Judge: Lynette Gridiron Winston, Case: 23PSCV03064, Date: 2025-03-11 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23PSCV03064    Hearing Date: March 11, 2025    Dept: 6

CASE NAME:  Yuzheng Chen v. Longji Guan, et al.

1.      Demurrer of Defendants Longji Guan and Xiuhua Liang to Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint; and

2.      Defendants Longji Guan and Xiuhua Liang's Motion to Strike 

TENTATIVE RULING 

The Court SUSTAINS the demurrer of Defendants Longji Guan and Xiuhua Liang to Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint without leave to amend. 

            The Court DENIES Defendants Longji Guan and Xiuhua Liang’s motion to strike as moot. 

            The Court directs Defendants Longji Guan and Xiuhua Liang to submit a proposed judgment of dismissal for the Court’s review and signature within five calendar days of this order. 

            Defendants Longji Guan and Xiuhua Liang are ordered to give notice of the Court’s ruling within five calendar days of this order. 

BACKGROUND 

This is a rental dispute. On October 6, 2023, plaintiff Yuzheng Chen (Plaintiff) filed this action against defendants Longji Guan (Longji), Xiuhua Liang (Xiuhua), Bingwei Guan, Yudan Li (collectively, Defendants), and Does 1 through 4, alleging one cause of action for breach of contract. 

On March 11, 2024, following the Court’s sustaining of Defendants Guan and Li’s demurrer to the complaint, Plaintiff filed the First Amended Complaint (FAC) against Defendants, alleging one cause of action for breach of contract. On May 7, 2024, the Court sustained the demurrer of Defendants Bingwei Guan and Yudan Li to the FAC without leave to amend and dismissed them from this action with prejudice. (Minute Order (Nunc Pro Tunc Order) 7/31/24; Minute Order 5/7/24.) On August 5, 2024, the Court sustained the demurrer of Longji and Xiuhua to the FAC with 20 days’ leave to amend, and denied the motion to strike as moot. 

On January 6, 2025, Plaintiff filed the operative Second Amended Complaint (SAC) against Defendants Longji Guan, Xiuhua Liang, Bingwei Guan, and Yudan Li, alleging causes of action for contract fraud, fraudulent conduct, and unlawful detainer. 

On February 5, 2025, Longji and Xiuhua (collectively, Moving Parties) demurred to and moved to strike the SAC. The motions are unopposed. 

LEGAL STANDARD – Demurrer 

            A demurrer is a pleading used to test the legal sufficiency of other pleadings. It raises issues of law, not fact, regarding the form or content of the opposing party's pleading (complaint, answer or cross-complaint). (Code Civ. Proc., § 422.10; see Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994 (Donabedian).) It is not the function of the demurrer to challenge the truthfulness of the complaint; and for purposes of ruling on the demurrer, all facts pleaded in the complaint are assumed to be true. (Id. at pp. 993-994.) 

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at p. 994.) No other extrinsic evidence can be considered. (Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881 [error for court to consider facts asserted in memorandum supporting demurrer]; see also Afuso v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 859, 862, disapproved on other grounds in Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Cos. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 287 [error to consider contents of release not part of court record].) 

A demurrer can be utilized where the “face of the complaint” itself is incomplete or discloses some defense that would bar recovery. (Guardian North Bay, Inc. v. Superior Court (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 963, 971-972.) The “face of the complaint” includes material contained in attached exhibits that are incorporated by reference into the complaint, or in a superseded complaint in the same action. (Frantz v. Blackwell (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 91, 94; see also Barnett v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 500, 505 [“[W]e rely on and accept as true the contents of the exhibits and treat as surplusage the pleader’s allegations as to the legal effect of the exhibits”].) 

A demurrer can only be sustained when it disposes of an entire pleading, cause of action, or affirmative defense. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1320, subd. (a); Poizner v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 119; Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redev. Agency (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1046-1047.)  

