Judge: Lynne M. Hobbs, Case: 20STCV25840, Date: 2023-12-18 Tentative Ruling
PLEASE NOTE:
The parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if there is an agreement to submit.
Regardless of whether there is any such agreement, each party who wishes to submit must send an email to the Court at SSCdept30@LACourt.org indicating the party's intention to submit.
Include the word "SUBMITS" in all caps and the case number in the subject line of the email and in the body provide the date and time of the hearing, your name, your contact information, the party you represent, whether that party is a plaintiff, defendant, cross-complainant, cross-defendant, claimant, or non-party.
If a party submits but still intends to appear at the hearing, include the words "SUBMITS BUT WILL APPEAR" in the subject line of the email.
If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.
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Be advised that after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of said motion and may adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.
Case Number: 20STCV25840 Hearing Date: January 26, 2024 Dept: 30
PAUL GONZALEZ vs HAYMAN PROPERTIES LLC., et al.
TENTATIVE
Defendant Otis’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.
Defendants Louis Vuitton USA, Inc., and Robert Hayman and Betty Hayman, as Trustees of the Fred Hayman Trust Established March 14, 1983’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.
Moving party to give notice.
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Legal Standard
The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) CCP Section 437c(c) “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.” (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 367, 381-382.)
“On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facia showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.” (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(p)(2).)
Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)
Discussion
Defendant Otis Elevator Company moves for summary judgment, or summary adjudication as to the cause of action against Defendant for negligence, arguing that: (1) there is no evidence of negligent maintenance of the Subject Elevator, or constructive notice of any defect or problem regarding the Subject Elevator; and (2) Plaintiff cannot establish the requisite causal link between any injuries allegedly suffered by Plaintiff and any claim of breach of duties by Otis with respect to the care and maintenance of the Subject Elevator.
Defendants Louis Vuitton USA, Inc., and Robert Hayman and Betty Hayman, as Trustees of the Fred Hayman Trust Established March 14, 1983 also move for summary judgment, or summary adjudication as to the causes of action against them for negligence and premises liability, arguing that: (1) there is no evidence of negligent maintenance, repair, operation, inspection or control of the Subject Elevator; (2) there is no evidence that Defendants’ action or inaction caused the incident; (3) there is no evidence that they had notice of any dangerous and/or defective condition regarding the elevator. Defendants also move for summary adjudication as to the count for willful failure to warn under the premises liability cause of action, arguing it is not applicable to the alleged incident because they are not landowners that opened the property to the public for recreational use.
The elements of a cause of action for premises liability are the same as those for negligence: duty, breach, causation, and damages.¿ (Castellon v. U.S. Bancorp¿(2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 994, 998.)¿¿Those who own, possess, or control property generally have a duty to exercise ordinary care in managing the property¿to¿avoid exposing others to an unreasonable risk of harm.¿¿(Annocki¿v. Peterson Enterprises, LLC¿(2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 32, 37.)¿¿The existence and scope of duty are legal questions for the court.¿¿(Id.¿at¿36.)¿¿If a dangerous condition exists, the property owner is “under a duty to exercise ordinary care either to make the condition¿reasonably safe for their¿[customers’]¿use or to give a warning adequate to enable them to avoid the harm.”¿¿(Bridgman v. Safeway Stores, Inc.¿(1960) 53 Cal.2d 443, 446.)¿
“A plaintiff alleging injuries based on a dangerous condition must prove the defendant¿either: (1) created the dangerous condition, or (2)¿knew or should have known
of the dangerous condition.”¿ (See¿Peralta v. Vons Companies, Inc.¿(2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1030, 1036; see also¿Ortega v. Kmart Corp.¿(2001) 26 Cal.4th 1200, 1206.)¿¿“[A] defendant¿is entitled to judgment as a matter of law if the plaintiff fails to show that the dangerous condition existed for at least a sufficient time to be discovered by ordinary care and inspection.”¿¿(Ortega,¿supra, 26 Cal.4th at¿1207.)¿¿“Whether a dangerous condition has existed long enough for a reasonably prudent person to have discovered it is a question of fact for the jury.” (See id. at 1207.) “The owner must inspect the premises or take other proper action to ascertain their condition, and if, by the exercise of reasonable care, the owner would have discovered the condition, he is liable for failing to correct it.” (See id.)
