Judge: Lynette Gridiron Winston, Case: 25PSCV00047, Date: 2025-06-02 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 25PSCV00047 Hearing Date: June 2, 2025 Dept: 6
CASE NAME: David Ndungu v. Inland Valley Partners, LLC d/b/a Inland Valley Care and Rehabilitation Center, et al.
2. Defendants Inland Valley Partners, LLC d/b/a Inland Valley Care and Rehabilitation Center and Renew Health Consulting Services LLC’s Motion to Strike
TENTATIVE RULING
The Court OVERRULES the demurrer to the First, Second and Third Causes of Action.
The Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to strike in its entirety.
Defendants shall file and serve an answer to the Complaint within 10 days.
Plaintiff is ordered to give notice of the Court’s ruling within five calendar days of this order.
BACKGROUND
This is an elder abuse/dependent adult case. On January 7, 2025, plaintiff David Ndungu (Plaintiff) filed this action against defendants Inland Valley Partners, LLC d/b/a Inland Valley Care and Rehabilitation Center (Inland Valley), Renew Health Consulting Services, LLC (Renew) (collectively, Defendants), and Does 1 through 50, alleging causes of action for negligence, violations of the Elder and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act, and violations of resident rights.
On April 28, 2025, Defendants filed a demurrer and motion to strike. On May 9, 2025, Plaintiff opposed the motions. Defendants replied late on May 27, 2925.
LEGAL STANDARD – Demurrer
A demurrer is a pleading used to test the legal sufficiency of other pleadings. It raises issues of law, not fact, regarding the form or content of the opposing party's pleading (complaint, answer or cross-complaint). (Code Civ. Proc., § 422.10; see Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994 (Donabedian).) It is not the function of the demurrer to challenge the truthfulness of the complaint; and for purposes of ruling on the demurrer, all facts pleaded in the complaint are assumed to be true. (Id. at pp. 993-994.)
A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at p. 994.) No other extrinsic evidence can be considered. (Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881 [error for court to consider facts asserted in memorandum supporting demurrer]; see also Afuso v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 859, 862, disapproved on other grounds in Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Cos. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 287 [error to consider contents of release not part of court record].)
A demurrer can be utilized where the “face of the complaint” itself is incomplete or discloses some defense that would bar recovery. (Guardian North Bay, Inc. v. Superior Court (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 963, 971-972.) The “face of the complaint” includes material contained in attached exhibits that are incorporated by reference into the complaint, or in a superseded complaint in the same action. (Frantz v. Blackwell (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 91, 94; see also Barnett v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 500, 505 [“[W]e rely on and accept as true the contents of the exhibits and treat as surplusage the pleader’s allegations as to the legal effect of the exhibits”].)
A demurrer can only be sustained when it disposes of an entire pleading, cause of action, or affirmative defense. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1320, subd. (a); Poizner v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 119; Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redev. Agency (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1046-1047.)
DISCUSSION – Demurrer
Meet and Confer
Per Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41, subdivision (a), Defendants were required to meet and confer in person, by telephone, or by video conference before bringing this demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a).) Defendants only sent a meet and confer letter, which is insufficient. (Yousefi Decl., ¶ 3.) Nevertheless, the Court may not overrule a demurrer for failure to adequately meet and confer. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a)(4).) The Court will still consider the demurrer, but admonishes Defendants to comply with the Code of Civil Procedure’s requirements going forward.
First Cause of Action – Negligence
To state a cause of action for negligence, the plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating duty, breach, causation, and damages. (Thomas v. Stenberg (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 654, 662.)
Defendants demur to the First Cause of Action for negligence on the grounds that it fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Defendants contend Plaintiff’s claim is a claim for professional negligence since the complaint alleges the facility at issue is a skilled nursing facility and that Plaintiff depended on Defendants for nursing and healthcare services. Defendants contend the decision to protect Plaintiff from falling was a duty to Plaintiff as a patient, not a duty to the public, and that all decisions related to Plaintiff’s care are related to his medical care and treatment.
