Judge: Lynne M. Hobbs, Case: 21STCV00245, Date: 2023-11-27 Tentative Ruling

 PLEASE NOTE:    

The parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if there is an agreement to submit.  

Regardless of whether there is any such agreement, each party who wishes to submit must send an email to the Court at SSCdept30@LACourt.org indicating the party's intention to submit. 

Include the word "SUBMITS" in all caps and the case number in the subject line of the email and in the body provide the date and time of the hearing, your name, your contact information, the party you represent, whether that party is a plaintiff, defendant, cross-complainant, cross-defendant, claimant, or non-party.  

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If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar. 

Unless all the parties have submitted, the Court will hear argument from any party that appears at the hearing and wishes to argue. The Court may change its tentative as a result of the argument and adopt the changed tentative as the final order at the end of that hearing, even if all the parties are not present. 

Be advised that after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of said motion and may adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.     

Case Number: 21STCV00245    Hearing Date: November 27, 2023    Dept: 30

ADAM CHACON vs CITY OF COVINA, et al.

Motion for Determination of Good Faith Settlement

TENTATIVE

The motion for a determination of good faith settlement is DENIED.  Defendant City of Covina to give notice.

DISCUSSION  

In order to determine whether the settlement was made in good faith under CCP section 877.6, the Court applies the following factors identified by the California Supreme Court in Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488 to determine whether the settlement amount is “in the ballpark” of the settling party’s share of liability for the injuries:

1) a rough approximation of the plaintiff's total recovery;

2) an approximation of the settling party's share of the liability;

3) recognition that a settling party should pay less in settlement than if found liable after a trial;

4) the allocation of the settlement proceeds among plaintiffs;

5) the settling party's financial condition and insurance policy limits;

6) evidence that the plaintiff and the settling party acted with an intent to make the non-settling parties pay more than their fair share (considered fraud and collusion under Tech-Bilt).

The "good faith" concept in CCP section 877.6 is a flexible principle imposing on reviewing courts the obligation to guard against the numerous ways in which the interests of nonsettling defendants may be unfairly prejudiced. (Rankin v. Curtis (1986) 183 Cal. App. 3d 939, 945.) Accordingly, under Tech-Bilt, the party asserting the lack of “good faith” may meet this burden by demonstrating that the settlement is so far "out of the ballpark" as to be inconsistent with the equitable objectives of the statute. (Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal. 3d 488, 499-500.) Such a demonstration would establish that the proposed settlement was not a "settlement made in good faith" within the terms of section 877.6. (Id.)

The Supreme Court explained that CCP section 877.6 is designed to further two equitable policies:

1) encouragement of settlements; and

2) equitable allocation of costs among joint tortfeasors.

(Id.)

Those policies would not be served by an approach which emphasizes one to the virtual exclusion of the other. (Id.) Accordingly, a settlement will not be found in good faith unless the amount is reasonable in light of the settling tortfeasor's proportionate share of liability. (Std. Pac. of San Diego v. A. A. Baxter Corp. (1986) 176 Cal. App. 3d 577, 589.)

1) A rough approximation of the plaintiff's total recovery

County has not presented any evidence as to a rough approximation of Plaintiff’s recovery.

However, Covina presents evidence that according to Plaintiff’s recent supplemental discovery responses, his medical specials alone are in excess of $519,737.00. (Hilgers Decl., Exh. D, Supp. Resp. to FROGS.)

As such, it appears the approximation of Plaintiff’s total recovery for special damages alone is $519,737.00. However, this amount does not include Plaintiff’s potential award of general damages, which could be up to double or triple that amount. As such, the County’s settlement amount of $0 does not account for any of Plaintiff’s total recovery.