REQUESTS FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE – Demurrer 

            The Court GRANTS Moving Parties’ requests for judicial notice as to Exhibits 1, 2, 4, and 5. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).) However, the Court takes judicial notice of the foregoing documents only as to “the existence, content and authenticity of public records and other specified documents”; it does not take judicial notice of the truth of the factual matters asserted in those documents. (Dominguez v. Bonta (2022) 87 Cal. App. 5th 389, 400.) The Court DENIES the request for judicial notice as to Exhibit 3, as there is no indication it is a court copy. (See Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).) 

PRELIMINARY ISSUE – Demurrer 

            The Court notes that, despite the Court dismissing Defendants Bingwei Guan and Yudan Li from this action with prejudice on May 7, 2024, the SAC includes them as defendants. (SAC, p. 1; Order – Dismissal (5/7/24); Minute Order (Nunc Pro Tunc Order) (7/31/24); Minute Order (5/7/24).) Their inclusion was therefore improper. Accordingly, on the Court’s own motion, the Court hereby STRIKES the SAC as to Defendants Bingwei Guan and Yudan Li. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (b).) 

DISCUSSION – Demurrer 

Meet and Confer 

Per Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41, subdivision (a), Moving Parties were required to meet and confer in person, by telephone, or by video conference before bringing this demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a).) The Court finds Moving Parties’ efforts to meet and confer sufficient. (Hwang Decl., ¶¶ 3-10.) 

First and Second Causes of Action – Contract Fraud/Fraudulent Conduct 

To state a cause of action for fraud, the plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating, “(1) the defendant represented to the plaintiff that an important fact was true; (2) that representation was false; (3) the defendant knew that the representation was false when the defendant made it, or the defendant made the representation recklessly and without regard for its truth; (4) the defendant intended that the plaintiff rely on the representation; (5) the plaintiff reasonably relied on the representation; (6) the plaintiff was harmed; and (7) the plaintiff's reliance on the defendant's representation was a substantial factor in causing that harm to the plaintiff. [Citation.]” (Graham v. Bank of Am., N.A. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 594, 605-606, internal quotation marks omitted (Graham).) “In California, fraud must be pled specifically; general and conclusory allegations do not suffice. Thus the policy of liberal construction of the pleadings ... will not ordinarily be invoked to sustain a pleading defective in any material respect. This particularity requirement necessitates pleading facts which show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered.” (Lazar v. Superior Ct. (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645, internal quotation marks and citations omitted, italics in original (Lazar).) 

Res judicata or claim preclusion precludes the relitigation of a cause of action that previously was adjudicated in another proceeding between the same parties or parties in privity with them. Res judicata applies if (1) the decision in the prior proceeding is final and on the merits; (2) the present proceeding is on the same cause of action as the prior proceeding; and (3) the parties in the present proceeding or parties in privity with them were parties to the prior proceeding. Res judicata bars the litigation not only of issues that were actually litigated but also issues that could have been litigated.” (Fed'n of Hillside & Canyon Assns. v. City of Los Angeles (2004) 126 Cal.App.4th 1180, 1202, internal citations omitted.) “Causes of action are considered the same if based on the same primary right. [Citation.]” (Citizens for Open Gov't v. City of Lodi (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 296, 325.) 

Moving Parties demur to the First and Second Causes of Action for contract fraud and fraudulent conduct, respectively, on the grounds that they are barred by res judicata and fail to state a cause of action. Moving Parties contend that Plaintiff previously sued them for breach of contract regarding the same property, but Plaintiff agreed in open court in the prior action to dismiss it with prejudice, and therefore Plaintiff’s claims here are barred. Moving Parties then contend it is unclear from the SAC exactly what Plaintiff is  claiming. Moving Parties contend that if Plaintiff’s claim is based on fraud, the SAC fails to allege what the representation was, whether the representation was about a material fact, and whether Plaintiff was harmed by the alleged representation. 

