Judge Lynne M. Hobbs, Case Number: 21STCV06691, Date: 2024-12-03 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Lynne M. Hobbs, Case: 21STCV06691, Date: 2024-12-03 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV06691 Hearing Date: December 3, 2024 Dept: 61

SYLVIA SANTIAGO vs KAISER FOUNDATION HOSPITALS, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al.

TENTATIVE

Plaintiff Sylvia Santiago’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production from Defendant Kaiser Foundation Hospitals is GRANTED in part as to Requests No. 87–88, reinterpreted to seek only job descriptions for assignments Plaintiff occupied, and as to Request No. 89, reinterpreted to seek only polices related to employees and human resources. The motion is GRANTED as to Requests No. 97–101. Further responses are ordered served within 30 days.

Sanctions are awarded against Defendant in the amount of $7,730.00, payable within 30 days.

Moving party to provide notice.

DISCUSSION

“A party may demand that any other party produce . . . a document that is in the possession, custody, or control of the party on whom the demand is made.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.010(b).) The demanding party may move for an order compelling further response to the demand if the demanding party deems that (1) a statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete, (2) a representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive, or (3) an objection in the response is without merit or too general. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310(a).) “The motion shall set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand,” and “[t]he motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310(b).)

A motion to compel a further response to an inspection demand must set forth specific facts showing “good cause” justifying the discovery sought by the inspection demand. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310(b)(1); Kirkland v. Superior Court (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 92, 98.) Unless there is a legitimate privilege issue or claim of attorney work product, that burden is met simply by a fact-specific showing of relevance. (TBG Ins. Services Corp. v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 443, 444.) Once the moving party demonstrates good cause for the discovery, the burden is on the responding party to justify any objection or failure to fully respond to the inspection demand. (Coy v Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220.)

Plaintiff Sylvia Santiago (Plaintiff) moves to compel further responses to Requests for Production, Sets 5–7, No. 87–89 and 97–101, from Defendant Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (Defendant).

Plaintiff seeks further responses to Requests No. 87–88, which together sought all job descriptions for Defendant’s “outside utilization department” and “patient quality department” from January 2017 through the present. (Separate Statement at pp. 2–4.). Defendant responded with objections, followed by the following statement: “Defendant has produced Plaintiff’s Labor and Delivery RN nurse job description.” (Ibid.) Plaintiff argues that these responses do not constitute statements of compliance under Code of Civil Procedure § 2031.220, and that the job description cited is non-responsive, as Plaintiff seeks job descriptions for other departments where she was temporarily reassigned. (Motion at pp. 5–6.)

Plaintiff has shown good cause for at least a portion of Requests No. 87 and 88, and Defendant’s response is non-compliant. Plaintiff seeks job descriptions for the two departments where she was reassigned during her employment, and seeks those descriptions to assess the basis for Defendant’s conclusion that no further reassignment was possible due to Plaintiff’s physical limitations. (Motion at pp. 5–6.) Plaintiff has thus demonstrated good cause for the production of job descriptions for those positions to which she was assigned, and this is indeed how she justifies the requests — as seeking “job descriptions for two positions Plaintiff was temporarily assigned to during a period she had work restrictions.” (Motion at p. 5.)

But the requests themselves are facially broader than Plaintiff’s justifications, seeking not only the job descriptions for those positions that Plaintiff occupied, but “[a]l job descriptions maintained” for the respective departments, regardless of whether Plaintiff held the position or not. (Separate Statement at pp. 2–4.) Plaintiff may thus seek only those job descriptions for assignments she actually occupied.

And Defendant’s response, to the extent it possesses responsive documents, must comply with Code of Civil Procedure § 2031.220. That section states:

A statement that the party to whom a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling has been directed will comply with the particular demand shall state that the production, inspection, copying, testing, or sampling, and related activity demanded, will be allowed either in whole or in part, and that all documents or things in the demanded category that are in the possession, custody, or control of that party and to which no objection is being made will be included in the production.

(Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.220.)

Defendant’s responses do not promise that all responsive documents in its possession will be or have been produced. Defendant merely states that it “has produced Plaintiff’s Labor and Delivery RN nurse job description,” without any indication as to whether other responsive documents exist or have been produced. Defendant in opposition argues that Plaintiff’s motion does not address the prefatory objections that precede this response. (Opposition at p. 7.) But this misstates the parties’ relative burdens on a motion to compel further. The moving party’s burden is to show “good cause” for the requests. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.310, subd. (b)(1).) It is the objecting party’s burden to justify their objections. (See Coy v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220 [noting the “the long-established procedural rule that he who asserts the affirmative of an issue has the burden of proving it”].) Defendant does not attempt to justify its response, or its objections to these requests.

