Judge: Lynne M. Hobbs, Case: 21STCV10214, Date: 2023-12-13 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV10214    Hearing Date: December 13, 2023    Dept: 30

MARC DUNCAN vs MEIR AVRAHM SCHMIEDER, et al.

Motion for Summary Judgment

TENTATIVE

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.  Moving party to give notice.

Request for Judicial Notice

The Court GRANTS West Palm Detox’s request for judicial notice of the FAC. (Evid. Code § 452, subd. (d).)

Plaintiff requests that the Court take judicial notice of (1) the Los Angeles Police Department Arrest Report dated March 18, 2019 and (2) the case summary and register of actions from the probate matter, LASC case number BP107200.

Under California Evidence Code section 452, the Court may take judicial notice, among other things, of official acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the United States and of any state of the United States and facts, court records, and propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and

accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy. (§ 452(c), (d), (h).) Official acts typically include “administrative and executive acts, such as proceedings and reports of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, records of the State Board of Education, and records of [the] county planning commission.” (Evid. Code, section 452, see comments.)

The Court can take judicial notice of the official acts of a state including records, orders, and reports of its administrative agencies. (Rodas v. Spiegel (2001) 87 Cal. App. 4th 513, 518.) However, the court may only judicially notice the existence of the record, not that its contents are the truth. (Sosinsky v. Grant (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1565.¿

Here, Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice is GRANTED as to the existence of the records only, but not the truth of its contents. Defendant’s objections to the request for judicial notice are overruled.

Discussion

Defendant moves for summary judgment on the ground that it is a nonmedical residential facility and does not owe a duty to the public to protect it from the criminal acts of its residents.

“The elements of a cause of action for negligence are well established. They are (a) a legal duty to use due care; (b) a breach of such legal duty; [and] (c) the breach as the¿proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury.” (Ladd v. County of San Mateo (1996) 12 Cal.4th 913, 917, internal quotations omitted.) “The first element, duty, may be imposed by law, be assumed by the defendant, or exist by virtue of a special relationship.” (Doe v. United States Youth Soccer Assn., Inc. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1118, 1128, internal quotations omitted.) “[T]he existence of a duty is a question of law for the court.” (Ky. Fried Chicken of Cal. v. Superior Court (1997) 14 Cal.4th 814, 819.)

A person owes no duty to control the conduct of another, nor to warn those endangered by such conduct unless there is a special relationship between the defendant and either the person whose conduct needs to be controlled or the foreseeable victim of a third party’s conduct. (Beauchene v. Synanon Foundation Inc. (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 342, 344.) The court must balance the public interest in safety from violent assault against the public policy favoring innovator criminal offender release and rehabilitation programs. (Id. (citing Tarasoff v. Regents, 17 Cal.3d 425, 440, 131 Cal.Rptr. 14, 26).) Policy considerations include the foreseeability of harm to plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved. (Id at p.347.)

Here, Defendant relies extensively on the case of Rice v. Center Point, Inc. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 949 for the proposition that, as a residential rehabilitation facility, it did not owe Plaintiff, as a member of the general public, a duty of care to protect Plaintiff against the subject attack from Defendant Schmieder.

In Rice, the Court of Appeal held that no special relationship existed between the residential drug rehabilitation treatment facility and the inmates residing at the facility, such that the facility owed a duty to the victims of stabbings by four escaped inmates, even if the facility violated its own safety procedures. (Rice, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at pp. 956-957.) The Court of Appeal reasoned that many factors, namely the public policy of encouraging rehabilitation of criminal offenders, the lack of foreseeability of injury to an identifiable person, and the fact that risk of injury was shared by all members of general public, militated against imposing a duty on the facility to exercise ordinary care. (Id.)

