Judge Lynette Gridiron Winston, Case Number: 23PSCV03999, Date: 2024-06-05 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Lynette Gridiron Winston, Case: 23PSCV03999, Date: 2024-06-05 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23PSCV03999 Hearing Date: June 5, 2024 Dept: 6

CASE NAME: Yuanyuan Gao v. Pomona Valley Hospital Medical Center, et al.

Defendant Pomona Valley Hospital Medical Center’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint

TENTATIVE RULING

The Court SUSTAINS the demurrer to the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Causes of Action with 20 days’ leave to amend.

The Court DENIES the motion to strike as to the First through Seventh Causes of Action, and DENIES the motion to strike as moot with respect to the punitive damages allegations.

Pomona Valley is ordered to give notice of the Court’s ruling within five calendar days of this order.

BACKGROUND

This is an action based on an admission to a mental institution. On December 28, 2023, plaintiff Yuanyuan Gao (Plaintiff) filed this action against defendants Pomona Valley Hospital Medical Center (Pomona Valley), College Hospital, Inc. doing business as College Hospital – Cerritos (CH Cerritos) (collectively, Defendants), and Does 1 to 25, alleging causes of action for false imprisonment, violation of patient rights, assault, battery, invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and discrimination.

On April 19, 2024, Pomona Valley demurred to and moved to strike portions of the complaint. On May 23, 2024, Plaintiff opposed the motions. On May 29, 2024, Pomona Valley replied.

LEGAL STANDARD – Demurrer

A demurrer is a pleading used to test the legal sufficiency of other pleadings. It raises issues of law, not fact, regarding the form or content of the opposing party's pleading (complaint, answer or cross-complaint). (Code Civ. Proc., § 422.10; see Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) It is not the function of the demurrer to challenge the truthfulness of the complaint; and for purposes of ruling on the demurrer, all facts pleaded in the complaint are assumed to be true. (Id.)

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at p. 994.) No other extrinsic evidence can be considered. (Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881 [error for court to consider facts asserted in memorandum supporting demurrer]; see also Afuso v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 859, 862, disapproved on other grounds in Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Cos. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 287 [error to consider contents of release not part of court record].)

A demurrer can be utilized where the “face of the complaint” itself is incomplete or discloses some defense that would bar recovery. (Guardian North Bay, Inc. v. Superior Court (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 963, 971-972.) The “face of the complaint” includes material contained in attached exhibits that are incorporated by reference into the complaint, or in a superseded complaint in the same action. (Frantz v. Blackwell (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 91, 94; see also Barnett v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 500, 505 [“[W]e rely on and accept as true the contents of the exhibits and treat as surplusage the pleader’s allegations as to the legal effect of the exhibits.”])

A demurrer can only be sustained when it disposes of an entire cause of action. (Poizner v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 119; Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redev. Agency (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1046.)

PRELIMINARY ISSUES – Demurrer

The Court notes that Plaintiff filed the opposition on May 23, 2024, which was one day late. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1005, subd. (b).) But, the Court also notes the opposition was served on Pomona Valley on May 22, 2024. Therefore, the Court exercises its discretion to still consider Plaintiff’s opposition, but admonishes Plaintiff to comply with the requirements of the Code of Civil Procedure going forward. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1300, subd. (d); Juarez v. Wash Depot Holdings, Inc. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1197, 1202.)

DISCUSSION – Demurrer

Meet and Confer

Per Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41, subdivision (a), Pomona Valley was required to meet and confer in person, by telephone, or by video conference before bringing this demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a).) The Court finds Pomona Valley’s meet-and-confer efforts sufficient. (Owen Decls., ¶¶ 3-6.)

First Cause of Action – False Imprisonment

To state a cause of action for false imprisonment, the plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating, “(1) the nonconsensual, intentional confinement of a person, (2) without lawful privilege, and (3) for an appreciable period of time, however brief. [Citation.]” (Easton v. Sutter Coast Hosp. (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 485, 496 (Easton).)

