Judge Lynne M. Hobbs, Case Number: 20STCV29859, Date: 2025-01-28 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Lynne M. Hobbs, Case: 20STCV29859, Date: 2025-01-28 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STCV29859 Hearing Date: January 28, 2025 Dept: 61

SATSUNDERTA KHALSA vs DOE 1, et al.

Tentative

Plaintiff Satsunderta Khalsa’s Motion to Compel Further Response to Special Interrogatories from Defendant Siri Singh Sahib Corporation is GRANTED. Defendant is ordered to serve responses within 30 days.

Moving party to provide notice.

Analysis:

“Any party may obtain discovery . . . by propounding to any other party to the action written interrogatories to be answered under oath.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.010(a).) If a propounding party is not satisfied with the response served by a responding party, the former may move the court to compel further interrogatory responses. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300; Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultants (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 390, 403.) The propounding party must demonstrate that the responses were incomplete, inadequate or evasive, or that the responding party asserted objections that are either without merit or too general. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300(a)(1)–(3); Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc., supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at 403.)

Plaintiff Satsunderta Khalsa (Plaintiff) moves to compel further responses from Defendant Siri Singh Sahib Corporation (SSSC) to Special Interrogatories No. 6 and 8–10. These interrogatories seek the following information:

· No. 6: Identify how many claims were made with the REPARATIONS PROGRAM by individuals who alleged sexual abuse by Yogi Bhajan;

· No. 8: Identify the total amount of monetary compensation that was paid through the REPARATIONS PROGRAM to settle claims by individuals who alleged sexual abuse by Yogi Bhajan;

· No. 9: Identify how many claims were made with the REPARATIONS PROGRAM by individuals who alleged sexual abuse as a minor by Yogi Bhajan;

· No. 10: Identify how many claims were made with the REPARATIONS PROGRAM by individuals who alleged sexual harassment by Yogi Bhajan.

(Separate Statement.)

Defendant SSSC responded to each interrogatory with objections based on relevance, privacy, the mediation privilege, and the attorney-client and work-product privileges. (Separate Statement.) Plaintiff argues that information concerning the number and types of claims submitted against Defendant through its informal reparations program, styled a mediation process, would prove relevant to her claims that Defendant was negligent in supervising Plaintiff’s alleged abuser, Defendant Yogi Bhajan. (Motion at pp. 7–9.) Plaintiff also argues that the mediation privilege does not apply, both because the reparations process was not a mediation, but a unilateral claims-evaluation process instituted by Defendant using administrators chosen by Defendant, and also because the interrogatories seek no communications exchanged within a mediation, but "aggregate statistics concerning the process." (Motion at pp. 6–7, 10.)

Defendant in opposition contends that New Mexico law applies to analysis of the reparations program, because the protocols of that program specify that New Mexico law applies. (Opposition at pp. 2–3.) Defendant argues that the data sought by Plaintiff is protected by the mediation privilege applicable under both California and New Mexico law, as the data arises from communications made in the context of mediation. (Opposition at pp. 8–11.) Defendant argues that the protocols governing the reparations process prohibit the disclosure of this information, and further that any such disclosure is prohibited by work product and attorney-client privilege. (Opposition at pp. 12–13.) Defendant contends that the information sought would be inadmissible as “Me Too” evidence. (Opposition at pp. 14–15.)

California Evidence Code § 1119 states: “No evidence of anything said or any admission made for the purpose of, in the course of, or pursuant to, a mediation or a mediation consultation is admissible or subject to discovery, and disclosure of the evidence shall not be compelled, in any arbitration, administrative adjudication, civil action, or other noncriminal proceeding in which, pursuant to law, testimony can be compelled to be given. (Evid. Code § 1119, subd. (a).)

New Mexico law states: “Except as otherwise provided in the Mediation Procedures Act or by applicable judicial court rules, all mediation communications are confidential, and not subject to disclosure and shall not be used as evidence in any proceeding.” (N.M. Stat. § 44-7B-4.)

The California statute applies to “anything said or any admission made for the purpose of, in the course of, or pursuant to a mediation,” while the New Mexico statute applies to “mediation communications.” These latter communications are elsewhere defined as “a statement, whether oral or in a record or verbal or nonverbal, that occurs during a mediation or is made for purposes of considering, conducting, participating in, initiating, continuing or reconvening a mediation or retaining a mediator.” (N.M. Stat. § 44-7B-2, subd. B.)

