Judge Lynette Gridiron Winston, Case Number: 23PSCV00557, Date: 2025-04-09 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Lynette Gridiron Winston, Case: 23PSCV00557, Date: 2025-04-09 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23PSCV00557 Hearing Date: April 9, 2025 Dept: 6

CASE NAME: Melanie Nicole Barber v. Volkswagen Group of America, Inc.

Defendant Volkswagen Group of America, Inc.’s Motion to Enforce the Terms of Defendant’s Accepted Offer to Compromise or in the Alternative Enter Judgment According to the Terms of the Accepted Offer to Compromise

TENTATIVE RULING

The Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion. The Court directs Defendant to submit a proposed judgment of dismissal with prejudice, per Defendant’s Code of Civil Procedure section 998 offer accepted by Plaintiff on June 6, 2024, for the Court’s review and signature.

Defendant is ordered to give notice of the Court’s ruling within five calendar days of this order.

BACKGROUND

This is a lemon law case. On February 24, 2023, Plaintiff Melanie Nicole Barber (Plaintiff) filed this action against Defendant Volkswagen Group of America, Inc. (Defendant) and Does 1 through 10 for Violation of Song-Beverly Act – Breach of Express Warranty, Violation of Song-Beverly Act – Breach of Implied Warranty, and Violation of the Song-Beverly Act Section 1793.2.

On March 14, 2025, Defendant filed a motion to enforce the terms of Defendant’s accepted offer to compromise, or in the alternative to enter judgment according to the terms of the accepted offer to compromise. On March 26, 2025, Plaintiff opposed the motion. On April 2, 2025, Defendant replied.

LEGAL STANDARD

(b) Not less than 10 days prior to commencement of trial or arbitration (as provided in Section 1281 or 1295) of a dispute to be resolved by arbitration, any party may serve an offer in writing upon any other party to the action to allow judgment to be taken or an award to be entered in accordance with the terms and conditions stated at that time. The written offer shall include a statement of the offer, containing the terms and conditions of the judgment or award, and a provision that allows the accepting party to indicate acceptance of the offer by signing a statement that the offer is accepted. Any acceptance of the offer, whether made on the document containing the offer or on a separate document of acceptance, shall be in writing and shall be signed by counsel for the accepting party or, if not represented by counsel, by the accepting party.

(1) If the offer is accepted, the offer with proof of acceptance shall be filed and the clerk or the judge shall enter judgment accordingly. In the case of an arbitration, the offer with proof of acceptance shall be filed with the arbitrator or arbitrators who shall promptly render an award accordingly.

(Code Civ. Proc., § 998, subd. (b)(1).)

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).) But, the Court takes judicial notice only as to the existence, content, and authenticity of such documents; it does not take judicial notice of the truth of the factual matters asserted therein. (Dominguez v. Bonta (2022) 87 Cal.App.5th 389, 400.)

DISCUSSION

Summary of Arguments

Defendant moves for an order to enforce the terms of Defendant’s 998 offer to compromise which Plaintiff accepted on June 6, 2024, or alternatively for the Court to enter judgment per the terms of that offer. Defendant contends its offer to compromise was valid and accepted. Defendant indicates that the 998 offer included, among other things, a principal settlement in the amount of $52,657.50, plus the option for Plaintiff to move for attorney fees within 90 days’ acceptance of the 998 offer or alternatively permitted Defenant to pay $5,000.00 in attorney fees within 120 days’ acceptance of the 998 offer if Plaintiff did not timely move for attorney fees within said 90 days. Defendant contends it has paid the settlement amount to Plaintiff and that Plaintiff did not move for attorney fees within 90 days’ acceptance of the 998 offer, so Defendant then paid the $5,000.00 in attorney fees on approximately January 24, 2025. Defendant contends Plaintiff has been dragging out the resolution of this action unnecessarily in light of the accepted 998 offer. Defendant indicates having filed the accepted 998 offer with the Court, along with a proposed judgment.

In opposition, Plaintiff contends Plaintiff’s motion for attorney fees is timely under California law and the terms of the 998 offer. Plaintiff contends the deadline for filing a motion for attorney fees is tied to the entry of judgment per Rule 3.1702, subdivision (b)(1), of the California Rules of Court, and no judgment has been entered in this case. Plaintiff contends the 998 offer contains no explicit language imposing a forfeiture of attorney fees if Plaintiff does not file within 90 days. Plaintiff contends Defendant unilaterally issued the $5,000.00 check on approximately January 24, 2025, which Plaintiff did not accept. Plaintiff contends other courts have rejected Defendants improper attempts to limit Plaintiff’s entitlement to attorney fees, citing the case of LASC Case Number 24SMCV01178, in which the trial court expressly rejected Defendant’s same argument.

Plaintiff contends the requested attorney fees are reasonable and supported by law. Plaintiff then contends Defendant’s claimed exigency is unsupported and insufficient to justify enforcement. Plaintiff contends to have timely performed all material obligations under the settlement, including surrendering the vehicle on September 6, 2024. Plaintiff contends Defendant has not shown that Plaintiff’s motion for attorney fees has interfered with the finality of settlement, delayed any payments, or caused any judicial inefficiency, and further contends that there is no evidence of prejudice, harm, or delay in performance that would warrant court intervention.