I. Defendant Otis’s MSJ
As to Defendant’s argument that there is no evidence of negligent maintenance of the Subject Elevator, or constructive notice of any defect or problem regarding the Subject Elevator, Defendant presents evidence that the relevant maintenance records for the Subject Elevator, for the time frame of August 1, 2017 to January 22, 2019 show that Otis did not receive any complaints or reports of any issues with the Subject Elevator’s door similar to the dangerous condition alleged by Plaintiff either prior to or following Plaintiff’s alleged incident. (UMF 14-39). The maintenance records are also equally silent as to any indication that an Otis mechanic detected any problems or concerns with the Subject Elevator’s door acting in the manner alleged by Plaintiff during any of the maintenance visits. (Id.)
At the time of Plaintiff’s alleged incident, Otis was providing regular, systematic preventative maintenance to the Subject Elevator pursuant to the Maintenance Contract with Louis Vuitton. (UMF 36.) The Otis maintenance records also reflect the Subject Elevator’s doors were tested for Code- compliance on March 16, 2018 (4 months prior to the incident), and again tested and serviced on June 26, 2018 (1 month prior to the incident), and the Subject Elevator was found to be Code-compliant. (UMF 33.) Records from the California State Department of Industrial Relations, Division of Safety and Health, Elevator Unit, and the Otis’s maintenance records show the Subject Elevator doors were tested and passed on August 30, 2017, December 18, 2017, September 26, 2018, January 18, 2019, October 21, 2020, and May 16, 2022. (UMF 34.) The records show no problem has ever been reported or repaired with the door system relating to door speeds, forces, times for closing too soon, or failures of the door re-opening device. (UMF 31.)
Further, Defendant presents evidence that on October 9, 2023, Mark L. Hollinger, an elevator expert, inspected and tested the Subject Elevator on behalf of Otis. (UMF 14.) Hollinger determined that at all relevant times, the door closing time, door force and kinetic energy of the Subject Elevator were Code-compliant. (UMF 15.) He concludes that: (a) the Subject Elevator’s door did not close at an excessive speed or an excessive force at the time of the alleged incident on July 26, 2018 (UMF 16); (b) the Optiguard door reopening device was functioning as designed and intended at the time of the incident on July 26, 2018 (UMF 17); (c) Plaintiff exited the elevator when the elevator door was already in the process of closing (UMF 18); (d) Plaintiff failed to obstruct the beam timely, and when he did obstruct the beam of the closing door, the door retracted in accordance with Code for standard and functionality intended for this equipment (UMF 19); and (e) any Subject Elevator door contact with Plaintiff was within Code-compliance for its allowable door force and kinetic energy. (UMF 20.)
The court finds that Defendant has met its initial burden of showing there are no triable issues of material fact as to whether it had any actual or constructive notice of any dangerous condition, and whether it negligently maintained the elevator, as Defendant conducted regular maintenance of the elevator, and the maintenance records show the elevator was code-compliant when it was tested only a month prior to the incident and there were no complaints. As a result, the burden shifts to Plaintiff.
Plaintiff has not filed an opposition to meet his burden. Thus, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment as to the sole remaining cause of action against it for negligence.
II. Defendants Louis Vuitton USA, Inc., and Robert Hayman and Betty Hayman, as Trustees of the Fred Hayman Trust Established March 14, 1983’s MSJ
a. Premises Liability & Negligence
Defendants argue there is no evidence that Defendants breached their duty of care by negligently maintaining, repairing, operating, inspecting and/or controlling the subject elevator and/or its door thereby creating a dangerous condition of property. They further argue they had no notice of a dangerous condition.
Otis provided regular, systematic preventative maintenance to the Subject Elevator pursuant to the Maintenance/Services Agreement with Louis Vuitton. (UMF 18.) The Otis maintenance records show that that there was no indication that an Otis mechanic detected any problems and/or concerns with the subject elevator's door closing mechanisms during any of the maintenance visits. (Id., 23-24.)
