Judge Lynne M. Hobbs, Case Number: 20STCV43780, Date: 2024-03-19 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Lynne M. Hobbs, Case: 20STCV43780, Date: 2024-03-19 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STCV43780 Hearing Date: March 19, 2024 Dept: 30

ANDREW MARTINEZ vs DEPARTMENT OF WATER & POWER, et al.

TENTATIVE

Cross-Defendant The Chrysalis Center’s Demurrer to the First Amended Cross-Complaint is SUSTAINED in part as to the first, second, and third causes of action and OVERRULED in part as to the fourth cause of action. Leave to amend is granted only to the third cause of action. Cross-Complainant City of Los Angeles is ordered to file an amended pleading consistent with this ruling within 20 days of this order.

Moving party is ordered to give notice.

Background

On November 13, 2020, Plaintiff Andrew Martinez (“Plaintiff”) initiated this action against Defendants Department of Water & Power (“DWP”), City of Los Angeles (“City”), and County of Los Angeles (“County”) (collectively, “Defendants”), alleging the following causes of action: (1) general negligence and (2) premises liability, which consists of the counts of negligence and dangerous condition of public property. As alleged in the complaint, on November 11, 2019, Plaintiff stepped onto a manhole cover while walking along Olympic Boulevard when it suddenly collapsed. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants negligently failed to properly maintain the manhole cover, and that this unstable manhole cover constituted a dangerous condition.

On June 28, 2021, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the first cause of action for general negligence and count one of the second cause of action for premises liability – negligence.

On September 28, 2021, Defendants City and DWP filed their joint answer. On the same day, Defendant City filed a cross-complaint against County and Roes 1 to 10, alleging the following causes of action: (1) indemnification, (2) apportionment of fault, and (3) declaratory relief.

On September 14, 2023, City voluntarily dismissed County from the cross-complaint.

On October 4, 2023, City filed Amendments to Cross-Complaint substituting in The Chrysalis Center for Roe 1 and Nonprofits Insurance Alliance of California for Roe 2.

On December 26, 2023, City voluntarily dismissed Nonprofits Insurance Alliance of California from the cross-complaint.

On January 4, 2024, City filed its operative First Amended Cross-Complaint (“FAXC”) against The Chrysalis Center (hereinafter, “Chrysalis”), alleging the following causes of action: (1) indemnification; (2) apportionment of fault; (3) declaratory relief; and (4) express indemnity.

On January 17, 2024, Chrysalis and Nonprofits Insurance Alliance of California filed a notice of lien pursuant to Labor Code §§ 3850, et seq., indicating that they provided workers’ compensation insurance benefits to Plaintiff and continue to do so.

On February 8, 2024, Chrysalis filed the instant demurrer directed at the FAXC. City filed its opposition on March 6, 2024. Thereafter, Chrysalis filed its reply on March 12, 2024.

Trial is scheduled for August 1, 2024.

Legal Standard

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) “To survive a demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.) For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966–967.) A demurrer “does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” (Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713.)

A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the pleadings and will be sustained only where the pleading is defective on its face. (City of Atascadero v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 445, 459.) “We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. We accept the factual allegations of the complaint as true and also consider matters which may be judicially noticed. [Citation.]” (Mitchell v. California Department of Public Health (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1000, 1007; Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 593, 604 [“the facts alleged in the pleading are deemed to be true, however improbable they may be”].) Allegations are to be liberally construed. (Code Civ. Proc., § 452.) A demurrer may be brought if insufficient facts are stated to support the cause of action asserted. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).)

“If substantial facts which constitute a cause of action are averred in the complaint or can be inferred by reasonable intendment from the matters which are pleaded, although the allegations of these facts are intermingled with conclusions of law, the complaint is not subject to demurrer for insufficiency.” (Krug v. Meeham (1952) 109 Cal.App.2d 274, 277.)

Discussion

As a preliminary matter, the Court finds that, based on the declaration of its counsel, Chrysalis has abided by the meet and confer requirement set forth under Code of Civil Procedure § 430.41. (Kang Decl. ¶¶ 12-13, Exhs. F-G.)

A. First and Second Causes of Action: Equitable Indemnification and Apportionment of Fault, Respectively.

Chrysalis demurs to the first and second causes of action for equitable indemnification and apportionment of fault on the ground that they are barred pursuant to Labor Code § 3864.