The Court finds that West Palm Detox has established the absence of a triable issue of material fact here. West Palm Detox has presented evidence showing that it is a “non-medical adult residential detox treatment facility.” (SSF 1.) The First Amended Complaint alleges that West Palm Detox is a residential treatment center. (SSF 3.) Thus, according to Rice, as a residential treatment center, West Palm Detox did not owe Plaintiff a duty of care. The burden now shifts to Plaintiff to establish the existence of a triable issue of material fact.

The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to establish the existence of a triable issue of material fact here. Plaintiff’s contention that residential rehabilitation facilities owe a duty of care to the public is a direct contradiction of the holding in Rice. (See 154 Cal.App.4th at pp. 956-957.) What the Court of Appeal actually said is that people generally do not owe a duty to another to control the conduct of a third party unless there is a special relationship between the defendant and the party whose conduct is to be controlled or the foreseeable victim of the third party’s conduct. (Id., at p. 955.) The Court of Appeal then held that no such duty existed because their injuries were not foreseeable and they were not identifiable intended victims. (Id.) It further held that no special relationship existed because of the public policy of encouraging rehabilitation of criminal offenders, the lack of foreseeability of injury to an identifiable person, and the fact that risk of injury was shared by all members of general public, militated against imposing a duty on the facility to exercise ordinary care. (Id., at pp. 956-957.)

Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to present sufficient evidence or legal authority that rebuts or distinguishes the above-mentioned holdings in Rice. Plaintiff’s only contentions are that West Palm Detox is a residential “live-in center which supervises clients 24/7” and that Schmieder was on some sort of “field trip” or “excursion” to visit a local business at the time Schmieder attacked Plaintiff. (RFJN, Ex. 1, p. 4; Duncan Decl., ¶¶ 2-3.) This evidence is insufficient for a number of reasons.

First, the Court has not taken judicial notice of the truth of the matters contained in the police report regarding Defendant Schmieder. (Bonta, supra, 87 Cal. App. 5th at p. 400.) Thus, the quoted language Plaintiff relies on from that exhibit does not create a disputed material fact. Second, even assuming for the sake of argument that language was true, it is unclear how that changes the analysis here. What matters is whether West Palm Detox is a residential rehabilitation facility, which it has established it is. (SSF 1, 3.) The facility at issue in Rice was for rehabilitation as well. (Rice, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at pp. 956-957.) Third, whether Schmieder was on a “field trip” or “excursion” does not change anything. The third party in Cardenas v. Eggleston Youth Center (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 331, upon which Rice based part of its ruling, was a resident of a youth group home who had a history of violence and left the facility on an open “pass” when he attacked the plaintiff in a convenience store, and the Court of Appeal still held there was no duty. (Id., at pp. 333, 335-336; Rice, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at pp. 956-957.)

Furthermore, none of the evidence Plaintiff has presented supports that Plaintiff’s injury was foreseeable or that Plaintiff was an identifiable victim. The evidentiary record only indicates that Plaintiff happened to be walking home when the incident occurred. (Duncan Decl., ¶ 2; FAC, ¶¶ 6-8.) In Rice, the Court of Appeal rejected the plaintiffs’ foreseeability arguments, finding that the proximity of the park in which the plaintiffs were attacked to the defendant facility did not render the plaintiffs identifiable or otherwise separate them from the general public. (Rice, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at p. 955.) Plaintiff has not even presented evidence of his proximity to the facility, only that he was walking home. (Duncan Decl., ¶ 2; FAC, ¶¶ 6-8.)

Finally, Plaintiff’s argument that he was an invitee because West Palm Detox’s premises were “brought to him” is without merit. Aside from having no basis in law, it is beyond the scope of the First Amended Complaint because the First Amended Complaint does not contain any allegations of Plaintiff being an invitee onto property owned or controlled by West Palm Detox, or that the events in question even occurred on such property. (See FAC, ¶¶ 6-8.) Plaintiff’s citations to other legal authorities regarding liability of owners or possessors of property are without merit for the same reasons.

Therefore, West Palm Detox’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

Without any cause of action pending against West Palm Detox, the issue of punitive damages is now moot.