Judge: Lynette Gridiron Winston, Case: 23PSCV00694, Date: 2025-04-29 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23PSCV00694    Hearing Date: April 29, 2025    Dept: 6

CASE NAME:  Carmen Neal, individually and as Heir of Ariana Young v. Pomona Valley Hospital Medical Center, et al.  

1.      Defendants Pomona Valley Hospital Medical Center, Erik Olsen, M.D., and Stefan Thomas Reynosa, M.D.’s Motion for Summary Judgment;

3.      Defendant Victoria Shook, M.D.’s Motion for Summary Judgment 

TENTATIVE RULING 

The Court DENIES the motion for summary judgment of Defendants Pomona Valley Hospital Medical Center, also dba Pomona Valley Hospital Health Center Urgent Care-Chino Hills Crossroads, Erik Olsen, M.D., and Stefan Thomas Reynosa, M.D. 

The Court DENIES Defendant Madiha Khurshid, D.O.’s motion for summary judgment. 

The Court DENIES Defendant Victoria Shook, M.D.’s motion for summary judgment. 

BACKGROUND 

This is a medical malpractice/wrongful death action. On March 9, 2023, plaintiff Carmen Neal, individually and as Heir of Ariana Young (Plaintiff) filed this action. On June 5, 2023, Plaintiff filed the operative First Amended Complaint against defendants Pomona Valley Medical Center, also dba Pomona Valley Hospital Health Center Urgent Care-Chino Hills Crossroads (Pomona Valley), Erik Olsen, M.D. (Olsen), Stefan Thomas Reynosa, M.D. (Reynosa), and Does 1 through 100, alleging the sole cause of action for professional negligence. On March 27, 2024, Plaintiff added defendants Victoria Shook, M.D. (Shook), and Madiha Khurshid, D.O. (Khurshid), by Doe amendment. Pomona Valley, Olsen, Reynosa, Shook, and Khurshid may be collectively referred to hereinafter as “Defendants.” 

On December 18, 2024, Pomona Valley, Olsen, and Reynosa (collectively, Moving Parties) moved for summary judgment. On February 18, 2025, Plaintiff opposed the motion. On February 28, 2025, Pomona Valley replied. 

On January 30, 2025, Khurshid moved for summary judgment. On April 4, 2025, Plaintiff opposed the motion. On April 18, 2025, Khurshid replied. 

On January 30, 2025, Shook moved for summary judgment. On April 4, 2025, Plaintiff opposed the motion. On April 18, 2025, Shook replied. 

LEGAL STANDARD 

The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119, italics in original and quoting Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.” (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381-382.) 

“On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.” (Scalf v. D.B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); see also Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.) 

Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff “to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion “shall not rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists but, instead, shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Id.; see also Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.) 

Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.) 

DISCUSSION – Motion for Summary Judgment of Pomona Valley, Khurshid, and Shook 

Summary of Proffered Material Facts 

Plaintiff’s daughter Ariana Young (the Decedent) died on September 1, 2021. (SSF 1.) Plaintiff testified in her deposition that both she and Decedent complained about the care Decedent received at Pomona Valley, the latter of whom felt like the doctors did not know what they were talking about. (SSF 2.) Plaintiff and Decedent discussed these complaints with each other on multiple occasions. (SSF 3.) Plaintiff and Decedent discussed the lack of an ultrasound machine. (SSF 4.) Plaintiff and Decedent discussed the August 22, 2021 emergency room visit and suspected that the care was improper in some way. (SSF 5.) Plaintiff and Decedent discussed the August 26, 2021 visit and suspected that the care was inadequate or improper. (SSF 6.) Plaintiff testified that she was not taking her daughter back to Pomona Valley because she felt the treatment there was subpar. (SSF 7.) Plaintiff was suspicious of the diagnosis of a pulled muscle “from the moment we got it.” (SSF 8.) The emergency room diagnosed the pulled muscle, but the second urgent care visit agreed with the emergency room’s diagnosis. (SSF 9.) Plaintiff wanted to file a lawsuit because she felt Decedent received inadequate treatment according to what Decedent was complaining about and Plaintiff had felt all along. (SSF 10.) Plaintiff filed this suit on March 9, 2023, more than one year after Decedent’s death. (SSF 11.) 

