Judge: Lynette Gridiron Winston, Case: 24PSCV02294, Date: 2025-01-30 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24PSCV02294 Hearing Date: January 30, 2025 Dept: 6
CASE NAME: Ashley Hernandez v. Get Air Pomona LP
Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and Request for Stay
TENTATIVE RULING
The Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration, and hereby STAYS this action pending the completion of the arbitration.
Defendant is ordered to give notice of the Court’s ruling within five calendar days of this order.
BACKGROUND
This is a personal injury action. On July 16, 2024, plaintiff Ashley Hernandez (Plaintiff) filed this action against defendant Get Air Pomona LP (Defendant) and Does 1 through 50, alleging causes of action for negligence, premises liability, and gross negligence.
On December 30, 2024, Defendant moved to compel arbitration. On January 15, 2025, Plaintiff opposed the motion. On January 23, 2025, Defendant replied.
LEGAL STANDARD
Parties may be compelled to arbitrate a dispute upon the court finding that: (1) there was a valid agreement to arbitrate between the parties; and (2) said agreement covers the controversy or controversies in the parties’ dispute.¿(Omar v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2004)¿118 Cal.App.4th 955, 961.) A party moving to compel arbitration has the burden of establishing the existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate and the party opposing the petition has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, any fact necessary to its defense. (Banner Entertainment, Inc. v. Superior Court¿(1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 348, 356-357.) A party seeking to compel arbitration meets their initial burden of establishing the existence of a valid arbitration agreement by attaching a copy to the motion. (Condee v. Longwood Mgmt. Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 218-219 (Condee).)
“California has a strong public policy in favor of arbitration and any doubts regarding the arbitrability of a dispute are resolved in favor of arbitration.” (Coast Plaza Doctors Hospital v. Blue Cross of California (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 677, 686.) “This strong policy has resulted in the general rule that arbitration should be upheld unless it can be said with assurance that an arbitration clause is not susceptible to an interpretation covering the asserted dispute.” (Ibid. [internal quotations omitted].) This is in accord with the liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), which governs all agreements to arbitrate in contracts involving interstate commerce. (9 U.S.C. § 2, et seq.; Higgins v. Superior Court (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1247.)
DISCUSSION
FAA v. CAA
“[T]he FAA's procedural provisions do not apply unless the contract contains a choice-of-law clause expressly incorporating them. [T]he question is not whether the parties adopted the CAA’s procedural provisions: The state's procedural statutes apply by default because Congress intended the comparable FAA sections to apply in federal court. The question, therefore, is whether the parties expressly incorporated the FAA’s procedural provisions into their agreements.” (Victrola 89, LLC v. Jaman Properties 8 LLC (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 337, 345, internal citations omitted and italics in original (Victrola 89.) “[P]revious cases have held that when an arbitration agreement provides that its ‘enforcement’ shall be governed by California law, the [CAA] governs a party's motion to compel arbitration. It follows that when an agreement provides that its ‘enforcement’ shall be governed by the FAA, the FAA governs a party's motion to compel arbitration.” (Id. at p. 346.)
The Arbitration Provision (defined below) does not provide that the FAA governs its enforcement. (Hall Decl., Ex. 1.) Accordingly, the CAA governs this motion to compel arbitration. (Victrola 89, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at pp. 345-346.)
Existence of Valid Arbitration Agreement and Covered Claims
Defendant seeks to compel arbitration based on a document entitled, “Signed Waiver,” which Plaintiff purportedly executed before entering Defendant’s trampoline park and suffering an injury. (Hall Decl., Ex. 1.) The Signed Waiver contains an arbitration provision (the Arbitration Provision). (Hall Decl., Ex. 1, ¶ 11.) The Arbitration Provision provides that it covers all disputes arising out of the Signed Waiver, including the participant’s use of Defendant’s trampoline park. (Hall Decl. Ex. 1, ¶ 11.) By having attached a copy of the Signed Waiver with the Arbitration Provision to the moving papers, Defendant has met its initial burden of establishing the existence of an arbitration agreement. (Condee, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at pp. 218-219.) The burden now shifts to Plaintiff to challenge its validity. (Id. at p. 219.)