Pomona Valley demurs to the First Cause of Action for false imprisonment for failure to state a cause of action and for uncertainty. Pomona Valley contends the allegations of the complaint fail to allege facts demonstrating that Plaintiff’s alleged restraint was without lawful privilege, citing the Easton case. Pomona Valley further contends the only inference to be drawn from the allegations of the complaint is that Plaintiff was placed on a hold under Welfare & Institutions section 5150, and that Plaintiff has not plead facts demonstrating her hold was unlawful.

In opposition, Plaintiff contends that Pomona Valley’s argument about a “5150 hold” is speculative, as the complaint says nothing about a “5150 hold.” Plaintiff contends Pomona Valley’s moving papers admit that Plaintiff was deceived into signing voluntary admission papers. Plaintiff contends that the false imprisonment claim is based on her having allegedly been tricked into signing the voluntary admission papers by misrepresenting them as discharge papers, and that restraining Plaintiff was therefore unlawful and unprivileged. Plaintiff further contends Pomona Valley’s reliance on Easton is misplaced, as that case involved privileged reports of suspected mistreatment of an elder, whereas this case involves obtaining consent through false pretenses.

The Court finds the First Cause of Action to be uncertain. Plaintiff lumps all defendants together and complains about conduct within the premises of Defendant CH Cerritos. (Compl., ¶¶ 26, 27.) The Court cannot determine which conduct Plaintiff seeks to allege as a basis for false imprisonment against Defendant Pomona Valley.

Based on the foregoing, the Court SUSTAINS the demurrer to the First Cause of Action with leave to amend.

Second Cause of Action – Violation of Patient Rights

Pomona Valley demurs to the Second Cause of Action for violation of patient rights for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and for uncertainty. Pomona Valley contends the patient’s private right of action is uncertain in that it fails to allege if it is based on a statute and that if based on Health & Safety Code section 1430(b)(1), such statute is available only to current or former residents and patients of skilled nursing facilities. Pomona Valley contends the complaint fails to allege fats demonstrating that Plaintiff received medical care. Pomona Valley also contends that the complaint lumps the defendants together without specifying who committed the actions of which Plaintiff claims she is entitled to punitive damages, and that Plaintiff fails to allege any facts showing Pomona Valley is responsible for the actions of Defendant College Hospital.

In opposition, Plaintiff contends that tricking a person into signing a voluntary admission is clearly involuntary, and that confining a person in a hospital under false pretenses violates that person’s patient rights.

The Court finds the Second Cause of Action fails to allege sufficient facts to support a cause of action for violation of patient rights. The complaint does not specify the basis for Plaintiff’s alleged patient rights. (See Compl., ¶¶ 30-35.) If plaintiff’s claims is based on Health and Safety Code section 1430, subdivision (b)(1), as cited in Pomona Valley’s moving papers (Demurrer, 10:7-14), that statute provides that it applies only to skilled nursing facilities and intermediate care facilities. (Health & Saf. Code, § 1430, subd. (b)(1); see also Id., § 1250, subd. (d) [definition of intermediate care facility]; Id., § 1250, subd. (c) [definition of skilled nursing facility].) The complaint does not allege whether Pomona Valley is a skilled nursing facility or intermediate care facility. The Second Cause of Action also lumps all defendants together and does not identify the actions of Pomona Valley alleged to be in violation of Plaintiff’s rights, which are also not identified.

Based on the foregoing, the Court SUSTAINS the demurrer to the Second Cause of Action with leave to amend.

Third and Fourth Causes of Action – Assault and Battery

To state a cause of action for assault, the plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating, “(1) the defendant acted with intent to cause harmful or offensive contact, or threatened to touch the plaintiff in a harmful or offensive manner; (2) the plaintiff reasonably believed he was about to be touched in a harmful or offensive manner or it reasonably appeared to the plaintiff that the defendant was about to carry out the threat; (3) the plaintiff did not consent to the defendant's conduct; (4) the plaintiff was harmed; and (5) the defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's harm. [Citation.]” (Carlsen v. Koivumaki (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 879, 890.)

