Plaintiffs Rudemil Valeros and Jocelyn Sicat’s Request for Entry of Default Judgment

Defendant: Bida Home Health, Inc., dba California Health, a California Corporation

Plaintiffs’ request for entry of default judgment is DENIED with prejudice. The Court will hear from Plaintiffs as to why the default should not be set aside and the case dismissed.

This is an unlawful detainer action. Plaintiffs Rudemil Valeros and Jocelyn Sicat (collectively, Plaintiffs) filed this action on January 18, 2023, against Defendant Bida Home Health, Inc., dba California Health, a California Corporation (Defendant) and Does 1 to 10, alleging the sole cause of action for unlawful detainer. On July 7, 2023, default was entered. On August 14, 2023, Plaintiffs submitted documents in support of their request for entry of default judgment. 

Code of Civil Procedure section 585 permits entry of a default judgment after a party has failed to timely respond or appear. (Code Civ. Proc., § 585.) A party seeking judgment on the default by the court must file a Request for Court Judgment, and: (1) a brief summary of the case; (2) declarations or other admissible evidence in support of the judgment requested; (3) interest computations as necessary; (4) a memorandum of costs and disbursements; (5) a proposed form of judgment; (6) a dismissal of all parties against whom judgment is not sought or an application for separate judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 579, supported by a showing of grounds for each judgment; (7) exhibits as necessary; and (8) a request for attorneys’ fees if allowed by statute or by the agreement of the parties. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1800.) 

Plaintiffs seek default judgment against Defendants in the total amount of $57,500.00, including $55,000.00 in damages, $0.00 in interest, $2,500.00 in attorney’s fees, and $798.11 in costs. However, the Court notes there are numerous defects here that render the Court unable to award default judgment to Plaintiffs.

First, Plaintiffs lack standing to bring this action, as the evidence does not show that they are the landlord or otherwise authorized to act on behalf of the landlord here. The lease agreement attached to the operative Complaint (the Lease), which forms the basis of this unlawful detainer action, lists “Carmel Equity and Investments” as the landlord. (Compl., Ex. A, ¶ 1.)  Nowhere in the Lease are the names of Plaintiffs mentioned, nor did the Plaintiffs sign the Lease. (See generally, Compl., Ex. A.)

Second, the principal damage amount listed in the Request for Entry of Default Judgment (Form CIV-100) does not match the principal damage amount listed in the Judgment (Form JUD-100). The Request for Entry of Default Judgment lists $55,500 in principal damages, whereas the Judgment lists $71,100 in principal damages. (See Request for Entry of Default Judgment, ¶ 2, subd. (a); Judgment, ¶ 6, subd. (a)(1).) Even assuming that Plaintiffs were adding the daily rate of $80.00 as requested in the Complaint, (Compl., ¶ 13), Plaintiffs have failed to explain how they calculated the $15,600 difference between $71,100 and $55,500, especially since the Complaint requests the daily rate until entry of judgment.

Third, it is unclear how Plaintiffs determined $80.00 to be the fair rental value of the premises on a per day basis. The Lease provides that the monthly rent is $1500. (Compl., Ex. A, ¶ 3, subd. (a)(1)). The annual rent would then be $18,000 (i.e., $1,500 multiplied by 12). $18,000 divided by 365 is $49.32, which would be the fair market value for the premises on a per day basis. This is a significant disparity between the $80.00 claimed in the Complaint.

Fourth, Plaintiffs seek to recover unpaid rents in excess of 12 months from the date the 3-day notice was served. (Compl., Ex. B.) “A valid three-day pay rent or quit notice is a prerequisite to an unlawful detainer action. [Citations.] Because of the summary nature of an unlawful detainer action, a notice is valid only if the lessor strictly complies with the statutorily mandated notice requirements. [Citation.]” (Foster v. Williams, 229 Cal.App.4th Supp. 9, 14 (quoting Bevill v. Zoura (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 694, 697.)) For unlawful detainer actions, a three-day notice to quit must include "the amount which is due” and it must be served on the tenant within “one year after the rent became due.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1161, subd. 2.) Thus, unpaid rent is limited to the past 12 months before the 3-day notice is served. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1161, subd. (2) [“The notice may be served at any time within one year after the rent becomes due.”]) 

Plaintiffs’ 3-day notice was served on January 6, 2023, but it seeks to recover unpaid rent dating back to January 2020. (Compl., Ex. B.) If a landlord waits over one year to sue for unpaid rent, the landlord is limited to collecting such rent in an ordinary breach of contract action. (Cal-American Income Property Fund IV v. Ho (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 583, 585; Levitz Furniture Co. v. Wingtip Communications, 86 Cal.App.4th 1035, 1042.) A notice that demands rent in excess of the amount due for the preceding year is invalid under section 1161, subdivision 2. (Bevill, supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 697-698.) However, the Court recognizes that "[i]n commercial cases only, if the landlord states that the amount of rent is an estimate under CCP § 1161.1, seeking rent that is more than one year old will not invalidate the notice as long as the estimate is no more than 20 percent above the amount due within the one-year period before service of the notice.” (1 Cal. Landlord-Tenant Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar. 2d ed. Dec. 2002 update) Terminating the Tenancy, § 8.37A, p. 677; see also Levitz Furniture Co., supra, 86 Cal.App.4th at p. 1038-1042.) Here, the three-day notice states that the amount demanded is an estimate. (Compl., Ex. B.) However, even if section 1161.1 does apply, the total amount demanded in the notice was not a reasonable estimate of the amount due for the one-year period immediately preceding the notice. Because the amount demanded in the notice was for three full years of back rent, it far exceeded the amount due for the one year immediately preceding the notice. Thus, the notice is invalid and cannot support a cause of action for unlawful detainer.

Sixth, Plaintiffs are not entitled to recover attorney’s fees in this action. Parties in pro per are generally not entitled to recover attorney’s fees, (Musaelian v. Adams (2009) 45 Cal.4th 512, 517), and this extends to attorneys appearing in pro per, (Leiper v. Gallegos (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 284, 294; Trope v. Katz (1995) 11 Cal.4th 274, 280). Ms. Sicat is both a plaintiff and the attorney of record for the Plaintiffs. (Compl., Caption on p. 1; Id., ¶ 1; Id., attorney signature block, p. 4.) Thus, Ms. Sicat is acting in pro per and is therefore not entitled to recover attorney’s fees. 

Plaintiffs also provided no information as to how they requested $2,500 in attorney’s fees. (See Local Rule 3.214; Civ. Code § 1717.5, (subd. (b).)) All they have provided is an estimate. (Statement of Damages, ¶ 4.) Plaintiff have also failed to identify the source of their entitlement to attorney’s fees here, i.e., by statute or contract. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (a)(10); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1800, subd. (d)(9).)

Finally, Plaintiffs have not dismissed any of the Doe defendants. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1800, subd. (a)(7).)

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs’ request for entry of default judgment is DENIED with prejudice. The Court will hear from Plaintiffs as to why the default should not be set aside and the case dismissed.