Judge: Lynette Gridiron Winston, Case: 23PSCV01391, Date: 2024-04-12 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23PSCV01391    Hearing Date: April 12, 2024    Dept: 6

Plaintiff Ruby Cortez Serrato’s Request for Entry of Default Judgment 

Defendant: Xiangdan Cui 

TENTATIVE RULING

            Plaintiff’s request for entry of default judgment is DENIED without prejudice.           

BACKGROUND

            This is a personal injury action. On May 8, 2023, plaintiff Ruby Cortez Serrato (Plaintiff) filed this action against defendant Xiangdan Cui (Defendant) and Does 1 to 50, alleging causes of action for motor vehicle and general negligence. On October 12, 2023, default was entered against Defendant. On March 4, 2024, Plaintiff filed a request for entry of default judgment.[1]           

LEGAL STANDARD

Code of Civil Procedure section 585 permits entry of a default judgment after a party has failed to timely respond or appear. (Code Civ. Proc., § 585.) A party seeking judgment on the default by the court must file a Request for Court Judgment, and: (1) a brief summary of the case; (2) declarations or other admissible evidence in support of the judgment requested; (3) interest computations as necessary; (4) a memorandum of costs and disbursements; (5) a proposed form of judgment; (6) a dismissal of all parties against whom judgment is not sought or an application for separate judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 579, supported by a showing of grounds for each judgment; (7) exhibits as necessary; and (8) a request for attorneys’ fees if allowed by statute or by the agreement of the parties. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1800.) 

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff seeks default judgment against Defendant in the total amount of $350,539.67, including $48,602.13 in special damages, $286,000 in general damages, $13,462.12 in interest, $0.00 in attorney fees, and $2,475.42 in costs. The Court finds multiple defects in this default judgment package. First, Plaintiff served the Statement of Damages on October 12, 2023, which is the same day Plaintiff served the request for entry of default. (Request for Entry of Default (10/12/23); Statement of Damages (10/12/23).) This was too soon, and default should not have been entered. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 425.11; Plotitsa v. Superior Court (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 755, 761 [default cannot be entered until 30 days after service of Statement of Damages]; Twine v. Compton Supermarket (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 514, 517 [following Plotitsa, the Court stated: “the plaintiff must personally serve a defendant, who has not appeared, with the statement of damages and defer entry of default until 30 days from such service so that defendant can file a responsive pleading.”]. It is also unclear if Plaintiff’s service of the Statement of Damages by mail was sufficient to satisfy the requirement that it be served in the same manner as a summons. (See Statement of Damages (10/12/23); Code Civ. Proc., § 415.11, subd. (d)(1); California Novelties, Inc. v. Sokoloff (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 936, 942 [finding 17 days’ service by mail of statement of damages was sufficient]; but see Schwab v. Southern California Gas Co. (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1322 fn. 11, disapproved on other grounds by Sass v. Cohen (2020) 10 Cal.5th 861 [noting that California Novelties was decided before Code Civ. Proc., § 415.11, subd. (d)(1), was amended in 1993 to require formal notice].) 

Second, the proof of service attached to the Statement of Damages did not attach the signed return receipt or provide other evidence of actual delivery. (See Statement of Damages (10/12/23); Code Civ. Proc., § 415.40.) More importantly, service by certified mail return receipt requested applies to service on persons outside of the state, not to persons inside the state like Defendant. (See Statement of Damages (10/12/23); Code Civ. Proc., § 415.40.) Such service is also incomplete until 10 days after mailing, which is problematic because Plaintiff filed the request for entry of default the same day Plaintiff served the Statement of Damages by certified mail return receipt requested. (See Statement of Damages (10/12/23); Code Civ. Proc., § 415.40.)

Third, Plaintiff did not complete the declaration of nonmilitary status for the request for entry of default judgment. (Form CIV-100, ¶ 8; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1800, subd. (a)(5).) Fourth, Plaintiff requests prejudgment interest but such was not sought in the Complaint or Statement of Damages. Thus, such prejudgment interest cannot be awarded in a default judgment. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 580(a) [The relief granted to the plaintiff, if there is no answer, cannot exceed that demanded in the complaint, in the statement required by Section 425.11….”].) “The courts have consistently held section 580 is an unqualified limit on the jurisdiction of courts entering default judgments. As a general rule, a default judgment is limited to the damages of which the defendant had notice. Further, the courts have reaffirmed the language of section 580 is mandatory. Therefore, ‘in all default judgments the demand sets a ceiling on recovery.’” (Finney v. Gomez (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 527, 534 [3 Cal. Rptr. 3d 604], fns. omitted, quoting Greenup v. Rodman (1986) 42 Cal.3d 822, 824 [231 Cal. Rptr. 220, 726 P.2d 1295].) Further, Plaintiff fails to city any authority supporting prejudgment interest for unpaid medical bills in a personal injury action. Fifth, Plaintiff requests conflicting amounts for costs. Paragraph 2, subdivision (c), of Form CIV-100 indicates $2,474.52 in costs, whereas paragraph 7, subdivision (e), indicates costs in the amount of $717.44. Sixth, the proposed judgment is submitted on the wrong form. Plaintiff’s proposed judgment is submitted on Form JUD-110, which is for judgments in unlawful detainer cases. (See Form JUD-110.) 

Finally, Plaintiff’s damage calculations are problematic. Plaintiff claims a number of charges incurred in connection with the underlying accident, such as $26.13 from Lambert Radiology Medical Group and $13,995.00 from Radiance Surgery Center, but it is unclear where the supporting documentation is for those amounts. (See Serrato Decl., ¶ 26.) Even assuming Plaintiff’s special damages calculations are correct, Plaintiff’s general damage calculations are almost six times the amount of Plaintiff’s purported special damages, which the Court finds to be excessive. 

CONCLUSION

              Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s request for entry of default judgment is DENIED without prejudice.