To state a cause of action for battery, the plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating: (1) the defendant intentionally did an act which resulted in a harmful or offensive contact with the plaintiff's person; (2) the plaintiff did not consent to the contact; and (3) the harmful or offensive contact caused injury, damage, loss or harm to the plaintiff. (Piedra v. Dugan (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1495.)

Pomona Valley demurs to the Third and Fourth Causes of Action for assault and battery, respectively, for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and for uncertainty. Pomona Valley contends that the only allegations against it relating to a possible assault and battery is in paragraph 12 of the complaint, but contends that the complaint does not allege such actions occurred at Pomona Valley. Pomona Valley contends the complaint does not allege Pomona Valley intended to make harmful or offensive contact, or that it intended for Plaintiff to believe that was true and Plaintiff believed she was going to be harmed. Pomona Valley contends the only laws which allow law enforcement for Plaintiff’s alleged harms is the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, and that in the absence of fats demonstrating Defendants lacked probable cause to detain Plaintiff for psychiatric evaluation, Plaintiff must allege facts which demonstrate that Defendants’ actions were without probable cause.

In opposition, Plaintiff contends Pomona Valley is again speculating as to why law enforcement officers might have brought Plaintiff to Pomona Valley, but that it does admit the complaint alleges Plaintiff was forcibly restrained after being deceived into signing the voluntary admission papers. Plaintiff contends the complaint alleges the facts necessary to state causes of action for assault and battery, as Plaintiff alleges that Pomona Valley caused Plaintiff to feel apprehension that she would be offensively touched and in fact was offensively touched when she was forcibly restrained and held down by iron bars. Plaintiff further reiterates the allegation that she was deceived into signing the voluntary admission papers.

The Court finds the Third and Fourth Causes of Action for assault and battery, respectively, to be uncertain. The Third and Fourth Causes of Action allege that Defendants Does 1 to 25 engaged in harmful conduct and that Defendants CH Cerritos and Pomona Valley are vicariously liable for the actions of Defendants Does 1 to 25. (Compl. ¶¶ 37-39, 42-43.) While these causes of action incorporate by reference prior allegations, this is not sufficient to give Defendant Pomona Valley notice of the basis for its potential liability. Different events occurred at different facilities by different individuals. The Court is left to speculate as to the exact conduct of Defendant Pomona Valley for which Plaintiff seeks to hold it liable for assault or battery or the basis for holding it vicariously liable. Again, Plaintiff lumps together the conduct of the Doe Defendants and does not specify the exact conduct for which Pomona Valley is allegedly liable.

Based on the foregoing, the Court SUSTAINS the demurrer to the Third and Fourth Causes of Action.

Fifth Cause of Action – Invasion of Privacy

Case law recognizes four different types of invasion of privacy: (1) intrusion into the plaintiff's privacy or solitude, Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc. (1998) 18 Cal.4th 200, 231; (2) public disclosure of private facts, (Id., at p. 478); (3) publicity placing the plaintiff in a false light, (Forsher v. Bugliosi (1980) 26 Cal.3d 792, 808; and (4) use or appropriation of the plaintiff's name or likeness, (Id.).

(a) A person is liable for physical invasion of privacy when the person knowingly enters onto the land or into the airspace above the land of another person without permission or otherwise commits a trespass in order to capture any type of visual image, sound recording, or other physical impression of the plaintiff engaging in a private, personal, or familial activity and the invasion occurs in a manner that is offensive to a reasonable person.

(b) A person is liable for constructive invasion of privacy when the person attempts to capture, in a manner that is offensive to a reasonable person, any type of visual image, sound recording, or other physical impression of the plaintiff engaging in a private, personal, or familial activity, through the use of any device, regardless of whether there is a physical trespass, if this image, sound recording, or other physical impression could not have been achieved without a trespass unless the device was used.

(Civ. Code, § 1708.8, subds. (a), (b).)