The motion is therefore GRANTED as to Requests No. 87 and 88, reinterpreted to seek only job descriptions for assignments Plaintiff occupied.

A further response is also required as to Request No. 89. This request seeks “[t]he entirety of the Kaiser Policy library, including all version that have existed between January 1, 2017 and the present.” (Separate Statement at p. 6.) This request is also facially overbroad, as Plaintiff seeks all of Defendant’s policies without regard to whether they apply to her employment. However, at the IDC that preceded this motion, the parties and court reached an understanding that the only those policies related to human resources and employees are to be produced. Although Defendant’s response to this request cited a number of policies that it claimed were pertinent to

the case, it once more failed to do so in a manner that complied with Code of Civil Procedure § 2031.220. (Separate Statement at pp. 6–7.)

The motion is therefore GRANTED as to Request No. 89, reinterpreted to seek polices related to employees and human resources.

Defendant contends that the remaining requests were not the subject of sufficient meet and confer efforts to be the subject of the present motion. (Opposition at pp. 6–7.) Defendant claims that Requests No. 97–99 and 100–101 were only the subject of one email, sent on October 9, 2024, a week before Plaintiff filed the present motion, and that Defendant offered to meet and confer further on those requests. (Opposition at pp. 6–7.)

This account is only partially true. After two IDCs were held on other discovery, Plaintiff’s counsel went on vacation from September 18 to October 2, 2024. (Mohrsaz Decl. ¶ 6.) Upon his return, Plaintiff’s counsel twice sent follow-up emails to Defendant seeking further conference on discovery issues on October 4 and October 9. (Mohrsaz Decl. Exh. 7.) Plaintiff not only sent a meet and confer letter on October 9 briefly summarizing Plaintiff’s issues with the requests, but sought an extension in which to bring the present motion. (Ibid.) Defendant’s assurances that it was willing to meet and confer, meanwhile, pointedly omitted any agreement to extend the motion deadline. (Ibid.) Because Defendant failed to grant this extension, its offer of further conference was essentially conditioned on Plaintiff’s wavier of the right to seek further discovery. Thus Plaintiff’s efforts were sufficient prelude to the present motion.

A further response is required for Requests No. 97 and 98. These requests seek all communications related to the decision not to transfer or select Plaintiff for various positions she applied from January 2017 to March 2022, to which Defendant responded only with objections based on irrelevance, overbreadth, privacy, and privilege. (Separate Statement at pp. 9–12.) Defendant in opposition contends that a request for “all communications” concerning the transfers or promotions sought by Plaintiff are overbroad. (Opposition at p. 10.) But while the number of responsive positions is high — Plaintiff apparently applied to 46 positions or transfers — there is no dispute that these decisions are relevant to the subject matter of this litigation. And although Defendant argues that these communications implicate privacy concerns for the employees selected for positions that Plaintiff applied to, Defendant acknowledges that it has already identified these employees in interrogatory responses. (Opposition at p. 10.) The motion is therefore GRANTED as to Requests No. 97–98.

Further responses are also necessary for Requests No. 99–101. These requests sought all job postings for nurse positions filled at Defendant’s Baldwin Park facility from January 1, 2017, to March 1, 2022, the job descriptions for each position, and the qualifications for same. (Separate Statement at pp. 14–23.) Defendant objected on the grounds that the requests were irrelevant and overbroad, yet in opposition provides no argument as to why this discovery should not be permitted. Plaintiff makes the case that these positions will reveal potential destinations for transfer that would have accommodated her disability, and thus shows good cause for the requests. The motion is therefore GRANTED as to Requests No. 99–101.

In summary the motion is GRANTED in part as to Requests No. 87–88, reinterpreted to seek only job descriptions for assignments Plaintiff occupied, and as to Request No. 89, reinterpreted to seek only polices related to employees and human resources. The motion is GRANTED as to Requests No. 97–101.

II. SANCTIONS

Statute provides that the court shall impose sanctions upon a party who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel further response to interrogatories, requests for production of documents, or requests for admission, absent substantial justification otherwise. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2030.300, subd. (d); 2031.310, subd. (h); 2033.290, subd. (d).)

Plaintiff seeks $7,730.00 in sanctions, representing 11.8 hours of attorney work at $650 per hour, plus a $60 filing fee. (Mohrsaz Decl. Exh. 8.) Sanctions are awarded against Defendant and its counsel in this amount.