Judge: Lynette Gridiron Winston, Case: 24PSCV03229, Date: 2025-05-01 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24PSCV03229 Hearing Date: May 1, 2025 Dept: 6
CASE NAME: Elizabeth Orduno v. General Motors, LLC
Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend Her Complaint
TENTATIVE RULING
The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend her complaint. Plaintiff must file and serve the proposed First Amended Complaint within five calendar days of this order.
Plaintiff is ordered to give notice of the Court’s ruling within five calendar days of this order.
BACKGROUND
This is a lemon law case. On September 30, 2024, plaintiff Elizabeth Orduno (Plaintiff) filed this action against defendant General Motors LLC (Defendant) and Does 1 through 50, alleging causes of action for violation of subdivision (d) of Civil Code section 1793.2, violation of subdivision (b) of Civil Code section 1793.2, violation of subdivision (a)(3) of Civil Code section 1793.2, breach of express warranty, and breach of the implied warranty of merchantability.
On March 25, 2025, Plaintiff moved for leave to amend her complaint. On April 17, 2025, Defendant opposed the motion. On April 24, 2025, Plaintiff replied.
LEGAL STANDARD
Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (a)(1) provides, in relevant part: “The court may, in furtherance of justice, and on any terms as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading or proceeding by adding or striking out the name of any party, or by correcting a mistake in the name of a party, or a mistake in any other respect; and may, upon like terms, enlarge the time for answer or demurrer. The court may likewise, in its discretion, after notice to the adverse party, allow, upon any terms as may be just, an amendment to any pleading or proceeding in other particulars; and may upon like terms allow an answer to be made after the time limited by this code.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (a)(1).) This discretion should be exercised liberally in favor of amendments, for judicial policy favors resolution of all disputed matters in the same lawsuit.” (Kittredge Sports Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1045, 1047.)
Under Rule 3.1324, subdivision (a) of the California Rules of Court, a motion to amend a pleading shall (1) include a copy of the proposed amendment or amended pleading, which must be serially numbered to differentiate it from previous pleadings or amendments; (2) state what allegations in the previous pleading are proposed to be deleted, if any, and where, by page, paragraph and line number, the deleted allegations are located; and (3) state what allegations are proposed to be added to the previous pleading, if any, and where, by page, paragraph, and line number, the additional allegations are located. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1324, subd. (a).)
Under Rule 3.1324, subdivision (b) of the California Rules of Court, a separate declaration must accompany the motion and must specify (1) the effect of the amendment; (2) why the amendment is necessary and proper; (3) when the facts giving rise to the amended allegations were discovered; and (4) the reasons why the request for amendment was not made earlier. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1324, subd. (b).)
DISCUSSION
Summary of Arguments
Plaintiff seeks leave to amend her complaint to change her claims and base them on the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act and the California Commercial Code. Plaintiff indicates that the recent California Supreme Court decision in Rodriguez v. FCA US, LLC (2024) 17 Cal.5th 189 (Rodriguez) has determined that manufacturers are not liable for used vehicles under the Song-Beverly Act under the facts of this case. Plaintiff seeks leave to add a claim for violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act and the California Commercial Code, and contends that the proposed claim is closely related to Plaintiff’s current Song-Beverly Act claims and that they are based on the same facts and legal issues. Plaintiff contends the breach of express written warranty claim will be alleged under both the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act and the California Commercial Code. Plaintiff contends resolution of the proposed and existing claims will require reference to the same evidence, and that Defendant has been on notice of the facts underlying Plaintiff’s breach of warranty claims since filing the initial complaint, and that Defendant will not be prejudiced.
Plaintiff further contends that California courts recognize a judicial policy liberally granting leave to amend and that leave to amend should be granted here. Plaintiff contends the proposed claims involve the same facts and evidence as Plaintiff’s Song-Beverly Act claims and will therefore not unduly prejudice Defendant. Plaintiff contends this case was only recently filed in September 2024, Plaintiff has not conducted discovery yet, and there is no trial date set. Plaintiff contends to have not delayed seeking amendment, as the recent change in law occurred in October, and Plaintiff’s counsel needed time to determine the best way forward. Plaintiff contends that Plaintiff would be prejudiced if the motion is denied because it would preclude Plaintiff from bringing a meritorious cause of action and enable Defendant to keep engaging in conduct harmful to consumers.