California Evidence Code § 1115 defines “mediation” to mean “a process in which a neutral person or persons facilitate communication between the disputants to assist them in reaching a mutually acceptable agreement.” (Evid. Code § 1115, subd. (a)(1).) And New Mexico law, cited as binding in the protocols, defines mediation as “a process in which a mediator:

(1) facilitates communication and negotiation between mediation parties to assist them in reaching an agreement regarding their dispute; or

(2) promotes reconciliation, settlement or understanding between and among parties

(N.M. Stat. § 44-7B-2, subd. A.)

Plaintiff argues that the mediation privilege does not apply because the reparations program for which data is sought was not a true mediation program, and also because, even if the reparations process is construed as a mediation, the interrogatories at issue do not seek mediation communications, but rather statistical information about the claims made. (Motion at p. 10.)

The reparations program, or the Independent Healing and Reparations Program for the Sikh Dharma Community, was promulgated in May 2022 to address allegations of sexual abuse by Yogi Bhajan (Bhajan) and others. (Motion Exh. 1.) The program was to permit eligible claimants to enter into a confidential mediation procedure whereby one or more Independent Claims Administrators, selected by SSSC but described as “third-party neutrals,” would assess the claims and eligibility of claimants and then make a reparations award. (Motion Exh. 1, § B.2.) Claimants could register between June 8 and August 19, 2022, to have their claims heard in this way. (Id. at § C.2.) Claimants were to submit claim forms, or other supporting documents, detailing their allegations. (Id. at § C.3.) Claimants could arrange an in-person meeting with the Administrator if they chose. (Id. at § C.4.) The Administrator would consider documents submitted by the claimant, and could request documents from an SSSC liaison, to which the claimant would not have access. (Id. at § C.5.) The Administrator had “sole decision-making authority to determine a claimant’s eligibility for reparations and the level of compensation that should be offered.” (Ibid.) SSSC would be bound by any Administrator determination, but the claimant could accept the offer within 60 days, or demand reconsideration within 30 days. (Id. at § C.6–7.) Claimants could reject the reparations offer and “retain any and all of their legal rights.” (Id. at § C.8.)

The reparations protocols state, “By submitting a registration or a claim form, all claimants agree they are accessing the IHRP as a confidential mediation program under New Mexico law to utilize the services of third-party neutrals to facilitate communication, promote reconciliation, settlement, and understanding between and among parties, and assist the parties reaching agreement regarding a dispute. See N.M. Stat. § 44-7B-1, et seq. As such, the Program will treat personal claimant information as confidential, and information submitted to the Administrators by the claimant will only be used and disclosed for the following purposes,” among which are mandated law enforcement reports, internal or criminal investigations of living individuals, claim processing and program administration, the effectuation of other SSSC child-protection policies, and responses to claims by parties that violate a signed release. (Id. at § D.1.) The privacy section also states: “Nothing in the foregoing list of protections will prevent the Program or SSSC from reporting on the Program using anonymized data and statistics.” (Ibid.)

Plaintiff argues that the protocols do not establish a true “mediation” for the application of any mediation privilege, because the program applied only to claimants who met SSSC’s eligibility criteria, afforded only a hearing before an Administrator chosen by SSSC, who retained the sole ability to determine the amount of compensation to be offered to the claimant, and which the claimant could then accept or reject. (Motion at pp. 6–7.)

Plaintiff’s argument is the more persuasive. Per both California and New Mexico statute, the privilege applicable to mediations covers communications made within the context of a mediation. Plaintiff’s interrogatories do not seek such communications, but only anonymized statistics concerning the general character of the mediation program. Indeed, Defendant’s protocols specifically informed the claimants within its program that “anonymized aggregate statistics” could be released. Plaintiff thus seeks no materials covered by the privilege, nor any materials that the participants would not expect to be disclosed.

SSSC’s supplemental opposition, filed after an informal discovery conference failed to resolve the matter, adds little to the above analysis. It argues that it does not have access to the information sought, due to the confidentiality of the materials. (Supp. Opposition at p. 1.) Yet it also describes the process by which it could obtain that information: having its attorneys review the claims and draw the information therefrom. (Supp. Opposition at pp. 8–9; Allen Decl. ¶ 7.) Such a process is hardly extraordinary.

Defendant also argues that using its attorney in this way would render the information protected work-product. (Supp. Opposition at pp. 14–15.) This argument is unsupported. The disclosure of the information sought poses no danger of revealing attorney impressions or opinions. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2019.030.) The interrogatories seek facts that exist independent of the attorney’s work, and are not made objectionable merely because an attorney is the one locating the information.

The motion is therefore GRANTED.