Judge: Lynette Gridiron Winston, Case: 25PSCV00064, Date: 2025-05-27 Tentative Ruling



Case Number: 25PSCV00064    Hearing Date: May 27, 2025    Dept: 6

Plaintiff Velocity Investments, LLC’s Request for Entry of Default Judgment 

Defendant: Fang Chi Sun 

TENTATIVE RULING 

            Plaintiff’s request for entry of default judgment is DENIED. The Court also hereby VACATES the default entered on April 29, 2025 as to Defendant Fang Chi Sun.           

BACKGROUND           

            This is a debt buying and collection case. On January 7, 2025, plaintiff Velocity Investments, LLC (Plaintiff), successor in interest to original creditor Cross River Bank, filed this action against defendant Fang Chi Sun (Defendant) and Does 1 through 10, alleging one cause of action for breach of contract. 

            On April 29, 2025, the clerk entered default against Defendant. On the same date, Plaintiff requested entry of default judgment.           

LEGAL STANDARD 

Code of Civil Procedure section 585 permits entry of a default judgment after a party has failed to timely respond or appear. (Code Civ. Proc., § 585.) A party seeking judgment on the default by the court must file a Request for Court Judgment, and: (1) a brief summary of the case; (2) declarations or other admissible evidence in support of the judgment requested; (3) interest computations as necessary; (4) a memorandum of costs and disbursements; (5) declaration of nonmilitary status; (6) a proposed form of judgment; (7) a dismissal of all parties against whom judgment is not sought or an application for separate judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 579, supported by a showing of grounds for each judgment; (8) exhibits as necessary; and (9) a request for attorneys’ fees if allowed by statute or by the agreement of the parties. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1800.) 

ANALYSIS 

Plaintiff seeks default judgment against Defendants in the total amount of $49,008.29, including $46,684.26 in damages, $1,790.53 in attorney fees, and $533.50 in costs. The default judgment package otherwise looks proper, but the Court notes that the proof of service fails to demonstrate proper service under Code of Civil Procedure section 415.20, subdivision (c), i.e., substitute service at a commercial mail receiving agency (CMRA). (Code Civ. Proc., § 415.20, subd. (c).) 

There is no evidence that Plaintiff attempted to serve Defendant personally. The Declaration of Reasonable Diligence does not include any attempts to effect service by personal delivery. (Proof of Service (1/17/25).) Plaintiff offers no evidence regarding the efforts Plaintiff made to locate and investigate Defendant’s addresses and the basis/results of that investigation. Plaintiff does not contend, and the record does not establish that the private mailbox belongs to Defendant personally. Further, Plaintiff has not offered sufficient evidence that the address at which the documents were served constitute Defendant's "usual mailing address." 

            Given the lack of evidence of proper service under Code of Civil Procedure section 415.20, subdivision (c), the Court will vacate the entry of default. 

CONCLUSION           

            Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s request for entry of default judgment is DENIED. The Court also hereby VACATES the default entered on April 29, 2025 as to Defendant Fang Chi Sun.




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