Pursuant to Labor Code § 3864, it states: “If an action…prosecuted by the employee…against the third person results in judgment against such third person, or settlement by such third person, the employer shall have no liability to reimburse or hold such third person harmless on such judgment or settlement in absence of a written agreement so to do executed prior to the injury.”

Here, it is undisputed that Plaintiff was an employee of Chrysalis at the time of the subject incident, and Chrysalis has even filed a notice of lien based on the workers’ compensation benefits that it has paid to Plaintiff. (See Notice of Lien.)

In opposition, City argues that these causes of action are proper and not barred by Labor Code § 3864 because it is entitled to seek offset for the workers’ compensation. (Opposition at pp. 4-5, relying on Witt v. Jackson (1961) 57 Cal.2d 57 and Del Monte Corp. v. Superior Court (1982) 127 Cal.App.3d 1049.) However, the Court is not persuaded by this reasoning. While City may be entitled to setoff, this entitlement can be evoked defensively through City’s answer to the complaint, not as a claim for equitable indemnity in a cross-action. (Difko Admin. (US) Inc. v. Superior Ct. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 125, 131.) Thus, because Labor Code § 3864 applies, City is precluded from seeking equitable indemnification against Chrysalis.

Accordingly, the Court sustains the demurrers to the first and second causes of action without leave to amend.

B. Third Cause of Action: Declaratory Relief.

Chrysalis also demurs to the third cause of action for declaratory relief on the grounds that it is uncertain and has not been sufficiently pleaded.

In a cause of action for declaratory relief, the pleadings must establish the following elements: (1) a proper subject of declaratory relief, and (2) an actual controversy involving justiciable questions relating to the rights or obligations of a party. (Lee v. Silva (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 527, 546.)

As alleged in the FAXC, City claims that there is an actual controversy between the parties as specified in Plaintiff’s complaint. (FAXC. at pg. 3, ¶ 9.) However, as Chrysalis points out, Plaintiff’s complaint is premises on the allegation that City owns public property on which a dangerous condition existed in the form of an unstable water meter cover. (Demurrer at pg. 7; Compl. at pg. 5, Prem. L-4.)

In opposition, City argues that the demurrer to the third cause of action should be overruled because there is an actual controversy “as to scope of indemnification provisions in the contracts executed prior to the date of Plaintiff’s alleged incident and which are attached as exhibits to the City’s FAXC.” (Opposition at pg. 7.) However, this has not been alleged in the FAXC. Therefore, because the FAXC only generally references Plaintiff’s complaint, the Court finds that the third cause of action is uncertain and has not been sufficiently pleaded to establish that an actual controversy exists between the parties.

Accordingly, because the third cause of action has not been sufficiently pleaded and is uncertain, the Court sustains this demurrer with leave to amend.

C. Fourth Cause of Action: Express Indemnity

Lastly, Chrysalis demurs to the fourth cause of action for express indemnity on the grounds that it is uncertain and has not been sufficiently pleaded. Chrysalis concedes that an express agreement for indemnity exists between the parties, but it argues that it only applies when Chrysalis’ own conduct gave rise to a claim against City. Chrysalis asserts that the scope of Plaintiff’s employment had nothing to do with the subject manhole cover and that there are no allegations to suggest that the subject incident arose because of Chrysalis’ conduct. (Demurrer at pp. 7-8.) Additionally, Chrysalis asserts that this cause of action is uncertain because it fails to give notice as to how its acts or omission and the alleged dangerous condition relate to the contract between Chrysalis and City. (Demurrer at pg. 8.)

Upon review of the pleadings, these arguments are not persuasive. First, the FAXC alleges on information and belief that Plaintiff’s injury was caused by acts or omissions of Chrysalis. (FAXC at pg. 3, ¶ 10.) Chrysalis fails to cite to any legal authority that would impose a heightened pleading standard on a claim for express indemnity. Second, Chrysalis effectively seeks the Court to conduct a factual analysis as to whether there is any evidence to support City’s express indemnity claim. Such a request is beyond the proper scope of a demurrer. (Blank, supra, 39 Cal.3d at 318.) Third, as to the contention that the cause of action is uncertain, while the pleading is somewhat vague, “ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.)

Accordingly, because the fourth cause of action for express indemnity has been sufficiently pleaded, the Court overrules this demurrer.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the Court sustains the demurrer in part as to the first, second, and third causes of action and overrules it in part as to the fourth cause of action. The Court grants leave to amend only to the third cause of action. City is ordered to file an amended pleading consistent with this ruling within 20 days of this order.