In opposition, Plaintiff contends there is no claim for professional negligence and that the complaint adequately alleges facts supporting general negligence. Plaintiff contends Defendants intentionally mischaracterize this cause of action as one for medical negligence in an attempt to heighten the applicable standard of care. Plaintiff contends this claim is for general negligence because it centers on fundamental custodial failures that do not require medical expertise or judgment. Plaintiff then contends the complaint alleges in detail that Defendants actually knew of Plaintiff’s condition, the risks presented by that condition, and his needs for basic care. Plaintiff also contends the complaint clearly alleges the progression of injury due to Defendants’ basic care failures and Plaintiff’s subsequent recovery at a different facility.
The Court finds the complaint alleges sufficient facts to state a cause of action for negligence. “The extent and character of the care that a hospital owes its patients depends on the circumstances of each particular case. A private hospital owes its patients the duty of protection, and must exercise such reasonable care toward a patient as his known condition may require. The measure of duty of a hospital is to exercise that degree of care, skill, and diligence used by hospitals generally in that community, and required by the express or implied contract of the undertaking. A hospital is liable for want of ordinary care, whether from incompetency of a nurse or failure in duty by a fully qualified nurse.” (Wood v. Samaritan Inst. (1945) 26 Cal.2d 847, 851-852.) It is unclear to the Court what meaningful difference there is between a general negligence claim and professional negligence claim in this case at the pleading stage, as Defendants do not argue that Plaintiff’s claim is time barred. (See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Demurrer, 6:15-8:2; Mitchell v. Los Robles Reg'l Med. Ctr. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 291, 297.) Even assuming for the sake of argument that the First Cause of Action is a professional negligence claim, the Court finds the complaint’s allegations sufficient. The complaint alleges that Plaintiff was a resident at Defendants’ skilled nursing facility and that Defendants breached their duty to Plaintiff by, among other things, failing to timely respond to calls for help and only repositioning Plaintiff once during night shifts, which led to Plaintiff developing an ulcer and other skin problems. (Compl., ¶¶ 21-29.)
Based on the foregoing, the Court OVERRULES the demurrer to the First Cause of Action.
Second Cause of Action – Violations of the Elder and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act
The elements of a cause of action for elder abuse and neglect are determined by the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act (EADACPA). (Welf. & Inst. Code § 15600 et seq.) The EADACPA defines “neglect” as “[t]he negligent failure of any person having the care or custody of an elder or a dependent adult to exercise that degree of care that a reasonable person in a like position would exercise.” (Welf. & Inst. Code § 15610.57.) Neglect under the EADACPA “refers not to the substandard performance of medical services but, rather, to the failure of those responsible for attending to the basic needs and comforts of elderly or dependent adults, regardless of their professional standing, to carry out their custodial obligations. Thus, the statutory definition of ‘neglect’ speaks not of the undertaking of medical services, but of the failure to provide medical care.” (Sababin v. Superior Court (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 81, 89, quotation marks and citation omitted, italics in original.)
Several factors “must be present for conduct to constitute neglect within the meaning of the Elder Abuse Act and thereby trigger the enhanced remedies available under the Act. The plaintiff must allege (and ultimately prove by clear and convincing evidence) facts establishing that the defendant: (1) had responsibility for meeting the basic needs of the elder or dependent adult, such as nutrition, hydration, hygiene or medical care; (2) knew of conditions that made the elder or dependent adult unable to provide for his or her own basic needs; and (3) denied or withheld goods or services necessary to meet the elder or dependent adult's basic needs, either with knowledge that injury was substantially certain to befall the elder or dependent adult (if the plaintiff alleges oppression, fraud or malice) or with conscious disregard of the high probability of such injury (if the plaintiff alleges recklessness). The plaintiff must also allege (and ultimately prove by clear and convincing evidence) that the neglect caused the elder or dependent adult to suffer physical harm, pain or mental suffering. Finally, the facts constituting the neglect and establishing the causal link between the neglect and the injury must be pleaded with particularity, in accordance with the pleading rules governing statutory claims.” (Carter v. Prime Healthcare Paradise Valley LLC (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 396, 406-407 (Carter), quotation marks and internal citations omitted.)
