Judge: Lynette Gridiron Winston, Case: 23PSCV03902, Date: 2024-06-06 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23PSCV03902    Hearing Date: June 6, 2024    Dept: 6

CASE NAME:  V.V. v. Mountain View School District 

Defendant Mountain View School District’s Demurrer to Complaint 

TENTATIVE RULING 

The Court OVERRULES Defendant Mountain View School District’s demurrer to the complaint. Defendant is ordered to file an answer to the complaint within 10 calendar days. 

             Plaintiff is ordered to give notice of the Court’s ruling within five calendar days of this order. 

BACKGROUND 

This is a childhood sexual abuse case. On December 18, 2023, plaintiff V.V. (Plaintiff) filed this action against defendant Mountain View School District (Defendant) and Does 2 through 25 (Doe Defendants), alleging two causes of action for negligence against Defendant and the Doe Defendants, respectively, and two causes of action for negligent hiring, retention, and supervision against Defendant and the Doe Defendants, respectively. 

On April 24, 2024, Defendant demurred to the complaint. On April 25, 2024, Defendant filed an amended demurrer[1] to the complaint. On May 20, 2024, Plaintiff opposed the demurrer. On May 30, 2024, Defendant replied. 

LEGAL STANDARD – Demurrer 

            A demurrer is a pleading used to test the legal sufficiency of other pleadings. It raises issues of law, not fact, regarding the form or content of the opposing party's pleading (complaint, answer or cross-complaint). (Code Civ. Proc., § 422.10; see Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) It is not the function of the demurrer to challenge the truthfulness of the complaint; and for purposes of ruling on the demurrer, all facts pleaded in the complaint are assumed to be true. (Id.) 

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at p. 994.) No other extrinsic evidence can be considered. (Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881 [error for court to consider facts asserted in memorandum supporting demurrer]; see also Afuso v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 859, 862, disapproved on other grounds in Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Cos. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 287 [error to consider contents of release not part of court record].) 

A demurrer can be utilized where the “face of the complaint” itself is incomplete or discloses some defense that would bar recovery. (Guardian North Bay, Inc. v. Superior Court (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 963, 971-972.) The “face of the complaint” includes material contained in attached exhibits that are incorporated by reference into the complaint, or in a superseded complaint in the same action. (Frantz v. Blackwell (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 91, 94; see also Barnett v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 500, 505 [“[W]e rely on and accept as true the contents of the exhibits and treat as surplusage the pleader’s allegations as to the legal effect of the exhibits.”]) 

A demurrer can only be sustained when it disposes of an entire cause of action. (Poizner v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 119; Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redev. Agency (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1046.)  

REQUESTS FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE – Demurrer 

            The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s requests for judicial notice. (Evid. Code § 452, subds. (a)-(d).) However, the Court takes judicial notice only as to “the existence, content and authenticity of public records and other specified documents”; it does not take judicial notice of the truth of the factual matters asserted in those documents. (Dominguez v. Bonta (2022) 87 Cal. App. 5th 389, 400.) 

DISCUSSION 

Meet and Confer 

Per Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41, subdivision (a), Defendant was required to meet and confer in person, by telephone, or by video conference before bringing this demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a).) The Court notes that Defendant did not provide a declaration indicating whether it attempted to meet and confer before filing the demurrer, as is required under Code of Civil Procedure, section 430.41, subdivision (a)(3). (Id., § 430.41, subd. (a)(3).) Nevertheless, the Court may not overrule a demurrer for failure to adequately meet and confer. (Id., § 430.41, subd. (a)(4).) 

Defendant’s Arguments 

Defendant demurs to the entire complaint on the grounds that AB 218, which amended Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41 to revive previously barred childhood sexual assault claims, is unconstitutional for violating Article XVI, § 6 of the California Constitution, i.e., the “Gifts Clause.” Defendant notes the amendments to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41 opened a three-year window for plaintiffs to file suit regardless of when the assaults occurred, and that the claims presentation requirement was also retroactively eliminated. 

Defendant contends Plaintiff never had an enforceable claim against Defendant at any time before the passage of AB 218 because Plaintiff never complied with the claims presentation requirement for public entities. Defendant contends that before 2009, Plaintiff was required to comply with the claims presentation requirement, that the law was clear then that the timely claim presentation requirement was a substantive element of any claim against a public entity, and that the 2008 amendment to Government Code section 905 only eliminated the claims presentation requirement for prospective claims. 