There is also a constitutional right to privacy under the California Constitution, which requires the plaintiff to allege facts demonstrating, “(1) a legally protected privacy interest; (2) a reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances; and (3) conduct by defendant constituting a serious invasion of privacy.” (All of US or None - Riverside Chapter v. Hamrick (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 751, 798.)

Pomona Valley demurs to the Fifth Cause of Action for invasion of privacy for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and for uncertainty. Pomona Valley contends the complaint fails to allege facts demonstrating an invasion of privacy under Civil Code section 1708.8, as the complaint only alleges an unwanted entry onto Plaintiff’s property by four police officers, but there is no allegation that Pomona Valley caused that to happen. Pomona Valley further contends the complaint fails to allege which Defendants undertook the actions of forcibly removing Plaintiff’s clothing, seizing her mobile phone, and restricting her freedom to practice her religion. Pomona Valley contends the complaint does not allege facts demonstrating that this event occurred at Pomona Valley.

In opposition, Plaintiff contends Pomona Valley’s argument is incorrectly based on Civil Code section 1708.8, since that applies to intrusions of privacy on to a plaintiff’s land or airspace for the purpose of capturing video or audio recordings. Plaintiff contends her claim is based on common law invasion of privacy, and that her right to privacy was violated when she was forcibly restrained on false pretenses, which caused an invasion of Plaintiff’s personal space.

The Court finds the complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action for invasion of privacy, and such cause of action is uncertain. While the Court does agree that Civil Code section 1708.8 does not apply here for the reasons Plaintiff argues, that is ultimately beside the point. The complaint alleges that Plaintiff was forced to undress at Defendant CH Cerritos, not at Pomona Valley. (Compl., ¶ 13.) The complaint also alleges that incidents regarding Plaintiff’s phone and reading her bible occurred at Defendant CH Cerritos, not at Pomona Valley. (Compl., ¶¶ 19, 20.) These allegations conflict with paragraph 46 of the complaint, which indiscriminately lumps all of the Defendants together into an omnibus conclusory allegation of wrongdoing. (Compl., ¶ 46; see Perez v. Golden Empire Transit Dist. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1236 [specific allegations control over general ones].) There is no other allegation in the complaint that demonstrates Pomona Valley having engaged in any conduct that would constitute an invasion of Plaintiff’s privacy. Additionally, Plaintiff fails to provide the full citation supporting her contention that a restraint constitutes an invasion of privacy, and the Court was not able to find any such authority. (See Opp., 8:21-25.) The complaint therefore fails to allege facts stating a cause of action against Pomona Valley for invasion of privacy, and is uncertain.

Based on the foregoing, the Court SUSTAINS the demurrer to the Fifth Cause of Action with leave to amend.

Sixth Cause of Action – Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

To state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating, “(1) defendant engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct (conduct so extreme as to exceed all bounds of decency in a civilized community) with the intent to cause, or with reckless disregard to the probability of causing, emotional distress; and (2) as a result, plaintiff suffered extreme or severe emotional distress.” (Berry v. Frazier (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 1258, 1273.)

Pomona Valley demurs to the Sixth Cause of Action for intentional infliction of emotional distress for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and for uncertainty. Pomona Valley contends the complaint lacks facts setting forth the alleged injurious conduct by Pomona Valley. Pomona Valley cites the case of Larson v. UHS of Rancho Springs, Inc. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 336 (Larson), as an example of a higher burden of proving outrageous conduct in the context of a medical procedure. Pomona Valley contends the complaint is silent as to any allegations, other than the alleged deception of having her sign the voluntary admission document, and contends that the complaint contains contradictory allegations that she was involuntarily admitted and treated. Pomona Valley further contends that the allegations of Pomona Valley forcibly restraining her are insufficient to constitute outrageous conduct, especially if the restraint was privileged, as well as no facts demonstrating an intent to inflict injury.