The Court agrees with Moving Parties. While it is difficult to fully understand the allegations of the SAC, it appears that Plaintiff is suing to recover unpaid rent from Moving Parties for the period of August 6, 2021, to September 30, 2021, which appears to have been a holdover period following the expiration of the lease on July 31, 2021. (SAC, pp. 2-3, 6, Ex. 1.) However, Plaintiff previously sued Moving Parties in Case Number 21PSCV00516 regarding their allegedly wrongful possession of the subject property from August 2021 to September 2021 in connection with the same lease agreement. (Request for Judicial Notice, Exs. 1-2; SAC, Ex. 1.) Plaintiff also mentioned the same dispute regarding unpaid rent for the months of May 2021 through July 2021. (Request for Judicial Notice, Exs. 1-2; SAC, pp. 2-6.) While Plaintiff has styled these claims as fraud claims in the SAC, they involve the same primary right, i.e., the wrongful use of Plaintiff’s property without compensation. (Citizens for Open Gov't, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at p. 325.) Plaintiff dismissed his breach of contract claims against Moving Parties in the prior case with prejudice. (Request for Judicial Notice, Ex. 5.) Claim preclusion applies to claims voluntarily dismissed with prejudice and acts as a judgment on the merits. (Gray v. La Salle Bank, N.A. (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 932, 950.) It also applies to any claims the plaintiff could have litigated in the prior action. (Fed'n of Hillside & Canyon Assns., supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at p. 1202.) Plaintiff’s claims here are therefore barred. (See ibid.) 

The Court also agrees with Moving Parties that the SAC fails to allege sufficient facts to state a cause of action for fraud. The SAC does not allege Moving Parties made any representation to Plaintiff upon which Plaintiff relied and was harmed. (See generally, SAC.) The SAC does not allege who purportedly made the misrepresentation, or when, how, or to whom it was made, or by what means it was tendered. (Lazar, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 645.) 

Furthermore, although not raised in Moving Parties’ demurrer, the Court notes that Plaintiff improperly substituted these fraud claims for Plaintiff’s prior breach of contract claim. When the Court granted Plaintiff leave to amend the FAC, the Court did not grant him leave to substitute in new causes of action. (See Order re Tentative Ruling (10/5/24); Patrick v. Alacer Corp. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 995, 1015 [after a demurrer is sustained with leave to amend, the scope of permissible amendment is limited to the causes of action to which the demurrer was sustained, unless the new cause of action directly responds to the court’s reasoning for sustaining the prior demurrer].) 

Finally, the Court construes Plaintiff’s lack of opposition as a concession that Moving Parties’ arguments are meritorious. (D.I. Chadbourne, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 60 Cal.2d 723, 728, fn. 4 [where nonmoving party fails to oppose a ground for a motion, "it is assumed that [nonmoving party] concedes" that ground].) 

Based on the foregoing, the Court SUSTAINS the demurrer to the First and Second Causes of Action without leave to amend. 

Third Cause of Action – Unlawful Detainer 

To state a cause of action for unlawful detainer, the plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating, “(1) the tenant is in possession of the premises; (2) that possession is without permission; (3) the tenant is in default for nonpayment of rent; (4) the tenant has been properly served with a written three-day notice; and (5) the default continues after the three-day notice period has elapsed.” (KB Salt Lake III, LLC v. Fitness Internat., LLC (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1032, 1045.) 

Moving Parties demur to the Third Cause of Action for unlawful detainer on the grounds that it is barred by res judicata and that Plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action. Moving Parties reiterate their arguments made above regarding res judicata. Moving Parties also contend Plaintiff does not allege any facts showing that he served Moving Parties with any written notice to terminate the tenancy or that Moving Parties  remain in possession of the subject property. 

The Court agrees with Moving Parties. The facts alleged in the SAC to support Plaintiff’s unlawful detainer claim are the same ones alleged in Plaintiff’s prior action against Moving Parties. (Request for Judicial Notice, Exs. 1-2; SAC, pp. 4-5.) They therefore arise from the same primary right and are barred by res judicata. (Citizens for Open Gov't, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at p. 325; Fed'n of Hillside & Canyon Assns., supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at p. 1202.) 