Defendant cites multiple cases to support the argument that the California Supreme Court has repeatedly held the legislature has no power to impose liability on a public entity for a past occurrence where there was no enforceable claim before the law was passed. Specifically, Defendants cites the cases of Bourn v. Hart (1982) 93 Cal. 321, Conlin v. Board of Supervisors (1893) 99 Cal. 17, Powell v. Phelan (1903) 138 Cal. 271, Heron v. Riley (1930) 209 Cal. 507, and Jordan v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 431. 

Defendant contends that Plaintiff did not have an enforceable claim before the passage of AB 218. Defendant contends that Plaintiff alleges the misconduct occurred more than 30 years ago, and that the law then required compliance with the claims presentation requirement, even for childhood sexual abuse cases until 2009. Defendant contends that the law was clear the claims presentation requirement was a substantive element of any cause of action against a public entity then. Defendant notes that paragraph 19 of the complaint alleges that Plaintiff never presented a government claim, and that therefore there was never a time in this case before 2020 and the adoption of AB 218 that all of the elements of a cause of action against Defendant existed in favor of Plaintiff. Defendant makes clear that it does not dispute the Legislature’s ability to extend already expired statutes of limitations; the issue here is the retroactive elimination of the claims presentation requirement. 

Plaintiff’s Arguments 

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the retroactive elimination of the claims presentation requirement in AB 218 is constitutional and does not violate the Gift Clause because it has a clear and established public purpose. Plaintiff argues that an appropriation of public funds that benefits particular individuals does not violate the Gift Clause if it is found that the funds are to be used for a public purpose. Plaintiff contends that the legislative history for AB 218 makes clear that it was enacted for a public purpose, namely that it enables victims of childhood sexual assault to seek compensation from private and public entities. Plaintiff cites various changes in Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1 over the years, wherein the rights of childhood sexual assault survivors has been expanded through the years, such as in 1986 when the statute of limitations was extended and in 2008 when the Legislature prospectively eliminated the claims presentation requirement. 

            Plaintiff contends the public purpose in AB 218 is further reflected in its legislative history by helping to prevent future assaults through raising the costs for this abuse and applying this law equally against all types of entities, whether public or private. Plaintiff then contends it has been held that retroactive relief from a government claims filing requirement does not violate the Gift Clause. Plaintiff also cites Coats v. New Haven Unified School District (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 415 for the contention that the courts have already determined that the Legislature’s motives were to alleviate the hardships of victims of childhood sexual assault by enabling them to bring their claims, as well as preventing future childhood sexual assaults, and that these motives present a public purpose and reasonable basis. 

Analysis 

At the time this action was filed, Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1, subdivision (a), provided that: 

In an action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault, the time for commencement of the action shall be within 22 years of the date the plaintiff attains the age of majority or within five years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by the sexual assault, whichever period expires later, for any of the following actions: 

(1) An action against any person for committing an act of childhood sexual assault. 

(2) An action for liability against any person or entity who owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, if a wrongful or negligent act by that person or entity was a legal cause of the childhood sexual assault that resulted in the injury to the plaintiff. 

(3) An action for liability against any person or entity if an intentional act by that person or entity was a legal cause of the childhood sexual assault that resulted in the injury to the plaintiff. 

(Code Civ. Proc., § 340.1, subd. (a).) 

At the time this action was filed, Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1, subdivision (q), provided that: 

Notwithstanding any other law, a claim for damages described in paragraphs (1) through (3), inclusive, of subdivision (a) that has not been litigated to finality and that would otherwise be barred as of January 1, 2020, because the applicable statute of limitations, claim presentation deadline, or any other time limit had expired, is revived, and these claims may be commenced within three years of January 1, 2020. A plaintiff shall have the later of the three-year time period under this subdivision or the time period under subdivision (a) as amended by the act that added this subdivision. 

(Code Civ. Proc., § 340.1, subd. (q).) 