In opposition, Plaintiff contends Defendant has failed to meet its burden of proof because Defendant has not taken Plaintiff’s deposition, Plaintiff has expressly stated in discovery responses that she lacks sufficient information to admit or deny whether she signed the Signed Waiver, and that she does not recognize the signature on it. Plaintiff then contends that the mere existence of a document in Defendant’s system with matching biographical data is insufficient to authenticate the signature on the agreement. Plaintiff contends Defendant has not provided any detailed explanation or verified testimony to show that it has unique internal mechanisms to confirm that Plaintiff is the person who electronically executed the Signed Waiver. Plaintiff contends Defendant did not present any confirmatory logs, digital certificates, secure sign-in credentials, or other reputable means of confirming that Plaintiff electronically signed the Signed Waiver. Plaintiff contends the Arbitration Provision is unenforceable without authentication.
The Court does not find Plaintiff has adequately challenged the validity of the Arbitration Provision. Although Plaintiff’s discovery responses do not say one way or the other whether she signed the Signed Waiver, but instead say she lacks sufficient information to admit or deny (Cohen Decl., Ex. B, RFA No. 14.), this is insufficient to challenge the validity of the Arbitration Provision. Plaintiff provided no other evidence, such as a declaration from herself, in which she challenges the validity of the Arbitration Provision by directly claiming she did not sign it or that she does not recall signing it, either of which would have been sufficient to shift the burden of proof back to Defendant. (See Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto Grp. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 836, 842-846 [inability to recall signing arbitration agreement sufficient to shift evidentiary burden back to moving party]; Garcia v. Stoneledge Furniture LLC (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 41, 52 [written declaration from employee saying she did not sign the arbitration agreement sufficient to shift evidentiary burden back to moving party].) Plaintiff’s contention that she does not recognize the signature is not supported by any evidence or citation to evidence. (Opp., 3:12-15.) The Court declines to rely on Plaintiff’s counsel’s declaration stating that Plaintiff maintains she does not recognize the signature since that is from Plaintiff’s counsel rather than Plaintiff and creates an issue regarding personal knowledge. (Cohen Decl., ¶ 5; Evid. Code, § 702.) Further, Plaintiff’s discovery responses admit that she signed a waiver provided by Defendant before the subject incident. (Cohen Decl., Ex. B, RFA No. 11.)
Moreover, even if Plaintiff had challenged the validity of the Arbitration Provision and shifted the burden back to Defendant, the Court would find Defendant had proven its validity by a preponderance of the evidence. The declaration of Deanna Hall sets forth in detail the procedures for customers filling out the Signed Waiver at Defendant’s trampoline park, provides that Plaintiff was required to sign it before using the facility at the trampoline park, and that the subject Signed Waiver included Plaintiff’s name, date of birth, phone number, address, and email information that Plaintiff would have input at the time she visited the trampoline park. (Hall Decl., ¶¶ 3-5.) The Court also notes that the electronic signature on the Signed Waiver is dated June 16, 2024, i.e., the date of the incident. (Hall Decl., Ex. 1, p. 8 of pdf.) Additionally, although Defendant may have not presented evidence of confirmatory logs, digital certificates, or secure sign-in credentials, the Court notes that those are not necessarily required as a matter of law; rather, Defendant only needs to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that it is more likely than not that Plaintiff signed the Signed Waiver, which the Court finds it has done here. (See Gamboa v. Ne. Cmty. Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 167-168 [similar evidence needed to authenticate paper and electronic signatures, subject to a preponderance of the evidence standard].)
Additionally, the Court notes that Plaintiff does not dispute that her claims fall within the scope of the Arbitration Provision. (D.I. Chadbourne, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 60 Cal.2d 723, 728, fn. 4 [where nonmoving party fails to oppose a ground for a motion, "it is assumed that [nonmoving party] concedes" that ground].)
Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS the motion.
CONCLUSION
The Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration, and hereby STAYS this action pending the completion of the arbitration.
Defendant is ordered to give notice of the Court’s ruling within five calendar days of this order.