In opposition, Plaintiff contends Larson is inapposite because Plaintiff was tricked into signing the voluntary admission papers, and argues instead that this case is more similar to So v. Shin (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 652 (So), where the plaintiff awoke during a procedure, the anesthesiologist showed the plaintiff her blood in a container, and urged her not to report the incident. Plaintiff contends Pomona Valley’s actions fell outside the scope of professional services, as Plaintiff never validly consented to any services being performed by Pomona Valley.

The Court finds the complaint alleges sufficient facts to state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Whether conduct is extreme and outrageous is generally a question of fact. (Smith v. BP Lubricants USA Inc. (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 138, 148.) The complaint alleges that Plaintiff was deceived into voluntarily admitting herself to Pomona Valley, and then forcibly restrained. (Compl., ¶¶ 11-12.) Whether this conduct was extreme and outrageous is a question of fact that the Court will not resolve on demurrer. (See Smith v. BP Lubricants USA Inc., supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at p. 148; see also Panterra GP, Inc. v. Superior Court of Kern County (2022) 74 Cal. App. 5th 697, 709 [a demurrer is not the appropriate procedure for determining the truth of disputed facts.]) The Court also liberally construes this pleading as sufficient to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Code Civ. Proc., § 452.)

The Court further finds Larson inapposite, as it does not address the question of what constitutes extreme and outrageous conduct or otherwise indicate that Pomona Valley’s conduct is not extreme and outrageous as a matter of law. (See generally, Larson, supra, 230 Cal.App.4th 336.) So reinforces the point that extreme and outrageous conduct is usually a question of fact, and does not indicate one way or another whether Pomona Valley’s alleged conduct was extreme and outrageous as a matter of law. (So, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 672.)

However, as discussed above, the Court finds the Sixth Cause of Action to be uncertain. Plaintiff lumps all of the defendants together and does not identify which conduct of Pomona Valley is alleged to provide the basis for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. Because some of the alleged misconduct occurred at different facilities by different individuals, Plaintiff must identify the specific conduct of Pomona Valley alleged to be extreme and outrageous.

Based on the foregoing, the Court SUSTAINS the demurrer to the Sixth Cause of Action with leave to amend.

Seventh Cause of Action – Discrimination

Whenever there is reasonable cause to believe that any person or group of persons is engaged in conduct of resistance to the full enjoyment of any of the rights described in this section, and that conduct is of that nature and is intended to deny the full exercise of those rights, the Attorney General, any district attorney or city attorney, or any person aggrieved by the conduct may bring a civil action in the appropriate court by filing with it a complaint. The complaint shall contain the following:

(1) The signature of the officer, or, in the officer's absence, the individual acting on behalf of the officer, or the signature of the person aggrieved.

(2) The facts pertaining to the conduct.

(3) A request for preventive relief, including an application for a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order against the person or persons responsible for the conduct, as the complainant deems necessary to ensure the full enjoyment of the rights described in this section.

(Civ. Code, § 52, subd. (c).)

Pomona Valley demurs to the Seventh Cause of Action for discrimination for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and for uncertainty. Pomona Valley contends the allegations regarding Plaintiff being denied an interpreter due to her language barrier is unsupported because the complaint also alleges that Plaintiff understood what she was being given and asked to sign what she understood to be discharge papers which voluntarily committed her to a mental hospital. Pomona Valley contends this is contradicted later in the complaint by stating that she was voluntarily admitted to Defendant College Hospital. Pomona Valley further contends Plaintiff fails to allege facts demonstrating that her race, religion, or other protected class was the motivating factor in Pomona Valley’s alleged conduct.

In opposition, Plaintiff contends Pomona Valley misunderstands the complaint. Plaintiff contends she alleges that she was discriminated against by denial of her request for a Chinese interpreter, and that she was discriminated against by signing what she thought were discharge papers but instead voluntarily admitted Plaintiff to a mental hospital. Plaintiff contends the deception renders the admission involuntary. Plaintiff contends the Unruh Act prohibits discrimination based on language or national origin, which the complaint alleges. Plaintiff contends the discrimination prevented her from communicating with hospital staff and facilitated the deception of her signing the voluntary admission papers.