Analysis 

“In an action for injury or death against a health care provider based upon such person's alleged professional negligence, the time for the commencement of action shall be three years after the date of injury or one year after the plaintiff discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury, whichever occurs first.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 340.5.) “For purposes of the one-year period, discovery of the injury means the plaintiff has discovered ‘both his or her injury and its negligent cause.’ [Citation.] The plaintiff ‘need not be aware of either the specific facts or the actual negligent cause of the injury. [Citation.] If the plaintiff has notice or information of circumstances that would put a reasonable person on inquiry notice, the limitation period is activated.’ [Citation.]” (Filosa v. Alagappan (2020) 59 Cal.App.5th 772, 779 (Filosa).) “Generally, statute of limitations issues raise questions of fact that must be tried, however, when the uncontradicted facts are susceptible of only one legitimate inference, summary judgment is proper. [Citation.]” (Kline v. Turner (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1369, 1374.) 

Moving Parties contend Plaintiff’s action is barred by the one-year statute of limitations under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5. Moving Parties contend that a medical malpractice/wrongful death action accrues on the date of death, and that Plaintiff filed this action on March 9, 2023, more than one year after Decedent’s death on September 1, 2021. Moving Parties contend that the statute of limitations begins running once the plaintiff has notice of information to put a reasonable person on inquiry, and that suspicions is sufficient to trigger the running of the statute of limitations. Moving Parties cite to multiple excerpts from Plaintiff’s deposition transcript regarding her thoughts and concerns about the treatment Decedent received at Pomona Valley in August 2021 shortly before Decedent died, such as:   

·         Decedent feeling like the Defendants did not know what they were talking about;

·         Conversations between Plaintiff and Decedent regarding the inadequacy of the treatment provided;

·         Plaintiff not taking Decedent back to Pomona Valley because she felt the treatment was subpar;

·         Plaintiff’s suspicion of the pulled muscle diagnosis “from the moment we got it”; and

·         Plaintiff testifying that she was suspicious the Defendants’ conduct was improper and including the date of Decedent’s death. 

In opposition, Plaintiff contends that Moving Parties omitted key portions of Plaintiff’s deposition testimony, and that the evidence undermines the Moving Parties’ basis for the motion. Plaintiff contends a cause of action accrues in a medical malpractice action when the injured patient discovers the injury and its negligent cause. Plaintiff contends Moving Parties omitted relevant evidence that shows the complaint was timely filed. Plaintiff contends Moving Parties cherry picked portions of Plaintiff’s deposition and that those portions do not conclusively show that Plaintiff was aware of the injury and negligent cause more than a year before she filed suit. Plaintiff contends Moving Parties fail to provide evidence showing that Plaintiff knew any fact that should have led her to suspect the Moving Parties’ negligence was the cause of Decedent’s death. Plaintiff contends Moving Parties are improperly attempting to blame Plaintiff, a non-medically trained person, for failure to file the claim before she knew what caused Decedent’s death when Moving Parties claim they do not know the cause of Decedent’s death or claim that they did not cause it. 

The Court finds Moving Parties failed to establish the absence of a triable issue of material fact here. While there is no dispute that Decedent died on September 1, 2021, or that Plaintiff filed this action on March 9, 2023, the Court finds Moving Parties have failed to demonstrate the absence of a triable issue of material fact on the issue of Plaintiff’s suspicion. (SSF 1, 11.) 

“For purposes of the one-year period, discovery of the injury means the plaintiff has discovered ‘both his or her injury and its negligent cause.’” (Filosa, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 779.) Moving Parties failed to establish the absence of a triable issue of material fact as to when Plaintiff discovered her daughter’s injury and its negligent cause. The plaintiff must be aware of the injury, its factual cause, and sufficient facts to put her on inquiry notice of a negligent cause. (Clark v. Baxter Healthcare Corp. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1048, 1057.) Even when there is an appreciable manifestation of harm, that harm may not necessarily cause any reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing. (Id. at p. 1059-1060.) It cannot be determined as a matter of law that Plaintiff had reason to suspect her daughter’s death was caused by wrongdoing. There is a triable issue of material fact as to whether Plaintiff had sufficient facts to put her on inquiry notice of a negligent cause of her daughter’s death more than one year before this action was filed. 

