after protracted litigation. (See Mikhaeilpoor, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 248.)

Finally, the Court declines to award any additional fees incurred in connection with this motion. The billing entries submitted with this motion show that Plaintiff’s counsel already expended 7.1 hours preparing the moving papers here, and this amount was already included in the $12,282.00 requested. (Shahian Decl., Ex. 17, 8/30/23 entry.) Plaintiff requests an additional $3,500.00 to review the opposition, draft a reply, and attend the hearing on the motion. (See Memorandum of Points and Authorities, 3:1-3; Shahian Decl., ¶61.) However, Plaintiff did not file a reply and did not provide any supporting information as to the attendance at the hearing on the motion. Thus, no additional fees will be awarded.

Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses in the amount of $11,160.30, comprised of $9,837.00 in attorneys’ fees and $1,323.30 in costs.

CONCLUSION

The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses in the amount of $11,160.30.

Plaintiff is ordered to give notice of the Court’s ruling within five calendar days of this order.