Judge: Lynne M. Hobbs, Case: 21STCV21891, Date: 2023-12-12 Tentative Ruling

 PLEASE NOTE:    

The parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if there is an agreement to submit.  

Regardless of whether there is any such agreement, each party who wishes to submit must send an email to the Court at SSCdept30@LACourt.org indicating the party's intention to submit. 

Include the word "SUBMITS" in all caps and the case number in the subject line of the email and in the body provide the date and time of the hearing, your name, your contact information, the party you represent, whether that party is a plaintiff, defendant, cross-complainant, cross-defendant, claimant, or non-party.  

If a party submits but still intends to appear at the hearing, include the words "SUBMITS BUT WILL APPEAR" in the subject line of the email. 

If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar. 

Unless all the parties have submitted, the Court will hear argument from any party that appears at the hearing and wishes to argue. The Court may change its tentative as a result of the argument and adopt the changed tentative as the final order at the end of that hearing, even if all the parties are not present. 

Be advised that after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of said motion and may adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.     



Case Number: 21STCV21891    Hearing Date: March 18, 2024    Dept: 30

MARINA M. AVALOS GUZMAN vs GEOBALDA ZAMORA, et al.

TENTATIVE

Defendant Geobalda Zamora’s motion for costs of proof sanctions is GRANTED.

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420, Plaintiff Marina M. Avalos Guzman is ordered to pay Defendant $1,958.45 within 30 days.

Moving party to give notice.

Legal Standard

The purpose of requests for admissions is to expedite trial by “setting at rest a triable issue so that it will not have to be tried.” (Cembrook v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 423, 429. Although a defendant “cannot be forced to admit the fact prior to trial despite its obvious truth”, the failure to do so comes with consequences, exposure to a costs of proof award. (Grace v. Mansourian (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 523, 532.)

C.C.P. §2033.420(a) provides: “If a party fails to admit the genuineness of any document or the truth of any matter when requested to do so under this chapter, and if the party requesting that admission thereafter proves the genuineness of that document or the truth of that matter, the party requesting the admission may move the court for an order requiring the party to whom the request was directed to pay the reasonable expenses incurred in making that proof, including reasonable attorney's fees.”

C.C.P. §2033.420(b) provides: “The court shall make this order unless it finds any of the following: (1) An objection to the request was sustained or a response to it was waived under Section 2033.290. (2) The admission sought was of no substantial importance. (3) The party failing to make the admission had reasonable ground to believe that that party would prevail on the matter. (4) There was other good reason for the failure to admit.”

“Costs of proof are available against a party only, not its counsel.” (Estate of Manuel (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 400, 404.) “[I]f a party denies a request for admission (of substantial importance) in circumstances where the party lacked personal knowledge but had available sources of information and failed to make a reasonable investigation to ascertain the facts, such failure will justify an award of expenses . . .” (Brooks v. American Broadcasting Co. (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 500, 510.) “An RFA has ‘substantial importance’ if it is ‘central to disposition of the case.’” (Doe v. Los Angeles County Dept. of Children & Family Services (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 675, 690. See also Brooks, supra, 179 Cal.App.3d at 509 (“as a general rule a request for admission should have at least some direct relationship to one of the central issues in the case, i.e., an issue which, if not proven, would have altered the results in the case.”).)

Costs may be awarded when the requesting party proves the matter at trial or on a motion for summary judgment. (Barnett v. Penske Truck Leasing Co., L.P. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 494, 497-498.)

Cost-of-proof sanctions are authorized only where the responding party refused to admit a request for admission. If the responding party simply objected or gave an incomplete answer, the proponent must first move to compel further answers. (See Wimberly v. Derby Cycle Corp. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 618, 636-637.) However, objections with responses that are unequivocal denials support cost-of-proof sanctions. (See American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v. Metropolitan Water Dist. of Southern California (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 247, 268.)

The sanction is limited to reasonable expenses incurred after the denial. (See Garcia v. Hyster Co. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 724, 736.) Moreover, the sanction is limited to expenses incurred in “proving the matters denied.” (Id. at 736-737.)

Discussion

Defendant moves for costs of proof sanctions pursuant to C.C.P. §2033.420, on the grounds that (1) Plaintiff denied Request for Admissions (RFAs) Nos. 2, 3, 5, 8, 10, 16, and 18; (2) the admissions were of consequence; (3) Plaintiff’s denials were unjustified; and (4) Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication as to punitive damages was granted on December 12, 2023.

The RFAs propounded on Plaintiff asked Plaintiff to admit she had no facts to support her punitive damages claim against Defendant. The RFAs at issue were as follows:

(2) Admit that you have no facts to support your contention that Defendant Geobalda Zamora acted with malice related to the INCIDENT.

(3) Admit that you have no facts to support your contention that the DOG had any dangerous/vicious propensities prior to the INCIDENT.

(5) Admit that you have no facts to support your contention that the DOG showed any aggressive behavior prior to the INCIDENT.

(8) Admit that you have no facts to support your contention that the DOG had previously attacked someone prior to the INCIDENT.

(10) Admit that you have no facts to support your contention that the DOG had previously bit someone prior to the INCIDENT.

