Judge: Lynette Gridiron Winston, Case: KC070435, Date: 2024-03-04 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: KC070435 Hearing Date: March 4, 2024 Dept: 6
CASE NAME: Abdul Ahmed, et al. v. Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, et al.
Defendant County of Los Angeles’ Motion for Mandatory Dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Action
TENTATIVE RULING
The Court GRANTS Defendant County of Los Angeles’ motion for mandatory dismissal of Plaintiffs’ action.
Defendant County of Los Angeles is ordered to give notice of the Court’s ruling within five calendar days of this order.
BACKGROUND
This is a negligence action based on an unlawful search and seizure. On July 3, 2018, plaintiffs Abdul Ahmed and Sadiqa Farhat aka Farhat Sami (collectively, Plaintiffs) filed this action against defendants Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, Jim McDonnel, County of Los Angeles (County) (collectively, Defendants) and Does 1 through 20, alleging causes of action for negligence and exceeding scope of search warrant. On September 11, 2018, Defendants filed a cross-complaint against Cross-Defendant Nadia Ahmed (Nadia) for equitable indemnity.
On January 16, 2024, County filed a motion for mandatory dismissal of Plaintiffs’ action. On February 20, 2024, Plaintiffs filed an opposition. On February 26, 2024, County filed a reply.
LEGAL STANDARD
“An action shall be brought to trial within five years after the action is commenced against the defendant.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 583.310.) “In computing the time within which an action must be brought to trial pursuant to this article, there shall be excluded the time during which any of the following conditions existed: (a) The jurisdiction of the court to try the action was suspended. (b) Prosecution or trial of the action was stayed or enjoined. (c) Bringing the action to trial, for any other reason, was impossible, impracticable, or futile.” (Id., § 583.340.) “Notwithstanding any other law, including Code of Civil Procedure section 583.310, for all civil actions filed on or before April 6, 2020, the time in which to bring the action to trial is extended by six months for a total time of five years and six months.” (Emergency Rule 10, subd. (a).)
REQUESTS FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
The Court GRANTS County’s requests for judicial notice. (Evid. Code § 452, subd. (d).) However, the Court takes judicial notice of the foregoing documents only as to “the existence, content and authenticity of public records and other specified documents”; it does not take judicial notice of the truth of the factual matters asserted in those documents. (Dominguez v. Bonta (2022) 87 Cal. App. 5th 389, 400.)
DISCUSSION
Summary of Arguments
County moves to dismiss this action on the grounds that Plaintiffs failed to bring this action to trial within five years and six months of the commencement of this action per Code of Civil Procedure section 583.310 and Emergency Rule 10, subdivision (a). (Code Civ. Proc., § 583.310, subd. (a); Emergency Rule, subd. (a).) County contends that, based on this action having been filed on July 3, 2018, the deadline for Plaintiffs to have brought this action to trial was January 3, 2024. County argues that Plaintiffs cannot show an exception to the five-year deadline as provided under Code of Civil Procedure section 583.340. (Code Civ. Proc., § 583.340.) More specifically, County argues that this Court’s jurisdiction was never suspended, the action was never stayed, and that pretrial delays and continuances do not halt the five-year deadline.
County contends that Cross-Defendant Nadia’s Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition has no impact here because: (1) Nadia is not a defendant to the primary complaint; and (2) County is not a party in bankruptcy, and a bankruptcy stay is only effective as to a party in bankruptcy. County argues that the Court has not otherwise issued an order staying the entire action.
County further argues that Plaintiffs cannot show impracticability, impossibility, or futility. County contends that Plaintiffs cannot show that they were diligent at all stages of litigation, Plaintiffs are responsible for keeping track of the five-year deadline regardless of the Court’s actions, Plaintiffs cannot blame their attorneys for failing to meet the deadline, Plaintiffs never advised the Court of the five-year deadline or requested an extension, and the two-month period Plaintiffs represented themselves in pro per does not toll the five-year deadline.
In opposition, Plaintiffs contend that the motion should be denied because the time during which prosecution or trial of the action was stayed must be excluded from the period in which the action had to be brought to trial. Plaintiffs contend the action was stayed due to a bankruptcy filing and due to a divorce that was pending concurrently with this action, and that this was done by agreement between Plaintiffs’ prior counsel and defense counsel. Plaintiffs then argue that a continuance has the legal effect of a stay and that Plaintiffs’ counsel is equitably estopped based on certain representations made by opposing counsel.