Defendants demur to the Second Cause of Action for violations of the Elder and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act on the grounds that it fails to allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Defendants contend Plaintiff fails to allege facts sufficient to satisfy the pleading requirements for an elder/dependent adult claim. Defendants contend Plaintiff does not allege facts that would show Defendants engaged in reckless neglect directed at Plaintiff. Defendants contend Plaintiff does not allege facts showing corporate authorization or ratification specific to Defendants. Defendants contend the allegations regarding the pressure ulcer and appropriateness of care at most sound in medical negligence, not dependent abuse/neglect. Defendants contend no facts indicate who intentionally denied Plaintiff care or how such conduct caused Plaintiff’s damages. Defendants also contend the complaint fails to allege with specificity any conduct demonstrating ratification, authorization, or advance knowledge by an officer, director, or managing agent of the alleged abuse.
In opposition, Plaintiff contends the complaint alleges sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action for violation of the Elder and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act. Plaintiff contends he was a dependent adult while in Defendants’ care, and that Defendants failed to meet basic needs, failed to protect from health/safety hazards, and that there was a pattern of ongoing neglect. Plaintiff contends the complaint demonstrates recklessness and oppression through conscious disregard of known risks, systematic understaffing, and false representations. Plaintiff contends the complaint establishes corporate authorization and ratification through managing agents.
The Court finds the complaint alleges sufficient facts with respect to inadequate care. The complaint alleges that Plaintiff was admitted to Defendants’ skilled nursing facility following back surgery that had rendered Plaintiff temporarily immobile, and that he required assistance with toileting, mobility, dressing, and feeding. (Compl., ¶¶ 21-22.) The complaint alleges that Plaintiff developed open wounds/pressure ulcers on his back within three days of his admission to the facility. (Compl., ¶¶ 25-26.) The complaint alleges that thereafter, Plaintiff began experiencing problems with getting repositioned, Inland Valley’s staff delayed responding to his call lights, and that they would only reposition him once during nighttime hours. (Compl., ¶¶ 27-28.) The complaint then alleges that his wounds improved after transferring to a hospital, receiving physical therapy, and later receiving care at home. (Compl., ¶¶ 29-32.) Thus, the Court finds these allegations sufficient to demonstrate that Defendants denied or withheld goods or services either with knowledge that substantial harm was certain to befall Plaintiff or with conscious disregard of the high probability of such injury, and that Plaintiff has pleaded a causal link with sufficient specificity. (Carter, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at pp. 406-407.)
The Court also finds the complaint alleges sufficient facts demonstrating that an officer, director, or managing agent of Defendants ratified, authorized, or otherwise knew in advance of Plaintiff’s alleged abuse. (See Compl., ¶¶ 21-44; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15657, subd. (c); Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (b).) The Court finds these allegations sufficient at the pleading stage.
Based on the foregoing, the Court OVERRULES the demurrer to the Second Cause of Action.
Third Cause of Action – Violations of Resident Rights
A current or former resident or patient, or the legal representative, personal representative, or successor in interest of a current or former resident or patient, of a skilled nursing facility, as defined in subdivision (c) of Section 1250, or intermediate care facility, as defined in subdivision (d) of Section 1250, may bring a civil action against the licensee of a facility who violates any rights of the resident or patient as set forth in Section 72527 or 73523 of Title 22 of the California Code of Regulations, or any other right provided for by federal or state law or regulation.
(Health & Saf. Code, § 1430, subd. (b)(1).)
Defendants demur to the Third Cause of Action for violation of resident rights on the grounds that it fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Defendants contend Plaintiff fails to plead facts with particularity. Defendants contend Plaintiff lists rights for which are there are no factual allegations to support, such as right to receive care pursuant to physician’s orders, right to have records of nurses’ notes that are clear and legible, the right to have a physician notified of any change in condition.
In opposition, Plaintiff contends the complaint alleges sufficient facts to state this cause of action. Plaintiff contends the complaint alleges that Plaintiff was a patient admitted at a license skilled nursing facility, that Defendants failed to, among other things, maintain adequate staffing and implement a proper care plan that resulted in Plaintiff developing a stage 3 ulcer and required hospitalization at a different facility.