In fact, the Otis maintenance records reflect the subject elevator's doors were tested for code-compliance on March 16, 2018 (4 months prior to the incident), and again tested and serviced on June 26, 2018 (1 month prior to the incident), and the Subject Elevator was found to be code-compliant. (UMF 25.) Records from the California State Department of Industrial Relations, Division of Safety and Health, Elevator Unit, and the Otis' maintenance records show the subject elevator door was tested and passed on August 30, 2017, December 18, 2017, September 26, 2018, January 18, 2019, October 21, 2020, and May 16, 2022. (UMF 26.) Records show no problem has ever been reported or repaired with the door system relating to door speeds, forces, times for closing too soon, or failures of the door re-opening device. (UMF 27).
Defendants never received any complaints and/or reports regarding the subject elevator door closing too fast and/or striking passengers prior to the incident, and/or following the incident. (UMF 22.) By the same token, Otis' maintenance records reflect no reported calls for any issue with the subject elevator doors or door reversal device in the year prior to, or six months following the incident. (UMF 23.)
The court finds that Defendants have met their initial burden of showing there are no triable issues of material fact as to whether they had any actual or constructive notice of any dangerous condition, and whether they negligently maintained the elevator, as Defendants conducted regular maintenance of the elevator, and the maintenance records show the elevator was code-compliant when it was tested only a month prior to the incident and there were no complaints. As a result, the burden shifts to Plaintiff.
Plaintiff has not filed an opposition to meet his burden. Thus, Plaintiff failed to meet his burden to show triable issues of material fact as to the causes of action for negligence and premises liability. Defendant is entitled to summary adjudication of these causes of action.
b. Willful Failure to Warn
Defendants also move for summary adjudication as to the count for willful failure to warn under the premises liability cause of action, arguing it is not applicable to the alleged incident because they are not landowners that opened the property to the public for recreational use.
Civil Code section 846 provides that “[a]n owner of any estate or any other interest in real property, whether possessory or nonpossessory, owes no duty of care to keep the premises safe for entry or use by others for any recreational purpose or to give any warning of hazardous conditions, uses of, structures, or activities on those premises to persons entering for a recreational purpose, except as provided in this section.” (Civ. Code, § 846(a).) Civil Code section 846 is thus more of an immunity provision and defense for landowners and does not create an independent duty of care and theory of liability. The willful failure to warn claim Plaintiff attempts to assert against Defendant in the complaint is merely an exception to the immunity and defense under Civil Code section 846. (See Civ. Code, § 846(d) (“This section does not limit the liability which otherwise exists for any of the following: [¶] (1) Willful or malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure or activity . . . .”).)
Additionally, as pointed out by Defendants, Civil Code section 846 does not apply in this case. Defendant argues their store is not open for a recreational purpose. The Court notes that the complaint does not allege that Defendant’s property was open for recreational use. (Id., § 846(b) (defining “recreational purpose” to include activities such as “fishing, hunting, camping, water sports, hiking, spelunking, sport parachuting, riding, including animal riding, snowmobiling, and all other types of vehicular riding, rock collecting, sightseeing, picnicking, nature study, nature contacting, recreational gardening, gleaning, hang gliding, private noncommercial aviation activities, winter sports, and viewing or enjoying historical, archaeological, scenic, nature, or scientific sites”).) “A defendant’s motion for summary judgment necessarily includes a test of the sufficiency of the complaint. [Citation.] When a motion for summary judgment is used to test whether the complaint states a cause of action, the court will apply the rule applicable to demurrers [or motions for judgment on the pleadings] and accept the allegations of the complaint as true.” (Prue v. Brady Co./San Diego, Inc. (2015) 245 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1375 [citation omitted].)
Plaintiff has offered no argument and has not opposed this motion. As such, Plaintiff does not have a viable claim under Civil Code section 846. Thus, summary adjudication is granted as to this claim.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, Defendant Otis’s motion for summary judgment of the sole cause of action against it for negligence is GRANTED.
Defendants Louis Vuitton USA, Inc., and Robert Hayman and Betty Hayman, as Trustees of the Fred Hayman Trust Established March 14, 1983’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.