Analysis
The Court finds County’s motion to be well taken. Plaintiffs commenced this action on July 3, 2018. (Request for Judicial Notice, Ex. A.) The five-year deadline would therefore have expired on July 3, 2023. (Code Civ. Proc, § 583.310.) The 6-month extension provided under Emergency Rule 10, subdivision (a), extended that deadline to January 3, 2024. (Emergency Rule 10, subd. (a).) It is now well past that deadline and the action on the Complaint has not been brought to trial.
Stay
Moreover, there is no evidence of any time in which this action was stayed or the Court’s jurisdiction was suspended. Plaintiffs’ arguments regarding concurrently proceeding lawsuits in federal bankruptcy court and in family law court are unavailing and unpersuasive, as Plaintiffs do not even identify which lawsuits purportedly had that effect on this action. To the extent Plaintiffs refer to the Chapter 7 bankruptcy stay against Cross-Defendant Nadia, County correctly contends that has no bearing on this action because: (1) Nadia is not a party to the Complaint between Plaintiffs and Defendants, (see Request for Judicial Notice, Ex. A; Shepard & Morgan v. Lee & Daniel, Inc. (1982) 31 Cal.3d 256, 260 [complaints and cross-complaints are separate actions]); and (2) the bankruptcy stay applies only to Nadia because she was the party in bankruptcy, not County, (see Freiberg v. City of Mission Viejo (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1488).
Plaintiffs also provided no evidence as to how the concurrently proceeding federal bankruptcy and family law court proceedings prevented Plaintiffs from proceeding against County in this action. (See Freiberg, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 1488.) Additionally, Plaintiffs cite no legal authority to support their contention that continuances have the legal effect of a stay, and the Court is unaware of any. (See Opp., 8:6-19.) Even from a practical perspective, if every continuance had the legal effect of a stay, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to determine when the five-year deadline occurs given the common occurrence of trial continuances.
Equitable Estoppel
Furthermore, as for equitable estoppel, Plaintiffs have not presented sufficient evidence of any statements or conduct by County upon which Plaintiffs relied to their detriment. “The elements of the doctrine [of equitable estoppel] are that (1) the party to be estopped must be apprised of the facts; (2) he must intend that his conduct shall be acted upon, or must so act that the party asserting the estoppel has a right to believe it was so intended; (3) the other party must be ignorant of the true state of facts; and (4) he must rely upon the conduct to his injury.” (Greene v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1583, 1590.)
It is unclear to the Court which conduct from County or its counsel is purportedly at issue here. Plaintiffs’ opposition quotes language purportedly from the Declaration of Michael P. Newman, former counsel for Plaintiffs, but that declaration is not attached to the motion. As such, the statement quoted in the opposition is not supported by any evidence. (See Opp., 9:3-7.) Even if it was supported by evidence, the statement quoted is from Plaintiffs’ counsel, not from counsel for County. (See Id.) For equitable estoppel to apply, the opposing party must have made the purportedly improper conduct. (See Greene, supra, 224 Cal.App.3d at p. 1590.)
Plaintiffs’ opposition otherwise argues in a conclusory fashion that their counsel relied on representations of opposing counsel wanting to hold litigation, but does not provide any details surrounding such purported representations. (See Opp., 9:3-7.) Moreover, County provided a copy of the referenced email correspondence between its counsel, Ms. Busch and Plaintiffs’ former counsel, “Mike”, and such discussion relates to the extension of deadlines on motions, not a stay of the litigation as Plaintiffs represent. (See Supp. Decl. of Kristin T. Busch, ¶ 3, Ex. Q.)
Lack of Opposition to Certain Arguments
Finally, the Court notes that Plaintiffs’ opposition did not respond to a number of County’s arguments, such as those regarding impracticability, impossibility, or futility. The Court construes such lack of opposition as a tacit admission that County’s arguments are meritorious. (Holden v. City of San Diego (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 404, 418; C. Opposing the Motion—and Rebutting the Opposition, Cal. Prac. Guide Civ. Pro. Before Trial Ch. 9(I)-C, ¶ 9:105.10.)
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiffs failed to bring the action to trial within 5 years and 6 months and GRANTS the motion.
CONCLUSION
The Court GRANTS Defendant County of Los Angeles’ motion for mandatory dismissal of Plaintiffs’ action.
Defendant County of Los Angeles is ordered to give notice of the Court’s ruling within five calendar days of this order.