Judge: Lynne M. Hobbs, Case: 19STCV47021, Date: 2024-07-02 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 19STCV47021    Hearing Date: July 2, 2024    Dept: 61

JOHN DOE vs LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, AN ENTITY OF FORM UNKNOWN, et al.

TENTATIVE

Plaintiff John Doe’s Motion to Compel Deposition Answers against Defendant Simone Young is GRANTED. Sanctions are awarded against Young, in favor of Plaintiff, in the amount of $5,400.00, payable within 30 days.

Plaintiff to provide notice.

DISCUSSION

I. MOTION TO COMPEL DEPOSITION ANSWERS

“If a deponent fails to answer any question or to produce any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing under the deponent's control that is specified in the deposition notice or a deposition subpoena, the party seeking discovery may move the court for an order compelling that answer or production.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2025.480, subd. (a).).

Plaintiff John Doe (Plaintiff) moves to compel deposition answers from Defendant Simone Young, to questions which Young refused to answer during deposition on the grounds of Fifth Amendment privilege. (Motion at pp. 2–4.) Plaintiff argues that Young can no longer rely on the privilege against self-incrimination, as she has already been convicted of the crime that is the subject of this action. (Motion at pp. 2–3.)

The privilege against self-incrimination does “not extend past the time sentence ha[s] been fixed and the judgment of conviction ha[s] become final.” (In re Tapia (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1104, 1111 fn. 3.) Young was convicted of lewd and lascivious acts with the minor Plaintiff on August 2, 2018, and sentenced on September 17, 2018. (9/7/2023 Compendium of Evidence in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, Exh. 6.) Accordingly, Young could no longer invoke the privilege against self-incrimination in response to questions concerning this conviction and the conduct that formed the basis therefore. However, Young consistently cited the privilege as a basis for her refusal to answer questions concerning the underlying facts of this litigation. This was improper.

It was also improper for Young to refuse to answer questions based on her objection of “relevance,” Deponents should generally “not be prevented by counsel from answering a question unless it pertains to privileged matters or deposing counsel's conduct has reached a stage where suspension is warranted.” (Stewart v. Colonial Western Agency, Inc. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1006, 1015.) “It is generally improper . . . for counsel to instruct a witness not to answer on grounds other than privilege, privacy, trade secrets or other matters statutorily or constitutionally exempt from discovery.” (Weil & Brown, Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2023) Ch. 8E-12 [8:695].) Young’s relevance objection did not furnish a basis for refusing to answer, and in any event the questions concerned her educational background, age, and the circumstances of her work at the school where the misconduct took place, and were therefore relevant to the subject matter of this action. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2017.010.)

The motion is therefore GRANTED.

II. SANCTIONS

“The court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel an answer or production, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.480, subd. (j).)

Plaintiff seeks $5,400.00 in sanctions against Young, representing nine hours of attorney work at $600 per hour. (Contreras Decl. ¶ 4.) Sanctions are awarded against Young in this amount.