Judge Lynne M. Hobbs, Case Number: 20STCV17005, Date: 2023-06-20 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Lynne M. Hobbs, Case: 20STCV17005, Date: 2023-06-20 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STCV17005 Hearing Date: June 20, 2023 Dept: 30

#38
JOHN GUTIERREZ vs HONEYCUT, et al.
20STCV17005
Demurrer and Motion to Strike

Ruling: Demurrer is overruled and Motion to Strike is granted. Moving party to give notice.

Rationale:

The First Amended Complaint ("FAC") alleges that Does 11 through 40 were acting within the course and scope of their employment with Defendants Honeycut, 213 Hospitality, Proprietors, LLC, and All Day Protection at the time they attacked Plaintiff. For the purposes of this demurrer, these facts are sufficient to state causes of action for assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress under a theory of vicarious liability.

Regarding negligent hiring supervision and retention, the FAC alleges that Does 11 through 40 were incompetent and unfit to perform the duties for which they were employed. (FAC ¶30.) Defendants hired Does 11 through 40 for management or security services where they would interact with patrons, customers, and other visitors despite knowing of their unfitness. (Id.) Because the FAC does allege Moving Defendants were aware of the unfitness of Does 11 through 40 and hired them despite this knowledge, the Court finds that the FAC sufficiently alleges facts to support a cause of action for negligent hiring, supervision, and retention.

The general rule is that the plaintiff need only allege ultimate facts, not evidentiary facts. (Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 550.) “All that is required of a plaintiff, as a matter of pleading, even as against a special demurrer, is that his complaint set forth the essential facts of the case with reasonable precision and with sufficient particularity to acquaint the defendant with the nature, source and extent of his cause of action.” (Rannard v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. (1945) 26 Cal.2d 149, 156-157.)

Motion to Strike:
When seeking damages from an employer, an employer is not liable for punitive damages arising from an employee’s actions pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code section 3294(a) unless the employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. (Cal. Civ. Code section 3294(b).) With respect to a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation. (Id.) Further, “The mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages. [Citation.] Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim. [Citation.]” (Grieves v. Superior Ct. (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166 (footnote omitted).)

Here, the FAC alleges facts showing Moving Defendants’ employees seized, pushed, struck, beat, and restrained Plaintiff while they were acting in the course and scope of their employment. However, the FAC fails to name an officer, director, or managing agent of a corporation. Therefore, the FAC fails to allege facts showing an officer, director, or managing agent had advance knowledge of, ratified, or authorized the employees’ conduct. Further, “As amended to include [despicable], the statute plainly indicates that absent an intent to injure the plaintiff, ‘malice’ requires more than a ‘willful and conscious’ disregard of the plaintiffs’ interests. The additional component of ‘despicable conduct’ must be found.” (College Hospital, Inc., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 725.) The statute’s reference to despicable conduct represents a “new substantive limitation on punitive damage awards.” (Ibid.) Despicable conduct is “conduct which is so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people. Such conduct has been described as ‘having the character of outrage frequently associated with crime.’” (Tomaselli v. Transamerica Ins. Co. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1287.)