Judge: Lynne M. Hobbs, Case: 20STCV35418, Date: 2024-06-10 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STCV35418    Hearing Date: June 10, 2024    Dept: 61

LAKESHA R CARTER vs CITY OF LOS ANGELES, et al.

TENTATIVE 

Defendant Carlos Carias’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is GRANTED without leave to amend.

Defendant to give notice.

“The standard for granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings is essentially the same as that applicable to a general demurrer, that is, under the state of the pleadings, together with matters that may be judicially noticed, it appears that a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Bezirdjian v. O’Reilly (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 316, 321.) When considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court not only should assume that all facts alleged in the SAC are true but also should give those alleged facts a liberal construction. (See Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Lyons (2000) 24 Cal.4th 468, 515–516, 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 470, 12 P.3d 720.) In particular, the court should liberally construe the alleged facts “‘with a view to attaining substantial justice among the parties.’ [Citation.]” (See Alliance Mortgage Co. v. Rothwell (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1226, 1232, 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 352, 900 P.2d 601.)

Defendant Carlos Carias (Defendant) moves for judgment on the pleadings against the Complaint asserted by Plaintiff Lakesha R. Carter (Plaintiff) in the consolidated action of Carter v. Irani, LASC Case No. 20STCV45349. While the lead case in this action — Carter v. City of Los Angeles, LASC Case No. 20STCV35418 — alleges claims against the City of Los Angeles and Defendant (an LAPD detective) related to the allegedly false arrest of Plaintiff, the complaint that is the subject of this motion targets Plaintiff’s former employers for alleged defamation and abuse of process related to proceedings to obtain a temporary restraining order against Plaintiff, as well as the offering of false evidence that led to her arrest. (20STCV45349 Complaint ¶¶ 12–45.) Defendant Carias is also included as a Defendant in these allegations, which he challenges here.

In the present motion, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s government claim failed to place Defendant or his public entity employer on notice of the conduct at issue in the second lawsuit, as the “defamation” referred to in the charge is described in only vague terms. (Motion at pp. 5–6; RJN Exh. 1.) Defendant also argues that the claims against him were filed more than six months after Plaintiff received a notice of the denial of her claims, meaning the claims against him are untimely under Government Code § 945.6. (Motion at pp. 6–8.) Defendant finally argues that the claims against him are barred by the immunity provided in Government Code § 821.6 for “instituting or prosecuting any judicial or administrative proceeding.” (Motion at pp. 8–9.)

Defendant is correct that the claims against him in the later, consolidated case are time-barred. The time to bring an action against a public entity is, “[i]f written notice is given in accordance with Section 913, not later than six months after the date such notice is personally delivered or deposited in the mail.” (Gov. Code, § 945.6, subd. (a)(1).) This limitation applies to suits against public employees. (See Apollo v. Gyaami (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1468, 1486.) Here, Plaintiff’s government claim against Defendant was filed on February 6, 2020, and denied on March 17, 2020. (RJN Exhs. 1, 2.) Plaintiff thus had six months, until September 17, 2020, to file the Complaint. However, Plaintiff did not file it until November 30, 2020.

Plaintiff makes no argument in opposition as to the timeliness of the complaint against Defendant. Rather, Plaintiff claims that the present motion was filed too late, and relies on matters extrinsic to the pleadings. (Opposition at pp. 4–6.) Neither argument is supported by authority. Motions for judgment on the pleadings are specifically authorized when “the defendant has already filed his or her answer to the complaint and the time for the defendant to demur to the complaint has expired.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 438, subd. (f)(2).) Moreover, the “extrinsic” matters that Defendant presents to show the untimeliness of the complaint are subject to judicial notice and thus judicial consideration upon such a motion. (See Bezirdjian, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at p. 321.)