Judge: Lynette Gridiron Winston, Case: 24PSCV00679, Date: 2024-06-13 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24PSCV00679    Hearing Date: June 13, 2024    Dept: 6

CASE NAME:  Steve S. Demircift v. Universal Plastics Recycling, Inc., et al. 

Defendant Universal Plastics Recycling, Inc.’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs 

TENTATIVE RULING 

The Court DENIES Defendant Universal Plastics Recycling, Inc.’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs. 

             Plaintiff is ordered to give notice of the Court’s ruling within five calendar days of this order. 

BACKGROUND 

This is an unlawful detainer action. On March 4, 2024, plaintiff Steve S. Demircift (Plaintiff) filed this action against defendant Universal Plastics Recycling, Inc. (Defendant) and Does 1 to 10, alleging the sole cause of action for unlawful detainer. On April 11, 2024, Plaintiff dismissed the entire action without prejudice. 

On April 26, 2024, Defendant moved for attorney’s fees and costs. On May 31, 2024, Plaintiff opposed the motion. On June 6, 2024, Defendant replied. 

LEGAL STANDARD 

In any action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides that attorney's fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce that contract, shall be awarded either to one of the parties or to the prevailing party, then the party who is determined to be the party prevailing on the contract, whether he or she is the party specified in the contract or not, shall be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees in addition to other costs. 

(Civ. Code, § 1717, subd. (a).)

(b) (1) The court, upon notice and motion by a party, shall determine who is the party prevailing on the contract for purposes of this section, whether or not the suit proceeds to final judgment. Except as provided in paragraph (2), the party prevailing on the contract shall be the party who recovered a greater relief in the action on the contract. The court may also determine that there is no party prevailing on the contract for purposes of this section. 

(2) Where an action has been voluntarily dismissed or dismissed pursuant to a settlement of the case, there shall be no prevailing party for purposes of this section. 

(Civ. Code, § 1717, subd. (b)(1), (2).) 

The party seeking fees and costs bears the burden to show "the fees incurred were allowable, were reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation, and were reasonable in amount." (Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor America (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99, 104.) To satisfy this burden, evidence and descriptions of billable tasks must be presented in sufficient detail, enabling the court to evaluate whether the case was overstaffed, the time attorneys spent on specific claims, and the reasonableness of the hours expended. (Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 459, 486-487.) 

“A trial court assessing attorney fees begins with a touchstone or lodestar figure, based on the ‘careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney… involved in the presentation of the case.” (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1321.) “The reasonableness of attorney fees is within the discretion of the trial court, to be determined from a consideration of such factors as the nature of the litigation, the complexity of the issues, the experience and expertise of counsel and the amount of time involved. [Citation.] The court may also consider whether the amount requested is based upon unnecessary or duplicative work. [Citation.]” (Wilkerson v. Sullivan (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 443, 448.) 

“The courts repeatedly have stated that the trial court is in the best position to value the services rendered by the attorneys in his or her courtroom [citation], and this includes the determination of the hourly rate that will be used in the lodestar calculus.[Citation.]” (569 E. Cnty. Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426, 436-437.) 

REQUESTS FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 

            The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s requests for judicial notice as to Exhibits E and F, and DENIES as to all other documents. (Evid. Code § 452, subd. (d).) The Court GRANTS Defendant’s requests for judicial notice. (Id.) However, the Court takes judicial notice only as to “the existence, content and authenticity of public records and other specified documents”; it does not take judicial notice of the truth of the factual matters asserted in those documents. (Dominguez v. Bonta (2022) 87 Cal. App. 5th 389, 400.) 

DISCUSSION 

Summary of Arguments 

Defendant seeks attorney fees and costs in the amount of $22,469.01, comprised of $21,745.00 in attorney fees, $547.26 in court costs, and $236.12 in other litigation costs. Defendant cites paragraph 31 of the subject lease agreement between Defendant and Plaintiff, which provides for the recovery of attorney fees to the prevailing party. Defendant contends Plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal of this action after the Court denied Plaintiff’s request for leave to amend the complaint entitles it to recover attorney fees and costs here. Defendant contends the complaint was defective and that the Court’s denial of the motion for leave to amend meant that Plaintiff would have had to proceed to trial with a materially defective three-day notice, and Defendant therefore successfully defended this action. Defendant further contends the attorney fees it seeks are reasonable. 

In opposition, Plaintiff contends Defendant is not entitled to an award of attorney fees because the complaint was voluntarily dismissed, so Defendant is not the prevailing party under Civil Code section 1717, subdivision (b)(2). Plaintiff contends that even if Plaintiff is entitled to an award of attorney fees, the Court has discretion to deny the fees requested due to Defendant insufficiently supporting the amount requested. Plaintiff further contends that Defendant failed to file a memorandum of costs per Rule 3.1700 of the California Rules of Court, and that Defendant’s attorney was substituted out as Defendant’s attorney of record in the new unlawful detainer action (LASC Case No. 24PSCV01208). 

