Judge: Lynette Gridiron Winston, Case: 25PSCV00320, Date: 2025-05-15 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 25PSCV00320 Hearing Date: May 15, 2025 Dept: 6
CASE NAME: Edd Bean, et al. v. Volkswagen Group of America Inc.
Defendant Volkswagen Group of America Inc.’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Third Cause of Action
TENTATIVE RULING
The Court SUSTAINS Defendant Volkswagen Group of America Inc.’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Third Cause of Action with 20 days’ leave to amend.
Defendant is ordered to give notice of the Court’s ruling within five calendar days of this order.
BACKGROUND
This is a lemon law case. On January 29, 2025, plaintiffs Edd Bean and Diane Bean (collectively, Plaintiffs) filed this action against defendant Volkswagen Group of America Inc. (Defendant) and Does 1 through 10, alleging causes of action for violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act breach of express warranty, violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act breach of implied warranty, and violation of Business and Professions Code § 17200.
On April 18, 2025, Defendant demurred to the Third Cause of Action in the complaint. On April 30, 2025, Plaintiffs opposed the motion. On May 8, 2025, Defendant replied.
LEGAL STANDARD
A demurrer is a pleading used to test the legal sufficiency of other pleadings. It raises issues of law, not fact, regarding the form or content of the opposing party's pleading (complaint, answer or cross-complaint). (Code Civ. Proc., § 422.10; see Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994 (Donabedian).) It is not the function of the demurrer to challenge the truthfulness of the complaint; and for purposes of ruling on the demurrer, all facts pleaded in the complaint are assumed to be true. (Id. at pp. 993-994.) The Court may not consider contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law. Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.App.4th 634, 638.
A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at p. 994.) No other extrinsic evidence can be considered. (Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881 [error for court to consider facts asserted in memorandum supporting demurrer]; see also Afuso v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 859, 862, disapproved on other grounds in Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Cos. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 287 [error to consider contents of release not part of court record].)
A demurrer can be utilized where the “face of the complaint” itself is incomplete or discloses some defense that would bar recovery. (Guardian North Bay, Inc. v. Superior Court (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 963, 971-972.) The “face of the complaint” includes material contained in attached exhibits that are incorporated by reference into the complaint, or in a superseded complaint in the same action. (Frantz v. Blackwell (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 91, 94; see also Barnett v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 500, 505 [“[W]e rely on and accept as true the contents of the exhibits and treat as surplusage the pleader’s allegations as to the legal effect of the exhibits”].)
A demurrer can only be sustained when it disposes of an entire pleading, cause of action, or affirmative defense. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1320, subd. (a); Poizner v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 119; Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redev. Agency (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1046-1047.)
DISCUSSION
Meet and Confer
Per Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41, subdivision (a), Defendant was required to meet and confer in person, by telephone, or by video conference before bringing this demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a).) The Court finds Defendant’s efforts to meet and confer sufficient. (Simpson-James Decl., ¶¶ 3-7.)
Third Cause of Action – Violation of Business and Professions Code § 17200
“As used in this chapter, unfair competition shall mean and include any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising and any act prohibited by Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 17500) of Part 3 of Division 7 of the Business and Professions Code.” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200.) Any business practice that violates any law also violates Business and Professions Code section 17200. (People v. E.W.A.P. Inc. (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 315, 318-319.) Business and Professions Code section 17200 “borrows” violations of other laws and treats them as independently actionable. (Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Superior Ct. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 377, 383 (Farmers).)
Defendant demurs to the Third Cause of Action for violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200 on the grounds that it fails to state sufficient facts to state a cause of action. Defendant contends Plaintiffs will not be able to show any representations made by Defendant to Plaintiffs because there were none, and that it was not involved in the sale, repair, or transaction of the subject vehicle to Plaintiffs. Defendant contends Plaintiffs do not allege that Defendant made any statements to Plaintiff pursuant to a business activity. Defendant contends the complaint does not allege facts showing that Defendant knew the vehicle was defective before the time of sale. Defendant contends Plaintiffs do not plead the alleged conduct is tethered to any specific constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provision when the claim is based on unfairness due to an alleged public policy violation. Defendant also contends Plaintiffs do not allege facts showing that Defendant’s conduct fails the balancing test for unfair conduct.
Defendant then argues that Plaintiffs already have an adequate remedy at law, rendering equitable relief under the unfair competition law (UCL) improper. Defendant cites the case of Durkee v. Ford Motor Co. (N.D. Cal. 2014) No. C 14-0617 PJH, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122857 (Durkee), in which the federal district court dismissed a UCL claim on this basis. Defendant contends Plaintiffs cannot simultaneously seek legal remedies under the Song-Beverly Act and equitable remedies under the UCL.