            Government Code section 905, subdivisions (m) and (p) provide as follows: 

There shall be presented in accordance with Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 900) and Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 910) all claims for money or damages against local public entities except any of the following… 

(m) Claims made pursuant to Section 340.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault… 

(p) The changes made to this section by the act that added this subdivision are retroactive and apply to any action commenced on or after the date of enactment of that act, and to any action filed before the date of enactment and still pending on that date, including any action or causes of action that would have been barred by the laws in effect before the date of enactment. 

(Gov. Code, § 905, subds. (m), (p).) 

The Court finds that AB 218 is constitutional and does not violate the Gift Clause. First, Defendant’s reply arguments regarding Coats are unpersuasive. While the Court agrees that Coats does not address the Gift Clause, that does not necessarily change the outcome here. Coats explicitly states that the Legislature has the power to revive claims previously barred by the claim presentation requirement, not just the statute of limitations. (Id., at p. 428, italics added [“The present case, of course, involves revival of a cause of action barred by a claim presentation requirement, not a statute of limitations. But we are aware of no reason the Legislature should be any less able to revive claims in this context, as it expressly did in Assembly Bill 218…”]) Coats is on point since it addressed Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1, subdivision (q)[2], which expressly provided that the claims presentation requirement was not required for a childhood sexual assault claim under section 340.1. (Id.) 

Second, the cases Defendant cites in support of its demurrer are inapposite and distinguishable. In Conlin v. Board of Supervisors (1893) 99 Cal. 17, the plaintiff had waived his claim, and the effect of the statute would have been to pay him for that which he had waived. (Id., at p. 23.) In Bourn v. Hart (1892) 93 Cal. 321, the state could not be sued at the time of the plaintiff’s injuries. (Id., at p. 327.) In Powell v. Phelan (1903) 138 Cal. 271, the law at the time the plaintiff performed juror services did not provide for the payment of such services. (Id., at p. 276.) In Heron v. Riley (1930) 209 Cal. 507, the California Supreme Court specifically stated that the State can consent to liability, which it did when the Legislature enacted the Government Tort Claims Act in 1963, i.e., after Heron was decided and well before Plaintiff’s claims arose. (Id., at p. 517; see Stats. 1963, c. 1681, p. 3268, § 1.) Heron also held that appropriations to pay judgments after due process requirements were met are not gifts of public money. (Id., at p. 517.) Jordan v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 431 is unavailing since it is cited primarily for the argument that the legislature may not use public monies to compensate an unenforceable claim. As noted above, the Court finds that the Legislature has the power to revive claims previously barred by the claims presentation requirement, which it did when enacting AB 218, so Plaintiff’s claim is not unenforceable for lack of complying with the claims presentation requirement. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 340.1, subd. (q); Gov. Code, § 905, subd. (m).) 

Finally, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that AB 218 was enacted for a public purpose and that it had a reasonable basis for doing so, namely, to benefit victims of childhood sexual assault, prevent further assaults, and hold accountable perpetrators and enablers of abuse who benefit from statutes of limitations. (See Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice, Ex. 12 [“AB 218 would also confront the pervasive problem of cover ups in institutions, from schools to sports league… This reform is clearly needed both to compensate victims who never should have been victims- and would not have been if past sexual assault had been properly brought to light- and also as an effective deterrent against individuals and entities who have chosen to protect the perpetrators of sexual assault over the victims.’”].) Just because Plaintiff may benefit personally and Defendant may be held liable does not necessarily mean AB 218 was enacted without a public purpose. 

It is generally held that in determining whether an appropriation of public funds is to be considered a gift, the primary question is whether the funds are to be used for a ‘public’ or ‘private’ purpose; the benefit to the state from an expenditure for a public purpose is in the nature of consideration and the funds expended are therefore not a gift even though private persons are benefited therefrom. [Citation]. The determination of what constitutes a public purpose is primarily a matter for the Legislature to determine, and its discretion will not be disturbed by the courts so long as that determination has a reasonable basis. 

(Cnty. of Alameda v. Carleson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 730, 745-746.) 

Based on the foregoing, the Court OVERRULES the demurrer. 

CONCLUSION 

The Court OVERRULES Defendant Mountain View School District’s demurrer to the complaint. Defendant is ordered to file an answer to the complaint within 10 calendar days. 

             Plaintiff is ordered to give notice of the Court’s ruling within five calendar days of this order.