Whether Defendant is Entitled to Recovery Attorney Fees and Costs 

The Court finds that Defendant is not entitled to recover attorney fees and costs. In an unlawful detainer action, Civil Code section 1717, subdivision (b)(2) precludes recovery for voluntary dismissals of contract claims, but does not preclude recovery for voluntary dismissal of non-contract claims when the attorney fees provision in the lease covers non-contract claims. (Drybread v. Chipain Chiropractic Corp. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1063, 1071-1072.) “[I]f an unlawful detainer action is based on an alleged breach of the lease during an unexpired term (e.g., nonpayment of rent, improper use of the premises), then it is an action sounding in contract.” (Mitchell Land & Improvement Co. v. Ristorante Ferrantelli, Inc. (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 479, 486 [analyzing Drybread.]) Here, the complaint is based on Defendant’s failure to pay rent and other fees required under the lease agreement. Plaintiff served a three-day notice to pay rent or quit demanding $135,790.20 owed pursuant to the Standard Industrial/Commercial Single-Tenant Lease – Gross and Addendum thereto, as amended. (See Compl, ¶¶ 9.a.(1), 9.b., Exh. 2 and Exh. A attached thereto.) Thus, Plaintiff’s unlawful detainer action sounds in contract. 

Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the unlawful detainer action without prejudice on April 11, 2024. Since the action sounds in contract, Defendant is not the prevailing party and is not entitled to recover attorney fees and costs. (See Drybread, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 1075 [“If the right to recover realty emanates from the breach of a lease provision occurring during an unexpired term of a lease, then the right to recover  has its inception in a contractual arrangement between the parties.”]; see also Mitchell Land & Improvement Co. v. Ristorante Ferrantelli, Inc. (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 479, 490 [action was found to be on a contract because the action was premised on the breach of the lease and therefore attorney fees were barred under Civil Code § 1717, subd. (b)(2)].) 

Even if the Court would have found that Defendant was the prevailing party, Defendant’s requested attorney fees is unreasonable. 

            Reasonableness of Fees Requested 

The Court finds that Defendant’s request for $21,745.00 in attorney fees is unreasonable. First, Defendant provided nothing to support this amount. Defendant provided instead a lump sum without any explanation or documentary evidence. (See Cheng Decl., ¶ 6, Ex. “B”, p. 1.) Defendant did not provide a verified fee bill or any invoices to evidence services rendered for specific tasks. (See Hadley v. Krepel (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 677, 682 [a verified cost bill is prima facie evidence that the costs, expenses, and services listed were reasonable].) Without any such fee bill or other documentary evidence, the Court is unable to determine whether the amount requested is reasonable, and the Court will not guess as to what the proper amount should be here. 

Second, the Court further finds this amount unreasonable on its face given Defendant was involved in this action for one month before Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed it. (Answer (3/13/24); Request for Dismissal (4/11/24).) The Court does not find it credible that Defendant’s counsel incurred almost $22,000.00 in attorney fees in the span of one month for an answer, an opposition, and appearing at the hearing on the opposition. (Answer (3/13/24); Opposition to Ex Parte (4/10/24); Minute Order (4/11/24); 569 E. Cnty. Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc., supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at pp. 436-437 [trial courts are in the best position to determine the reasonable value of legal services rendered by attorneys in their courtrooms].) 

Given the absence of evidence to support the amount requested, the Court declines to award any attorney fees to Defendant. (See Heritage Pac. Fin., LLC v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 1010. [“Trial courts retain discretion to penalize block billing when the practice prevents them from discerning which tasks are compensable and which are not. [Citation.]”]) 

            Substitution of Attorney 

            The Court finds Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the substitution of attorney of Defendant’s counsel in the new unlawful detainer action (LASC Case No. 24PSCV01208) to be unavailing. Plaintiff cites no legal authority to show that the substitution of attorney in a different action, even if between the same parties to another action, has any bearing on the legal representation in this action. (Moulton Niguel Water Dist. v. Colombo (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1215 [“Contentions are waived when a party fails to support them with reasoned argument and citations to authority. [Citation.]”.) LASC Case No. 24PSCV01208 is a different lawsuit, and as far as the Court is concerned, Cummins and White, LLP is still Defendant’s counsel of record in this action and was authorized to bring this motion. 

            Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES the motion. 

CONCLUSION 

The Court DENIES Defendant Universal Plastics Recycling, Inc.’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs. 

             Plaintiff is ordered to give notice of the Court’s ruling within five calendar days of this order.