Judge Lynne M. Hobbs, Case Number: 20STLC06910, Date: 2025-03-10 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Lynne M. Hobbs, Case: 20STLC06910, Date: 2025-03-10 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STLC06910 Hearing Date: March 10, 2025 Dept: 61

MARIA DE LA CRUZ vs ROBERT HUGHES, et al.

Tentative:

Defendant Erin Hughes’ Motion to Vacate Judgment is DENIED.

Plaintiff to give notice.

Analysis

I. MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT

Defendant Erin Hughes moves to vacate the judgment entered on May 17, 2023, on the grounds that she was abandoned by her attorney and is eligible for equitable relief on the grounds of extrinsic mistake. (Motion at pp. 4–8.)

“Where, as in the case at bench, the motion is made more than six months after entry of default, the motion is not directed to the court's statutory power under section 473 to grant relief for mistake or excusable neglect but rather is directed to the court's inherent equity power under which it may grant relief from a default judgment where there has been extrinsic fraud or mistake.” (Aldrich v. San Fernando Valley Lumber Co. (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 725, 737.) “In this context the terms ‘fraud’ and ‘mistake’ have been given a broad meaning by the courts, and tend to encompass almost any set of extrinsic circumstances which deprive a party of a fair adversary hearing.” (Id. at p. 738.) “To qualify for equitable relief based on extrinsic mistake, the defendant must demonstrate: (1) a meritorious case; (2) a satisfactory excuse for not presenting a defense to the original action; and (3) diligence in seeking to set aside the default once the fraud [or mistake] had been discovered. (Mechling v. Asbestos Defendants (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 1241, 1246, internal quotation marks omitted.)

“Generally, in motions under section 473, or under the inherent equity power of the court, the plaintiff must plead that the neglect or omission of his attorney was excusable, because inexcusable neglect is ordinarily imputed to the client, and his redress is an action for malpractice. However, in a case where the client is relatively free from negligence, and the attorney's neglect is of an extreme degree amounting to positive misconduct, the attorney's conduct is said to obliterate the existence of the attorney-client relationship.” (Aldrich, supra, 170 Cal.app.3d at p. 738.) “Positive misconduct is found where there is a total failure on the part of counsel to represent his client.” (Id. at p. 739.)

Clients should not be forced to act as hawklike inquisitors of their own counsel, suspicious of every step and quick to switch lawyers. The legal profession knows no worse headache than the client who mistrusts his attorney. The lay litigant enters a temple of mysteries whose ceremonies are dark, complex and unfathomable. Pretrial procedures are the cabalistic rituals of the lawyers and judges who serve as priests and high priests. The layman knows nothing of their tactical significance. He knows only that his case remains in limbo while the priests and high priests chant their lengthy and arcane pretrial rites. He does know this much: that several years frequently elapse between the commencement and trial of lawsuits. Since the law imposes this state of puzzled patience on the litigant, it should permit him to sit back in peace and confidence without suspicious inquiries and without incessant checking on counsel. (Aldrich, supra, 170 Cal.App.3d at p. 739, quoting Daley v. County of Butte (1964) 227 Cal.App.2d 380.) “Where a client is unknowingly deprived of effective representation by counsel the client will not be charged with responsibility for misconduct if the client acts with due diligence in moving for relief after discovering the attorney's neglect and if the other side will not be prejudiced by the delay.” (Aldrich, supra, 170 Cal.app.3d at p. 739.)

Defendant presents the following testimony in support of her request for equitable relief from the judgment after trial entered on May 17, 2023, on the grounds that she was abandoned by her attorney, Charles Fonarow. Defendant’s evidence on this point consists of the following paragraph:

The Case summary reflects an utter abandonment of this case by my prior attorney Charles Fonarow. [Defendant] Robert Hughes hired Charles Fonarow to defend this case. However, based on Mr. Fonarow’s declaration filed in May of 2022 he was bedridden and hospitalized in Saint Joseph’s Hospital in Burbank. Unbeknown to me, Mr. Fonarow did not timely file a responsive pleading, failed to respond to discovery, failed to inform me of the trial date or appear at trial and did not respond to my inquiries regarding the case. Mr. Fonarow was unfit to practice law at the time of this case and based on my knowledge he is currently ineligible to practice law. I filed a motion to set aside the entry of the judgment based on the inherent power of this Court since I never employed [Plaintiff] Ms. Cruz, the judgment is excessive and void against me, my attorney provided inadequate representation, failed to appear for trial, and abandoned this case. (Hughes Decl. ¶ 2.)

This showing is insufficient because Defendant makes no attempt to demonstrate “diligence in seeking to set aside the default once the fraud [or mistake] had been discovered.” (Mechling, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 1246.) Defendant refers to unspecified “inquiries” made to her prior counsel, without identifying when those inquiries were made, or describing how she learned of the circumstances of the case. Approximately 19 months elapsed between the entry of judgment on May 17, 2023 and Defendant’s filing of the present motion on January 9, 2025. Defendant’s motion implicitly acknowledges the unavailability of statutory relief under Code of Civil Procedure § 473 because of the long lapse of time since the entry of judgment. But Defendant offers no explanation for this delay, and thus no argument that she was diligent in seeking it.*

This matter has already come on for trial, and Plaintiff would be substantially prejudiced by the overturning of the judgment in her favor. Defendant has not made a sufficient showing to justify this prejudice and override the judicial policy in favor of the finality of judgments. (See Seacall Development, Ltd. v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 201, 205.)2

The motion is therefore DENIED.

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*Defendant briefly argues that Plaintiff failed to notify her of the suspension of her prior counsel in July 2023, as required in Code of Civil Procedure § 286. (Motion at p. 7; RJN Exh. 7.) This argument is of no import to the motion, because this suspension occurred after the judgment was entered in May of that year.