(16) Admit that you have no facts to support your contention that the DOG had any propensity to cause injury to any persons prior to the INCIDENT.

(18) Admit that you have no facts to support your request for punitive and exemplary damages as alleged in your Complaint.

(Levine Decl., ¶¶ 7, 8, 17 and Exhs. D, E, I.) Plaintiff denied the RFAs. (Id.)

Plaintiff deposed defendant after responding to the RFAs. Defendant’s deposition testimony was consistent with her special interrogatory responses that Peluche, the dog, had never previously bitten or attacked anyone. (Zamora Depo. (Exh. G), pgs. 45:13-15; 65:25-66:3; 75:10-23.) Plaintiff could have, but did not, amend her responses to these RFAs after defendant’s deposition.

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that one of C.C.P. § 2033.420(b)’s exception applies (i.e. the party failing to make the admission had reasonable ground to believe that that party would prevail on the matter), and requests the Court reduce the fees.

Plaintiff argues that based on the prior incident biting a handyman’s shoes and of the dog’s known propensity to growl at people, coupled with the fact that Plaintiff was, in fact, bitten by the dog, the request for admissions were reasonably denied.

" ‘In evaluating whether a "good reason" exists for denying a request to admit, "a court may properly consider whether at the time the denial was made the party making the denial held a reasonably entertained good faith belief that the party would prevail on the issue at trial." [Citation.]’ "(Grace v. Mansourian, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at 529.) A party's reasonable belief must be grounded in the evidence; it cannot be based merely on "hope or a roll of the dice." (Id., at 532.)

Here, Plaintiff presents no admissible evidence that the dog had previously bit a handyman or that the dog growled at people. The Court notes Plaintiff submits her own response to interrogatories, but a party cannot use her own interrogatory responses as evidence. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.410 [“[a]t . . . any . . . hearing in the action, . . . the propounding party or any party other than the responding party may use any answer or part of an answer to an interrogatory only against the responding party”], italics added; Bayramoglu v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 726, 741; Great American Ins. Cos. v. Gordon Trucking, Inc. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 445, 450.) As such, the Court cannot find that Plaintiff had reasonable ground to believe she would prevail.

The Court finds that the responses to RFAs Nos. 2, 3, 5, 8, 10, and 16 contain unequivocal denials which are subject to cost-of-proof sanctions under C.C.P. §2033.420. Objections with responses that are unequivocal denials support cost-of-proof sanctions. (See American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v. Metropolitan Water Dist. of Southern California (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 247, 268.) However, the response to RFA No. 18 only contains an objection and is not subject to cost-of-proof sanctions, because Defendant should have moved to compel further.

Further, the admissions went to a key issue, i.e., malice for punitive damages. Moreover, as noted above, the Court does not find any reasonable ground to believe Plaintiff would prevail on the issue, and there do not appear to be any other good reasons for Plaintiff’s failure to admit the requests. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2033.420(b).)

Defendant seeks $2,743.07. The attorneys’ fees, at a rate of $160.17 per hour, and costs include $52.86 for .33 hours meeting and conferring with plaintiff’s counsel regarding plaintiff’s response to request for admission no. 18; $80.08 for .5 hours to prepare for and appear at the March 8, 2023, IDC; $160.17 for an hour to drafting a motion to continue trial so that defendant’s motion for summary adjudication could be heard; $61.65 for the filing fee for motion to continue trial; $961.02 for six hours to research and draft the motion for summary adjudication of issues and supporting separate statement; $513.75 for the filing fee for the motion for summary adjudication (including credit card fee); $40.04 for .25 hours for drafting notice of ruling re motion for summary adjudication; $480.51 for three hours for researching and drafting this motion for costs of proof sanctions; $61.65 for the filing fee for this motion; $160.17 for one hour to review the opposition and draft a reply; and $160.17 for an hour to appear for the hearing of this motion.

The court must determine both the amounts and reasonableness of the expenses incurred by the requesting party in proving the truth of the matters denied. (Brooks, supra, 179 Cal.App.3d at 512-513.)

First, the Court finds that the total of the listed costs and fees amounts to $2,732.07, and not $2,743.07, as Defendant states.

Next, the Court notes that some of the costs are associated with RFA No. 18, including meeting and conferring over RFA No. 18, and the fees associated with the IDC. (2/24/2023 IDC Form.) As noted above, the motion is not granted as to RFA No. 18, because the response was only an objection, and not a denial. As such, $132.94 in fees for the time spent in connection with RFA No 18 is reduced from the amount sought. Moreover, the Court finds that Defendant’s MSA for punitive damages was relatively straightforward and reduces three hours from the time spent on that motion, for an additional reduction of $480.51 from the amount sought. Lastly, the Court finds that five hours spent on this motion is also excessive, and reduces one hour of attorney time, i.e., $160.17. Therefore, a total of $773.62 is reduced. As to the remaining costs, the Court finds these expenses were incurred in proving the admissions false and are recoverable under Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420. As such, the Court grants the motion in the reduced amount of $1,958.45.

Conclusion

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for costs of proof sanctions is GRANTED.

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420, Plaintiff Marina M. Avalos Guzman is ordered to pay Defendant $1,958.45 within 30 days.