In opposition, Defendant contends Plaintiff’s motion should be denied because Plaintiff unjustifiably delayed seeking to add the proposed new causes of action, allowing Plaintiff to add new causes of action at this stage would unfairly prejudice Defendant, and any attempt to pursue the proposed new causes of action would be futile. Defendant contends Plaintiff’s motion offers no explanation or justification for failing to assert the new causes of action in Plaintiff’s original complaint, and that Plaintiff does not cite any newly discovered facts or evidence in support of the motion. Defendant contends Plaintiff cites no authority to support her argument that the recent California Supreme Court decision forecloses her claims justifying asserting new causes of action that were previously available but Plaintiff chose not to assert. Defendant contends that the fact the sole causes of action Plaintiff chose to assert are no longer viable does not justify Plaintiff’s delay, as Plaintiff was on notice of the Supreme Court’s grant of review of Rodriguez when she filed the complaint.
Defendant then contends it would be unfairly prejudiced if Plaintiff were permitted leave to amend the complaint at this stage because it would open an entirely new field of inquiry without any satisfactory explanation why the change was not made earlier, expand the scope of the case, force Defendant to expend additional resources on discovery, and ultimately delay trial or final resolution of this case. Defendant contends the measure of damages between the Commercial Code and Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act on the one hand and the Song-Beverly Act on the other differ. Defendant contends the Commercial Code has notice and reliance requirements that Song-Beverly does not, and that forcing Defendant to engage in additional discovery, expend additional resources, and prolong the ultimate resolution is unwarranted because Plaintiff was aware of these potential causes of action when she filed the complaint. Defendant further contends amendment would be futile because none of the new causes of action are viable. Defendant contends the proposed amended complaint does not allege compliance with the notice and reliance requirements for the Commercial Code vis-à-vis the breach of express warranty claim, and that Plaintiff’s Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act claims also necessarily fail because they are coextensive with Plaintiff’s Commercial Code claims.
Analysis
The Court finds Plaintiff has sufficiently satisfied the requirements for obtaining leave to amend her complaint. Plaintiff has provided a copy of the proposed amended complaint with the proposed changes. (Kowalski Decl., Ex. 2; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1324, subd. (a)(1).) Plaintiff has also provided the necessary declaration explaining the effect of the proposed amendment, why it is necessary and proper, when the facts giving rise to the amended allegations were discovered, and the reasons the request for amendment was not made earlier. (Id., rule 3.1324, subd. (b); Kowalski Dec., ¶¶ 6-8.)
The Court further notes that this action has been pending for less than one year and no trial date is set, so there is little to no prejudice to Defendant in terms of timing. (Miles v. City of Los Angeles (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 728, 739.) Plaintiff also correctly contends that policy favors liberally granting leave to amend. “If the motion to amend is timely made and the granting of the motion will not prejudice the opposing party, it is error to refuse permission to amend and where the refusal also results in a party being deprived of the right to assert a meritorious cause of action or a meritorious defense, it is not only error but an abuse of discretion. [Citations.]” (Morgan v. Superior Ct. of Cal. In & For Los Angeles County (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 527, 530.) Finally, if the proposed new causes of action are not viable as Defendant contends, the Court finds the better practice is to let the parties address such arguments on a demurrer. (Atkinson v. Elk Corp. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 739, 760 [“we believe that the better course of action would have been to allow [plaintiff] to amend the complaint and then let the parties test its legal sufficiency in other appropriate proceedings”].)
Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS the motion.
CONCLUSION
The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend her complaint. Plaintiff must file and serve the proposed First Amended Complaint within five calendar days of this order.
Plaintiff is ordered to give notice of the Court’s ruling within five calendar days of this order.