Judge Lynette Gridiron Winston, Case Number: 23PSCV02478, Date: 2024-06-12 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Lynette Gridiron Winston, Case: 23PSCV02478, Date: 2024-06-12 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiff’s request for entry of default judgment is DENIED without prejudice.

This is a breach of contract case. On August 14, 2023, plaintiff Regions Bank, an Alabama State Bank and successor by merger of Ascentium Capital, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company (Plaintiff), filed this action against defendants Signalia, LLC, Kristhopper Marroquin aka Kristhopper Marroquin Perez (Defendant), and Does 1 through 20, alleging causes of action for breach of equipment finance agreement, breach of guaranty, and conversion. On February 13, 2024, Plaintiff dismissed Signalia, LLC. On June 5, 2024, Plaintiff dismissed the cause of action for conversion, in addition to dismissing the Doe Defendants.[1]

Code of Civil Procedure section 585 permits entry of a default judgment after a party has failed to timely respond or appear. (Code Civ. Proc., § 585.) A party seeking judgment on the default by the court must file a Request for Court Judgment, and: (1) a brief summary of the case; (2) declarations or other admissible evidence in support of the judgment requested; (3) interest computations as necessary; (4) a memorandum of costs and disbursements; (5) declaration of nonmilitary status; (6) a proposed form of judgment; (7) a dismissal of all parties against whom judgment is not sought or an application for separate judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 579, supported by a showing of grounds for each judgment; (8) exhibits as necessary; and (9) a request for attorneys’ fees if allowed by statute or by the agreement of the parties. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1800.)

Plaintiff seeks default judgment against Defendant in the total amount of $186,273.15, including $172,418.30 in principal damages, $2,685.90 in special damages, $9,278.05 in attorney fees, and $ 1,890.00 in costs. The Court finds multiple problems with the default judgment package. First, the request for entry of default judgment submitted on Form CIV-100 misspells Defendant’s last name as “Perezi” instead of “Perez.” (Request for Entry of Default Judgment, ¶ 1, subd. (d).) This might also explain why the clerk’s office indicated “there is no default request” and ticked the box indicating “Default NOT entered as requested…” (Id., p. 1.)

Second, the damage amounts seem to conflict with each other across all of the submitted documentation. For example, the request for entry of default judgment indicates $172,418.30 in principal damages, whereas the proposed judgment indicates $172,568.30. (Request for Entry of Default Judgment, ¶ 2, subd. (a); Proposed Judgment, 2:4.)

Third, the declaration of Jerry Noon indicates a Site Inspection, Title Fee, and Documentation Fee of $920.00, but the proposed judgment indicates $770.00 for those fees. (Noon Decl., ¶ 15; Proposed Judgment, 2:6.) The complaint also only indicates $770.00 for those fees. (Compl., ¶ 15; Id., Prayer for Relief, 6:25-26.)

Fourth, it is not entirely clear how Plaintiff calculated the principal amount due. The notice of default and acceleration served on Defendant indicates a total of $182,801.69, but Mr. Noon’s declaration says the total due is $184,023.91. (Noon Decl., ¶ 13, Ex. 5.) Plaintiff’s ledger and payment history also shows a then-current balance of $189,948.91 on February 7, 2023, which is the amount that matches the demand in the complaint. (Id., Ex. 6; Compl., Prayer for Relief, 6:19-21.)

Fifth, Plaintiff’s requested attorney’s fees exceeds the amount permitted under Local Rule 3.214. The way this rule works is for Plaintiff to look at the principal amount sought, subtract the applicable amount, e.g. $100,000.00 from any damages exceeding $100,000.00, multiply the remaining amount by the applicable percentage, and then add the remaining flat fee portion. (See Local Rule 3.214.) Plaintiff’s calculation does not follow this formula, but instead incorrectly segments each portion of the total damages sought and applies the formula to each portion, and essentially compounds the total fees. (Noon Decl., ¶ 24.) It is also unclear to the Court if Plaintiff is even entitled to collect attorney’s fees against Defendant, since the guaranty does not expressly mention attorney’s fees. (Noon Decl., Ex. 2, p. 2.)

Finally, the Court finds the costs requested excessive. Plaintiff provides no explanation for $1,455.90 in process server fees. (Request for Entry of Default Judgment, ¶ 7, subd. (b).) The Court finds it extremely unlikely that Plaintiff could incur that much in process server fees in the span of nine days from the date the complaint was filed on August 14, 2023, until it was personally served on Defendant on August 23, 2023. (Proof of Service (8/23/23); see generally, Compl.) In fact, this amount appears to be contradicted by the proof of service, which only indicates process server fees in the amount of $157.80. (Proof of Service (8/23/23), ¶ 7, subd. (d).)

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s request for entry of default judgment is DENIED without prejudice.

[1] The request for dismissal indicates it is as to the “Fourth Cause of Action for Conversion,” (Request for Dismissal (6/5/24)), but there is no Fourth Cause of Action in the complaint, (see generally, Compl.). The Court infers that Plaintiff meant the Third Cause of Action for conversion.