Judge: Lynette Gridiron Winston, Case: 23PSCV01314, Date: 2024-03-12 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23PSCV01314    Hearing Date: March 12, 2024    Dept: 6

CASE NAME:  Fernando Castillo v. T-Mobile US, Inc. 

Defendant T-Mobile USA, Inc.’s Motion to Strike Plaintiff Fernando Castillo’s Prayer for Punitive Damages 

TENTATIVE RULING 

The Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to strike Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages with 20 days leave to amend.  

              Defendant is ordered to give notice of the Court’s ruling within five calendar days of this order. 

BACKGROUND 

This is a products liability action. On May 1, 2023, plaintiff Fernando Castillo (Plaintiff) filed this action against defendant T-Mobile USA, Inc. (erroneously sued as T-Mobile US, Inc.) (Defendant) and Does 1 to 20, alleging causes of action for negligent products liability, strict products liability, breach of warranty, and negligence (general). 

On February 5, 2024, Defendant filed a motion to strike Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages. The motion is unopposed. 

LEGAL STANDARD 

            “Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof, but this time limitation shall not apply to motions specified in subdivision (e).” (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(2).) “The court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (b) Strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” (Id., § 436.) 

DISCUSSION 

Meet and Confer 

            Per Code of Civil Procedure section 435.5, subdivision (a)(1), Defendant was required to meet and confer telephonically or in person with Plaintiff before bringing this motion to strike. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435.5, subd. (a)(1).) The Court finds Defendant’s meet-and-confer efforts sufficient. (Robinson Decl., ¶¶ 3-6.) 

Analysis                     

“In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) 

            Defendant seeks to strike Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages in the complaint on the grounds that: (1) Plaintiff’s complaint does allege any facts indicating fraud, malice, or oppression by Defendant; and (2) Plaintiff fails to allege that the wrongful act giving rise to punitive damages was committed by an officer, director, or managing agent of Defendant. The Court will address each of these arguments in turn. 

            Insufficient Facts Alleged 

“While punitive damages may be recovered in a products liability case [citation] and in a negligence action [citation], in order to justify an award of punitive damages on the basis of a conscious disregard of the safety of others, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant was aware of the probable dangerous consequences of its conduct and that it wilfully [sic] and deliberately failed to avoid those consequences. [Citation.]” (Hilliard v. A. H. Robins Co. (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 374, 395, italics in original.) 

Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s complaint is devoid of any factual allegations of intentional conduct by Defendant or allegations showing oppression, fraud, or malice. Defendant contends the complaint does not allege that Defendant acted to suppress any knowledge regarding the unsafe nature of the cellular device at issue, and that there are no allegations this type of failure has occurred in any other devices from Defendant or that they caused injury to other customers. 

The Court agrees that the complaint fails to allege sufficient facts demonstrating fraud, oppression, or malice. The extent of any wrongful conduct on Defendant’s part is the allegation that Defendant issued a recall of the cellular device at issue in approximately 2017, which predates Plaintiff’s alleged injuries by approximately four years. (See Compl., ¶¶ 11, 13.) While these allegations demonstrate that Defendant was ostensibly aware of the dangerous nature of these devices before Plaintiff’s injury, they also demonstrate that Defendant undertook some effort to take them off the market by issuing a recall. (See Id.) The Court does not find these allegations demonstrate a deliberate failure to prevent the dangerous consequences of the cellular device at issue. (Hilliard, supra, 148 Cal.App.3d at p. 395.) The Court otherwise finds the complaint lacks any allegations evidencing fraud, oppression, or malice, and therefore does not support a claim for punitive damages. (See Turman v. Turning Point of Central California, Inc. (191 Cal.App.4th 53, 64 [claim for punitive damages subject to motion to strike where allegations do not rise to the level of fraud, oppression, or malice necessary under Civil Code section 3294.]) 

Additionally, the Court construes Plaintiff’s lack of opposition to this motion as a tacit admission that Defendant’s argument is correct here. (Holden v. City of San Diego (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 404, 418; C. Opposing the Motion—and Rebutting the Opposition, Cal. Prac. Guide Civ. Pro. Before Trial Ch. 9(I)-C, ¶ 9:105.10.) 

Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to strike Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages with leave to amend. 

            No Allegations of Acts Committed by Officer, Director, or Managing Agent 

An employer shall not be liable for damages pursuant to subdivision (a), based upon acts of an employee of the employer, unless the employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. With respect to a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation. 

(Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (b).) 

            Defendant further argues that the complaint contains no allegations showing that an officer, director, or managing agent of Defendant acted with malice, oppression, or fraud to support a claim for punitive damages, citing White v. Ultramar, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.App.4th 563. The Court finds this argument to be incorrect and unpersuasive. 

Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (b), limits liability of corporate employers for the acts of their employees. (See Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (b); White, supra, 21 Cal.App.4th at p. 573 [“The drafters' goals were to avoid imposing punitive damages on employers who were merely negligent or reckless and to distinguish ordinary respondeat superior liability from corporate liability for punitive damages.”]) Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (b), is irrelevant here because Plaintiff is not alleging liability against Defendant for actions undertaken by an employee or employees of Defendant. (See generally, Compl.) 

Accordingly, the Court DENIES the motion to strike Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages on these grounds. 

CONCLUSION 

The Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to strike Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages with 20 days leave to amend. 

              Defendant is ordered to give notice of the Court’s ruling within five calendar days of this order.