The Court finds the complaint fails to allege sufficient facts to state a cause of action for discrimination under the Unruh Act. While the complaint alleges that Pomona Valley refused to provide Plaintiff with a Chinese interpreter, it does not allege any facts indicating why it refused to do so. (Compl., ¶ 11.) Pomona Valley correctly contends that the complaint must allege facts indicating that Plaintiff’s race or national origin was the motivating factor in refusing to provide her with a Chinese interpreter. (See Koebke v. Bernardo Heights Country Club (2005) 36 Cal.4th 824, 854 [must demonstrate discrimination was motivated by the plaintiff’s protected class].) The other allegations regarding Plaintiff’s race and language barrier are alleged against CH Cerritos. (Compl., ¶¶ 14-15, 18, 20.) The Seventh Cause of Action is also uncertain for the same reasons discussed above regarding all of the defendants being lumped together.

Moreover, there is another problem with the complaint that neither party addressed in their respective briefs. A claim for discrimination under the Unruh Act requires the plaintiff to sign the complaint. (Civ. Code, § 52, subd. (c)(1).) The complaint contains no signature from Plaintiff or any verification. (See generally, Compl.) The complaint therefore fails to comply with Civil Code section 52, subdivision (c)(1), and is subject to demurrer.

Based on the foregoing, the Court SUSTAINS the demurrer to the Seventh Cause of Action for Discrimination with leave to amend.

LEGAL STANDARD – Motion to Strike

“Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof, but this time limitation shall not apply to motions specified in subdivision (e).” (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(2).) “The court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (b) Strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” (Id., § 436.)

PRELIMINARY ISSUES – Motion to Strike

DISCUSSION – Motion to Strike

Meet and Confer

Per Code of Civil Procedure section 435.5, subdivision (a), Pomona Valley was required to meet and confer in person, by telephone, or by video conference before bringing this motion to strike. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435.5, subd. (a).) The Court finds Pomona Valley’s meet-and-confer efforts sufficient. (Owen Decls., ¶¶ 3-6.)

Analysis – First Through Seventh Causes of Action

The Court denies Pomona Valley’s motion to strike with respect to the First through Seventh Causes of Action. Failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action is grounds for a general demurrer, not a motion to strike. (Ferraro v. Camarlinghi (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 509, 529.)

Analysis – Punitive Damages

A claim for punitive damages is subject to a motion to strike when the allegations fail to rise to the level of malice, oppression, or fraud necessary under Civil Code section 3294. (Turman v. Turning Point of Central California, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 64.)

Given that the Court sustained the demurrer at to each cause of action in the complaint with leave to amend, the Court DENIES the motion to strike as moot with respect to the punitive damage allegations in paragraphs 50, 56, and 62 of the complaint, and in the prayer for relief.

Unsigned Complaint

“Every pleading, petition, written notice of motion, or other similar paper shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's individual name, or, if the party is not represented by an attorney, shall be signed by the party. Each paper shall state the signer's address and telephone number, if any. Except when otherwise provided by law, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. An unsigned paper shall be stricken unless omission of the signature is corrected promptly after being called to the attention of the attorney or party.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 128.7, subd. (a).)

The Court notes that the complaint is not signed by Plaintiff’s attorney. (Compl., p. 13.) The Court directs Plaintiff’s counsel to sign the First Amended Complaint before filing it, or else it will be stricken. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 128.7, subd. (a).)

Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES the motion to strike as to the First through Seventh Causes of Action, and DENIES the motion to strike as moot with respect to the punitive damages allegations.

CONCLUSION

The Court SUSTAINS the demurrer to the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Causes of Action with 20 days’ leave to amend.

The Court DENIES the motion to strike as to the First through Seventh Causes of Action, and DENIES the motion to strike as moot with respect to the punitive damages allegations.

Pomona Valley is ordered to give notice of the Court’s ruling within five calendar days of this order.