Judge Lynette Gridiron Winston, Case Number: 23PSCV01096, Date: 2023-12-18 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Lynette Gridiron Winston, Case: 23PSCV01096, Date: 2023-12-18 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23PSCV01096 Hearing Date: January 3, 2024 Dept: 6

CASE NAME: Feng Ning v. Juan Hernandez, et al.

Motion for Leave to Intervene

TENTATIVE RULING

The Court GRANTS the motion to for leave to intervene but interprets such motion as seeking to intervene in resisting the claims of plaintiff, and not seeking to file an affirmative action. As such, Infinity Insurance Company is ordered to separately file and serve an Answer-In-Intervention within 10 calendar days of this order. The Court notes that although the document submitted with the motion is entitled proposed “Complaint-In-Intervention” it is actually an “Answer-In-Intervention” and should be titled appropriately as such.

Moving party is ordered to give notice of the Court’s ruling within five calendar days of this order.

BACKGROUND

This is an auto accident case. On April 14, 2023, plaintiff Feng Ning (Plaintiff) filed this action against defendants Juan Hernandez, Armando Sanchez, Sumbale Trucks LLC (Sumbale) (collectively, Defendants) and Does 1 to 50, alleging causes of action for motor vehicle and general negligence.

On November 27, 2023, Infinity Insurance Company (Infinity) filed a motion for leave to intervene. On December 15, 2023, Plaintiff opposed the motion. No reply was filed.

LEGAL STANDARD

“An intervention takes place when a nonparty, deemed an intervenor, becomes a party to an action or proceeding between other persons by doing any of the following:… (2) Uniting with a defendant in resisting the claims of a plaintiff.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 387, subd. (b)(2).) To intervene in an action, “[a] nonparty shall petition the court for leave to intervene by noticed motion or ex parte application.” (Id. § 387, subd. (c).)

A nonparty must be permitted to intervene if either of the following conditions are satisfied: (1) a provision of law confers an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) the person seeking intervention claims an interest related to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action and that person is so situated that the disposition of the action may impair or impede that person’s ability to protect that interest, unless that person’s interest is adequately represented by one or more of the existing parties. (Code Civ. Proc., § 387, subd. (d)(1)(A)-(B).) A court has discretionary authority to allow a nonparty to intervene “if the person shas an interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both.” (Id. § 387, subd. (d)(2).)

DISCUSSION

“Pursuant to section 387 the trial court has discretion to permit a nonparty to intervene where the following factors are met: (1) the proper procedures have been followed; (2) the nonparty has a direct and immediate interest in the action; (3) the intervention will not enlarge the issues in the litigation; and (4) the reasons for the intervention outweigh any opposition by the parties presently in the action. [Citation.]” (Reliance Ins. Co. v. Superior Ct. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 383, 386.) When a nonparty insurer intervenes, the nonparty insurer is deemed to not enlarge the issues in the case since the insurer will almost certainly assert the same defenses as its insured. (Id. at p. 388.)

“An insurer’s right to intervene in an action against the insured, for personal injury or property damage, arises as a result of Insurance Code section 11580. Section 11580 provides that a judgment creditor may proceed directly against any liability insurance covering the defendant, and obtain satisfaction of the judgment up to the amount of the policy limits. [Citation.] Thus, where the insurer may be subject to a direct action under Insurance Code section 11580 by a judgment creditor who has or will obtain a default judgment in a third party action against the insured, intervention is appropriate. [Citation.] The insurer may either intervene in that action prior to judgment or move under Code of Civil Procedure section 473 to set aside the default judgment. [Citation.] Where an insurer has failed to intervene in the underlying action or to move to set aside the default judgment, the insurer is bound by the default judgment.”

Here, Infinity seeks to intervene on the basis that, despite exhaustive efforts, it has been unable to establish or maintain meaningful contact with its insured Defendants or obtain their cooperation. (Moncayo Decl., ¶¶ 12-54.) Infinity indicates that it is Defendants’ insurer in this action. (Moncayo Decl., ¶ 7.) Infinity contends it has satisfied the requirements for intervention because: (1) it has a direct and immediate interest in the litigation as Defendants’ insurer and Defendants’ inability or unwillingness to participate has a direct effect on the amount Infinity may have to pay under the policy; (2) intervention will not enlarge the issues raised by the original parties because the fundamental nature of a personal injury action arising from a motor vehicle accident will remain the same, even after intervention and Infinity will assert the same defenses which would have been asserted by Defendants; and (3) intervention will not tread on the rights of the original parties because Infinity seeks to resolve the claims asserted against Defendants and Infinity will simply proceed with Infinity acting in the stead of Defendants and thereby promote the interests of all parties involved. Infinity further contends that intervention is timely.

In opposition, Plaintiff contends this is a permissive intervention, not mandatory, and the Court should exercise its discretion against permitting intervention here. Plaintiff contends that Infinity’s claim of being unable to locate Defendants is false since Infinity is a billion-dollar corporation and Plaintiff’s counsel was easily able to locate Defendants’ address, phone number, and social media pages. Plaintiff contends intervention will enlarge the issues of the case because it would prevent Plaintiff from conducting meaningful discovery as Infinity has no independent knowledge of the issues of the case since Infinity cannot communicate with Defendants. Plaintiff further contends that intervention will permit Infinity to take advantage of Defendants’ absence and thereby inhibit any meaningful discovery. Plaintiff further contends Infinity cannot show how the reasons for intervention outweigh the right of Defendants to conduct their own defense.

The Court agrees with Infinity and will grant Infinity leave to file the proposed Complaint-in-Intervention. The evidence shows that counsel for Infinity expended extensive efforts in attempting to locate and communicate with Defendants, but to no avail. Plaintiff’s argument of supposedly having located Defendants is not supported by any evidence submitted in opposition. (See generally, Shirazi Decl.) Plaintiff does not dispute that Infinity is Defendants’ insurer or that Infinity is potentially liable for Defendants’ conduct in this action. (Holden v. City of San Diego (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 404, 418; C. Opposing the Motion—and Rebutting the Opposition, Cal. Prac. Guide Civ. Pro. Before Trial Ch. 9(I)-C, ¶ 9:105.10.) Plaintiff also has not provided any legal authority to support Plaintiff’s contention that Defendants’ absence constitutes an enlargement of the issues. Plaintiff’s arguments in general here are conclusory, speculative, and largely devoid of any citations to legal authority. Defendants’ absence leaves Infinity no other means to protect itself in this action. The Court finds this threat of potential liability to Infinity outweighs Plaintiff’s opposition to intervention. Infinity otherwise appears to have followed the proper procedures in bringing this motion as well. The Court notes that although the document submitted with the motion is entitled proposed “Complaint-In-Intervention” it is actually an “Answer-In-Intervention” and should be titled appropriately as such.

Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS the motion for leave to intervene.

CONCLUSION

Moving party is ordered to give notice of the Court’s ruling within five calendar days of this order.