2) An approximation of the settling party's share of the liability and the amount paid in settlement

The County argues it is not liable to Plaintiff as a matter of law. The incident occurred outside of the County’s jurisdiction. The County did not own, manage, or control the roadway where the incident took place. The County owned some of the trees abutting the roadway. However, the County was not responsible for maintenance of the roadways in Covina. Unless the County received a report or maintenance request regarding the trees, the County could not service or repair roadways within Covina. In this case, the evidence developed during discovery confirms the County did not receive a request to repair or maintain roadway in the area where the incident occurred due to trees or any other condition. The County lacked notice of the alleged dangerous condition and had no duty or right to correct the alleged dangerous condition before the incident occurred.  

In opposition, Covina argues that Defendant only addresses whether it had notice, but fails to address whether it created the condition. It is undisputed (and in fact acknowledged by the County in the moving papers) that the County owns and maintains the trees that caused the alleged dangerous condition. (Hilgers Decl., Exh. A, County Resp. to RFAs.) There is evidence that the sidewalk damage had apparently been caused by roots from the County’s trees on the adjacent County-owned property. (Id., ¶ 10; Guerrero Decl., ¶ 5.)

Government Code section 835 provides that “a public entity is liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition of its property if the plaintiff establishes that the property was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition, that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred, and that either:                   

(a) [a] negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment created the dangerous condition; or

(b) [t]he public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition under Section 835.2 a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition.”

(Govt. Code, § 835.)

“A defendant cannot be held liable for the defective or dangerous condition of property which it did not own, possess, or control. Where the absence of ownership, possession, or control has been unequivocally established, summary judgment is proper. [Citation.]” (Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hospital (1985) 38 Cal.3d 112, 134.) There are exceptions to this general rule where a person has voluntarily assumed a duty to act, either by contract or by his or her actions (Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club of Southern California (2002) 161 Cal.App.3d 571, 575), or where a person creates the danger that causes the harm or increases a foreseeable risk of harm. (Vasilenko v. Grace Family Church (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1077, 1081.)

Here, County fails to address whether it can be liable for creating the alleged dangerous condition, where it appears the roots of the County tree caused the uplift on Covina’s property. Further, County fails to address Covina’s allegations in the cross-complaint, alleging that County failed to warn of the condition. While County argues it had no duty to inspect or repair City property, to the extent it created the danger, it may have had a duty to prevent or guard against the dangerous condition. (Low v. City of San Francisco (1970) 7 Cal. App. 3d 829, 833-834.)

The Court finds that a jury could well find that the County’s trees’ roots on adjacent County property was the cause of Plaintiff’s injuries, and that the County’s employees created a dangerous condition of public property, and thus, that County may be a joint tortfeasor.

3) Recognition that a settling party should pay less in settlement than if found liable after a trial

County is offering to pay an amount before trial and it should pay less than a potential verdict, if the matter proceeded to trial and the jury found in favor of the Plaintiff.                         

4) The allocation of the settlement proceeds among plaintiffs

This factor is not applicable.

5) The settling party's financial condition and insurance policy limits

County argues there is no insurance coverage for this action.               

6) Evidence that the plaintiff and the settling party acted with an intent to make the non-settling parties pay more than their fair share (considered fraud and collusion under Tech-Bilt).

County argues there is no collusion, fraud or tortious conduct aimed at injuring the interests of any parties. The settlement between Plaintiff and County of Los Angeles was reached after the County filed its motion for summary judgment.

Overall, the County has not shown a rough approximation of Plaintiff’s total recovery and that its settlement for a waiver of costs is an approximate share of its liability for Plaintiff’s injuries as there is evidence to show that a jury could find that County’s trees’ roots caused a dangerous condition of public property, or at the least, a jury could find that the County is a joint tort-feasor. Plaintiff’s special damages are around $500,000. As such, the $0 settlement would not account for any of Plaintiff’s total recovery, and thus, is not proportionate to its potential liability in this matter. Moreover, County has not provided any evidence regarding its financial condition.

As a result, County has not shown that its settlement is a good faith settlement for the purposes of CCP section 877.6.