Judge: Lynette Gridiron Winston, Case: 24PSCV03239, Date: 2025-02-25 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24PSCV03239 Hearing Date: February 25, 2025 Dept: 6
Plaintiff
Luis A. Arevalo-Chavez’s Request for Entry of Default Judgment
Defendants: Ryan Carroll, Carroll Enterprises LLC
TENTATIVE RULING
Plaintiff’s request for entry of default judgment is DENIED. The Court also hereby VACATES the entry of default as to Defendant Ryan Carroll. The Court will hear from Plaintiff’s counsel whether Plaintiff intends to amend the complaint, thereby setting aside the default or whether judgment should be entered in favor of Defendants.
BACKGROUND
This is a breach of contract action. On October 1, 2024, plaintiff Luis A. Arevalo-Chavez (Plaintiff) filed this action against defendants Ryan Carroll and Carroll Enterprises LLC (collectively, Defendants), alleging one cause of action for breach of contract.
On December 19, 2024, default was entered against Defendants.
On January 27, 2024, Plaintiff submitted a proposed default judgment.
LEGAL STANDARD
Code of Civil Procedure section 585 permits entry of a default judgment after a party has failed to timely respond or appear. (Code Civ. Proc., § 585.) A party seeking judgment on the default by the court must file a Request for Court Judgment, and: (1) a brief summary of the case; (2) declarations or other admissible evidence in support of the judgment requested; (3) interest computations as necessary; (4) a memorandum of costs and disbursements; (5) declaration of nonmilitary status; (6) a proposed form of judgment; (7) a dismissal of all parties against whom judgment is not sought or an application for separate judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 579, supported by a showing of grounds for each judgment; (8) exhibits as necessary; and (9) a request for attorneys’ fees if allowed by statute or by the agreement of the parties. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1800.)
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff seeks default judgment against Defendants in the total amount of $108,370.00, including $47,000.00 in general damages, $56,870.00 in prejudgment interest, and $4,500.00 in attorney fees. The Court finds multiple defects here that prevent the Court from entering a default judgment. First, the complaint does not allege sufficient facts to state a cause of action for breach of contract. (Kim v. Westmoore Partners, Inc. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 267, 282; see also Johnson v. Stanhiser (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 357, 361, italics added [a defaulting defendant admits only the well-pleaded facts concerning liability; the plaintiff must still introduce admissible prima facie evidence of damages].) The complaint does not allege the essential terms of the agreement between Plaintiff and Defendants or attach a copy of any written agreement. (Compl., ¶ BC-1.) Plaintiff instead alleges in confusing terms about having an Amazon store with the assistance of Defendant Carroll Enterprises, LLC, without any mention of Defendant Ryan Carroll and that Plaintiff was guaranteed his investment would be returned. (Compl., ¶ BC-2.) Plaintiff then states he only received $5,381.32, but now requests $44,619, “plus a 10% annem [sic] and attorney’s fees…” (Compl., ¶ BC-2.) Plaintiff then confusingly states that the breach occurred on “ON 9.” (Compl., ¶ BC-4.) These allegations are insufficient to state a cause of action for breach of contract.
Second, Plaintiff seeks $47,000.00 in damages, but the complaint only alleges $44,619.00 in damages. (Compl., ¶ 10; CIV-100, ¶ 2, subd. (b)(2); JUD-100, ¶ 6, subd. (a)(1).) Plaintiff may not seek damages greater than the amount prayed for in the complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., § 580, subds. (a)-(c); Paterra v. Hansen (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 507, 536; Greenup v. Rodman (1986) 42 Cal.3d 822, 826.) “The purpose of [Code of Civil Procedure] section 580 is to require the plaintiff to provide notice of the maximum amount of the defendant's potential liability.” (Electronic Funds Solutions, LLC v. Murphy (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1161, 1174; see also Becker v. S.P.V. Constr. Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 489, 494 [“a prayer for damages according to proof passes muster under section 580 only if a specific amount of damages is alleged in the body of the complaint”].) “The courts have consistently held section 580 is an unqualified limit on the jurisdiction of courts entering default judgments. As a general rule, a default judgment is limited to the damages of which the defendant had notice. Further, the courts have reaffirmed the language of section 580 is mandatory. Therefore, ‘in all default judgments the demand sets a ceiling on recovery.’” (Finney v. Gomez (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 527, 534, fns. omitted, quoting Greenup v. Rodman (1986) 42 Cal.3d 822, 824.) Because that ceiling is jurisdictional, “a default judgment is void when the damages are in excess of the damages specified in the complaint or the statement of damages.” (Yeung v. Soos (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 576, 582.)
Third, Plaintiff did not submit a brief summary of the case, supporting declarations, exhibits, or documentary evidence to support the amount of damages requested. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1800, subds. (a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(8); Code Civ. Proc., § 585, subd. (b) ["The court shall hear the evidence offered by the plaintiff and shall render judgment in the plaintiffs favor for that relief, not exceeding the amount stated in the complaint… as appears by the evidence to be just"].) This is especially pertinent since Plaintiff alleges the contract was written. (Compl., ¶ BC-1.)
Fourth, Plaintiff did not show how the prejudgment interest request was calculated. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1800, subd. (a)(3).) Additionally, Plaintiff requests interest at the rate of 4461.90% per year, which is impermissible.
Fifth, it is unclear on what basis Plaintiff is entitled to attorney’s fees. The complaint does not allege any terms in the contract that provide for the recovery of attorney fees. (See generally, Compl.; Civ. Code, § 1717, subd. (a).) If Plaintiff’s claim is based on statute, it is unclear what statute would apply here. Additionally, the amount of attorney’s fees requested exceeds the amount permissible under Local Rule 3.214 for default judgments. (Local Rule 3.214.)
Sixth, Plaintiff did not fully complete the memorandum of costs. (CIV-100, ¶ 7; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1800, subd. 4.)
Seventh, the proposed judgment indicates that the Court considered Plaintiff’s testimony and other evidence, in addition to Plaintiff’s written declaration, which is incorrect, as Plaintiff neither testified nor provided a written declaration. (JUD-10, ¶ 1, subd. (e)(1).)
Eighth, the proof of substituted service on Defendant Ryan Carroll contains no declaration of mailing or other indication as to when the documents were mailed to him. (Proof of Service by Substituted Service for Defendant Ryan Carroll (11/18/24).) The clerk therefore improperly entered default against Defendant Ryan Carroll. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 415.20, subd. (b).) The Court will set aside the entry of default as to Defendant Ryan Carroll.
CONCLUSION