For Separate Statement of Material Fact Number 2, Moving Parties state that Plaintiff testified she and Decedent complained about the care Decedent received, the latter of whom felt like the doctors did not know what they were talking about. (SSF 2.) But, Plaintiff has presented evidence that she testified her concerns and suspicions had more to do with the manner in which Moving Parties provided care to Decedent before she died. More specifically, Plaintiff stated that she felt the treatment Decedent received at the emergency department was rushed, and that she had concerns about the attitude or demeanor of the doctor. (Neal Decl., ¶ 11; Index of Evidence in Support of Plaintiff’s Opposition, Ex. B, Plaintiff’s Depo. Trans., 54:19-55:6.) 

Moreover, simply because Plaintiff had suspicions about Decedent’s death and Moving Parties’ diagnosis of a pulled muscle does not necessarily mean she had suspicion that the diagnosis is what caused Decedent’s death. (See SSF 8.) Plaintiff presented evidence of her testifying that although she had some suspicions about the diagnosis provided, Plaintiff still ultimately deferred to the doctor because he was the expert. (Index of Evidence in Support of Plaintiff’s Opposition, Ex. B, Plaintiff’s Depo. Trans., 54:19-55:6.) 

Plaintiff contends that she did not discover her daughter’s injury until the coroner declared the cause of death, at which time she suspected that Defendants’ negligence caused her daughter’s death. (Opp. SSF 16, 17, 18.) Moving Parties evidence that Plaintiff and her daughter complained about being rushed during the examination and questioning the diagnosis are insufficient to meet their burden. (SSF 5-8.) These facts are not sufficient, as a matter of law, to establish that Plaintiff had reason to suspect a factual basis for a cause of action or that she had notice or information of circumstances to put a reasonable person on inquiry at the time of her daughter’s death. Plaintiff contends she did not know the cause of her daughter’s death, nor did the coroner, until the final death certificate was issued in March 2022. (Opp. SSF 11-18.) Thus, there is a triable issue of fact as to whether Plaintiff’s suspicions were linked to the appreciable harm of Decedent’s death and whether Decedent’s death had reason to cause any suspicion of wrongdoing. 

Accordingly, the Court DENIES Moving Parties’ motion for summary judgment. 

DISCUSSION – Khurshid’s Motion for Summary Judgment 

            Summary of Proffered Material Facts 

Khurshid’s proffered material facts are identical to those proffered above with respect to the motion for summary judgment of Pomona Valley, Olsen, and Reynosa. 

            Analysis 

            Khurshid’s motion for summary judgment is virtually identical to the motion for summary judgment of Pomona Valley, Olsen, and Reynosa. Plaintiff’s opposition to Khurshid’s motion is the substantially similar to Plaintiff’s opposition to Pomona Valley, Olsen, and Reynosa’s motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, for the same reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES Khurshid’s motion for summary judgment. 

DISCUSSION – Shook’s Motion for Summary Judgment 

            Summary of Proffered Material Facts 

Shook’s proffered material facts are identical to those proffered above with respect to the motions for summary judgment of Pomona Valley, Olsen, and Reynosa on the one hand and Khurshid on the other. 

            Analysis 

            Shook’s motion for summary judgment is identical to Khurshid’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff’s opposition to Khurshid’s motion is the same opposition to Shook’s motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, for the same reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES Shook’s motion for summary judgment. 

CONCLUSION 

The Court DENIES the motion for summary judgment of Defendants Pomona Valley Hospital Medical Center, also dba Pomona Valley Hospital Health Center Urgent Care-Chino Hills Crossroads, Erik Olsen, M.D., and Stefan Thomas Reynosa, M.D. 

The Court DENIES Defendant Madiha Khurshid, D.O.’s motion for summary judgment. 

The Court DENIES Defendant Victoria Shook, M.D.’s motion for summary judgment.