Analysis

“When the language of section 998 does not provide a definitive answer for a particular application of its terms, courts may consult and apply general contract law principles.” (Martinez v. Brownco Constr. Co. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1014, 1020 (Martinez).)

The Court finds Defendant’s arguments persuasive. First, Defendant has filed a copy of the accepted 998 offer signed by Plaintiff’s counsel on June 6, 2024, as is required under Code of Civil Procedure section 998, subdivision (b)(1). (Alegado Decl., Ex. A, p. 11 of pdf; Code Civ. Proc., § 998, subd. (b)(1).) The accepted 998 offer provides for the dismissal of this action with prejudice in exchange for, among other things, Defendant’s payment of the principal settlement amount and a portion of Plaintiff’s attorney fees, the latter of which was to be determined either by a noticed motion for attorney fees made within 90 days’ acceptance of the 998 offer or, if Plaintiff did not file such motion within those 90 days, Defendant only had to pay $5,000.00 as payment in full for Plaintiff’s attorney’s fees and costs, within 120 days’ acceptance of the 998 offer. (Alegado Decl., Ex. A, ¶¶ 1-2, p. 7 of pdf.) Also, a dismissal with prejudice is equivalent to a judgment for purposes of a 998 offer. (Goodstein v. Bank of San Pedro (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 899, 907 [“for purposes of enforcement of settlement agreements, a compromise agreement contemplating payment by defendant and dismissal of the action by plaintiff is the legal equivalent of a judgment in plaintiff's favor”].) The Court further notes that the parties do not dispute the validity of the accepted 998 offer. Thus, the accepted 998 offer is valid and enforceable. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 998, subd. (b) [998 offer must be in writing, state the terms and conditions of the proposed judgment or award, and contain a provision allowing the offeree to accept the offer by signing a statement indicating acceptance].)

Second, with respect to the timeliness of Plaintiff’s motion for attorney fees under Rule 3.1702 of the California Rules of Court, the Court finds this argument beside the point. The issue here is not whether Plaintiff has timely moved for attorney fees as a procedural matter. Rather, the issue is whether to enforce the accepted 998 offer. Plaintiff’s right to attorney fees here is a term of the accepted 998 offer and thus is subject to the Court’s contractual interpretation. (See Martinez, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 120; see also Badie v. Bank of Am. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 799 [“Interpretation of a contract is solely a question of law unless the interpretation turns upon the credibility of extrinsic evidence. [Citation]”].) The accepted 998 offer in this case clearly states that Plaintiff had 90 days from June 6, 2024, to file a noticed motion for the Court to determine the amount of reasonably incurred attorney fees Plaintiff would receive; otherwise, Defendant would only have to pay $5,000.00 within 120 days’ acceptance of the offer. (Alegado Decl., Ex. A, ¶ 2, p. 7 of pdf.) Plaintiff did not move for attorney fees within 90 days of Plaintiff’s acceptance of the 998 offer, and Defendant subsequently paid the alternative $5,000.00. (Alegado Decl., ¶¶ 7-9.) Plaintiff did not present any evidence showing that Defendant failed to perform per the terms of the accepted 998 offer. (See generally, Opp.) Thus, there appears little else to do here except enter a dismissal with prejudice per the terms of the accepted 998 offer. (Alegado Decl., Ex. A, ¶ 7, p. 8 of pdf.)

Third, Plaintiff’s proffered interpretation of the attorney fees provision of the accepted 998 offer would render the 90-day deadline language therein mere surplusage, which is improper. “’We must give significance to every word of a contract, when possible, and avoid an interpretation that renders a word surplusage.’ [Citation.]” (Advanced Network, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1054, 1063.) The accepted 998 offer clearly states that the determination of the amount of Plaintiff’s recovery of attorney fees would be either an amount determined by the Court via noticed motion or $5,000.00 if Plaintiff did not make such motion within 90 days of acceptance of the 998 offer. (Alegado Decl., Ex. A, ¶ 2.) If Plaintiff could seek the full amount of attorney fees any time after the 90-day deadline, then the 90-day deadline would be meaningless.

Finally, the other trial court decision in the unrelated matter of LASC Case Number 24SMCV1178 is not binding on this court. (B.F. v. Superior Ct. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 621, 627 [California trial court decisions are not precedent].) Also, that trial court appears to have rejected the Defendant’s timeliness argument in that case because Defendant cited no authority for it. (Request for Judicial Notice, Ex. 1, p. 5 of pdf.) Defendant’s motion here is based on Code of Civil Procedure section 998 and the parties’ accepted 998 offer. (See Notice of Motion; Code Civ. Proc., § 998, subd. (b); Alegado Decl., Ex. A.) Also, that other matter involved a motion for attorney fees, whereas this is a motion to enforce a 998 offer. There also is no indication that the other matter was decided in the context of a 998 offer. (See Request for Judicial Notice, Ex. 1, p. 5 of pdf.)

Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS the motion.

CONCLUSION

Defendant is ordered to give notice of the Court’s ruling within five calendar days of this order.