The Court also agrees the SAC fails to allege sufficient facts to state a cause of action for unlawful detainer. The SAC does not allege facts demonstrating that Moving Parties are in possession of the property; in fact, it alleges their possession ended in September 2021. (SAC, p. 2.) The SAC also does not allege facts demonstrating that Plaintiff properly served Moving Parties with a three-day written notice. (KB Salt Lake III, LLC, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 1045.) 

Furthermore, similar to that noted above, Plaintiff improperly added this unlawful detainer claim. When the Court granted Plaintiff leave to amend the FAC, the Court did not grant him leave to add a new cause of action for unlawful detainer. (See Order re Tentative Ruling (10/5/24); Patrick v. Alacer Corp., supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 1015.) The Court also construes Plaintiff’s lack of opposition as a concession that Moving Parties’ arguments are meritorious. (D.I. Chadbourne, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 60 Cal.2d at p. 728, fn. 4.) 

Based on the foregoing, the Court SUSTAINS the demurrer to the Third Cause of Action without leave to amend. 

Fourth Cause of Action 

Although only briefly mentioned in the demurrer, the Court notes that the SAC contains a heading labeled, “[t]he fourth cause of action.” (SAC, p. 5.) However, it is unclear what cause of action this would be. The allegations appear to be directed at purportedly prejudicial testimony Bingwei Guan and Yudan Li made either in a declaration or under oath, which does not support any cause of action of which the Court is aware. (SAC, p. 5.) Also, as noted above, the Court struck the inclusion of Bingwei Guan and Yudan Li from the SAC given its violation of the Court’s order dismissing them with prejudice on May 7, 2024. (Order – Dismissal (5/7/24); Minute Order (Nunc Pro Tunc Order) (7/31/24); Minute Order (5/7/24).) Furthermore, similar to that noted above, Plaintiff improperly added this unlabeled claim. When the Court granted Plaintiff leave to amend the FAC, the Court did not grant him leave to add any new causes of action. (See Order re Tentative Ruling (10/5/24); Patrick v. Alacer Corp., supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 1015.) The Court therefore summarily disregards these allegations and strikes the purported “fourth cause of action” without leave to amend.

 

LEGAL STANDARD – Motion to Strike 

            Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof, but this time limitation shall not apply to motions specified in subdivision (e).” (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(2).) “The court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (b) Strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” (Id., § 436.) 

REQUESTS FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE – Motion to Strike 

            The Court GRANTS Moving Parties’ requests for judicial notice as to Exhibits 1, 2, 4, and 5. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).) However, the Court takes judicial notice of the foregoing documents only as to “the existence, content and authenticity of public records and other specified documents”; it does not take judicial notice of the truth of the factual matters asserted in those documents. (Dominguez v. Bonta (2022) 87 Cal. App. 5th 389, 400.) The Court DENIES the request for judicial notice as to Exhibit 3, as there is no indication it is a court copy. (See Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).) 

DISCUSSION – Motion to Strike 

Meet and Confer 

Per Code of Civil Procedure section 435.5, subdivision (a), Moving Parties were required to meet and confer in person, by telephone, or by video conference before bringing this motion to strike. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435.5, subd. (a).) The Court finds Moving Parties’ efforts to meet and confer sufficient. (Hwang Decl., ¶¶ 3-10.) 

            Analysis 

            Given the Court’s sustaining of the demurrer to the entire SAC without leave to amend, the Court DENIES the motion to strike as moot. 

CONCLUSION 

The Court SUSTAINS the demurrer of Defendants Longji Guan and Xiuhua Liang to Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint without leave to amend. 

            The Court DENIES Defendants Longji Guan and Xiuhua Liang’s motion to strike as moot. 

            The Court directs Defendants Longji Guan and Xiuhua Liang to submit a proposed judgment of dismissal with prejudice for the Court’s review and signature within five calendar days of this order. 

            Defendants Longji Guan and Xiuhua Liang are ordered to give notice of the Court’s ruling within five calendar days of this order.