In opposition, Plaintiffs contend they have properly pleaded a claim for unfair competition. Plaintiffs contend Defendant has unfettered access to its brochures, marketing, and advertising materials regarding the subject vehicle. Plaintiffs contend the complaint alleges sufficient facts to demonstrate violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200. Plaintiffs contend they have alleged that Defendant knew the components and subject vehicle suffered from defects that caused multiple fluid and oil leaks, requiring replacement of a new head gasket and causing a clogged and contaminated radiator. Plaintiffs contend they have alleged that Defendant intentionally failed to properly diagnose the issues in the subject vehicle and installed remanufactured or reconditioned parts that were not the same quality as the standard OEM components. Plaintiffs contend they alleged that Defendant installed components it knew were defective. Plaintiffs contend they also alleged that Defendant’s authorized repair facility performed negligent repairs because it knew that the manufacturer was unlikely to reimburse them for multiple repairs stemming from the same underlying issue. Plaintiffs also contend they alleged that consumers are likely to be deceived by the acts described in Plaintiff’s complaint, and that Defendant represented the subject vehicle would be repaired under warranty in a reasonable manner.
Plaintiffs then contend that Defendant’s advertisements and misrepresentations are actionable. Plaintiffs contend they allege that Defendant intentionally placed the subject vehicle with defective parts into the stream of commerce, that Defendant knew the defects caused substantial issues with the suspension and steering which required the replacement of new components. Plaintiffs contend that despite the passage of time, Plaintiffs have received no benefit from the warranty of the vehicle.
A Plaintiff alleging unfair business practices under the UCL must state with "reasonable particularity" the facts supporting the statutory elements of the violation. (Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 619. [Where the Plaintiff did not identify the statutory scheme which was allegedly violated and the particular facts supporting the violation].) Additionally, "heightened pleading" normally required of fraud allegations is not required to state a UCL claim. (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guar. Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 46; Gutierrez v. Carmax Auto Superstores California (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1234, 1261 ["Based on the foregoing, we conclude causes of action under the CLRA and UCL must be stated with reasonable particularity which is a more lenient pleading standard than is applied to common law fraud claims."].) Plaintiff must plead sufficient facts, which are the essential facts of the case, "with reasonable precision and with particularity sufficiently specific to acquaint the defendant with the nature, source, and extent of his cause of action." (Gressley v. Williams (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 636, 643-644.)
Here, the Court finds the complaint fails to allege sufficient facts to state a cause of action for violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200. Although Defendant did not demur to the First or Second Causes of Action for violations of the Song-Beverly Act, the complaint fails to allege sufficient facts to establish the predicate causes of action to support a UCL claim. “[A] violation of another law is a predicate for stating a cause of action under the UCL's unlawful prong.” (Berryman v. Merit Prop. Mgmt., Inc. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1544, 1554.) The complaint is devoid of any facts and instead contains only conclusory allegations. Plaintiffs’ opposition contends the alleged subject vehicle suffered from defects that caused multiple fluid and oil leaks, requiring replacement of a new head gasket and causing a clogged and contaminated radiator; that Defendant intentionally failed to properly diagnose the issues in the subject vehicle and installed remanufactured or reconditioned parts that were not the same quality as the standard OEM components; that Defendant installed components it knew were defective; and that Defendant’s authorized repair facility performed negligent repairs because it knew that the manufacturer was unlikely to reimburse them for multiple repairs stemming from the same underlying issue. (Opp. pp. 6:21-7:6.) However, none of these facts are alleged in the complaint; nor does the opposition cite to any allegations in the complaint. Plaintiffs do not allege the violations under the Song Beverly Warranty Act with reasonable particularity. The complaint does not specifically describe the vehicle's defects or any specific dates that Plaintiffs brought the subject vehicle in for servicing. The Complaint does not allege any facts relating to attempts to repair the subject vehicle. The Complaint fails to allege sufficient facts to state a UCL claim under the unlawful, unfair or fraudulent prongs.
The Court, however, rejects Defendant’s argument that Plaintiffs cannot allege a UCL claim because Plaintiffs have an adequate remedy at law with the Song Beverly claims. While Plaintiffs are not allowed to recover a double windfall at the resolution of their claims, Plaintiffs are allowed to allege alternative theories of recovery at the pleading stage. Plaintiffs are not prohibited from pursuing both the legal remedies available under the Song-Beverly Act and the equitable remedies available under the UCL at this stage of the litigation. UCL claims are independently actionable and their remedies are cumulative. (Farmers, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 383; Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17205.) The fact that the federal district court in Durkee may have ruled otherwise is unavailing, as federal court decisions, particularly unpublished decisions, interpreting state law are not binding on state courts. (Campbell v. Superior Ct. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1318; Ticconi v. Blue Shield of California Life & Health Ins. Co. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 528, 541, fn. 10.) Further, other unpublished district court cases concluded the opposite.
Based on the foregoing, the Court SUSTAINS the demurrer to the Third cause of action with 20 days’ leave to amend.
CONCLUSION
The Court SUSTAINS Defendant Volkswagen Group of America Inc.’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Third Cause of Action with 20 days’ leave to amend.
Defendant is ordered to give notice of the Court’s ruling within five calendar days of this order.