The Court finds the complaint alleges sufficient facts to state a cause of action for violation of resident rights. The rights of patients include, but are not necessarily limited to, the right to be free from mental and physical abuse and the right to be treated with consideration, respect, and full recognition of dignity. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 22, § 72527, subds. (a)(10), (a)(12).) The complaint alleges that Defendants failed to timely respond to Plaintiff’s calls for help and failed to reposition him more than once during nighttime hours. (Compl., ¶¶ 27-28.) The Court finds these allegations sufficient to show that Defendants abused Plaintiff by neglecting his needs and failing to provide him with the respect and consideration to which he was entitled. (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 22, § 72527, subds. (a)(10), (a)(12).)
Based on the foregoing, the Court OVERRULES the demurrer to the Third Cause of Action.
LEGAL STANDARD – Motion to Strike
“Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof, but this time limitation shall not apply to motions specified in subdivision (e).” (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(2).) “The court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (b) Strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” (Id., § 436.)
DISCUSSION – Motion to Strike
Meet and Confer
Per Code of Civil Procedure section 435.5, subdivision (a), Defendants were required to meet and confer in person, by telephone, or by video conference before bringing this motion to strike. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435.5, subd. (a).) Defendants only sent a meet and confer letter, which is insufficient. (Yousefi Decl., ¶ 3.) Nevertheless, the Court may not deny a motion to strike for failure to adequately meet and confer. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435.5, subd. (a)(4).) The Court will still consider the motion to strike, but admonishes Defendants to comply with the Code of Civil Procedure’s requirements going forward.
Punitive Damages and Attorney Fees Under Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657
A claim for punitive damages is subject to a motion to strike when the allegations fail to rise to the level of malice, oppression, or fraud necessary under Civil Code section 3294. (Turman v. Turning Point of Central California, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 64.) Attorney fees are recoverable only if provided by contract, law, or statute. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (a)(10).) A successful claim for elder or dependent adult abuse may entitle the prevailing party to attorney fees and punitive damages, among other remedies. (Welf. & Inst. Code § 15657.) Attorney fees are also available for violations of patient rights claims. (Health & Safety Code, § 1430, subd. (b)(1).)
Defendants seek to strike language from the complaint pertaining to punitive damages and attorney fees on the grounds that Plaintiff does not allege sufficient facts to satisfy the requirements of Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (b), and Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657. Defendants contend Plaintiff makes conclusory allegations of malice, oppression, and fraud without the facts to support such claims. Defendants also contend there is no basis to support a claim for attorney fees under Health and Safety Code section 1430 since Plaintiff did not allege sufficient facts indicating that Defendants violated any regulations related to Plaintiff’s care and treatment.
In opposition, Plaintiff contends the complaint alleges sufficient facts to support each cause of action therein and the corresponding requests for attorney fees and punitive damages. Plaintiff contends the complaint alleges specific instances of reckless neglect that satisfy the heightened pleading standard for elder abuse claims and facts supporting corporate liability. Plaintiff contends the prayer for attorney fees is properly supported as well under Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657 and Health and Safety Code section 1430, subdivision (b). Plaintiff further contends the complaint’s allegations support enhanced remedies.
Given the Court overruling the demurrer to the Second Cause of Action as noted above, the Court finds the complaint also necessarily alleges facts supporting Plaintiff’s requests for punitive damages and attorney fees under Welfare & Institutions Code section 15657, subdivision (c). (See Welf. & Inst. Code § 15657, subd. (c).)
And, since the Court also overruled the demurrer to the Third Cause of Action, the Court also necessarily finds the complaint alleges sufficient facts that would support an award for attorney fees under Health and Safety Code section 1430, subdivision (b)(1). (See Health & Safety Code, § 1430, subd. (b)(1).)
The Court also notes that it could not find any language that read, “as well as attorney’s fees” on page 19, line 25 of the complaint. The Court cannot strike language that does not exist.
Additionally, it is unclear why Defendants seek to strike the words, “[r]easonable costs of suit” from page 25, line 10 of the complaint. Defendants provided no argument for why this language should be stricken.
Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to strike in its entirety.
CONCLUSION
The Court OVERRULES the demurrer to the First, Second and Third Causes of Action.
The Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to strike in its entirety.
Defendants shall file and serve an answer to the Complaint within 10 days.
Plaintiff is ordered to give notice of the Court’s ruling within five calendar days of this order.