Judge Lynne M. Hobbs, Case Number: 21STCV30110, Date: 2023-08-17 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Lynne M. Hobbs, Case: 21STCV30110, Date: 2023-08-17 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV30110 Hearing Date: August 17, 2023 Dept: 30

TRACY YBARRA, AN INDIVIDUAL vs SMARTSTOP SELF STORAGE REIT, INC. WHICH WILL DO BUSINESS IN CALIFORNIA AS SMARTSTOP SELF STORAGE, A MARYLAND CORPORATION, et al.

Re: Motion for Summary Judgment

Ruling: Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. Moving party is ordered to give notice.

Discussion:

Defendant moves for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication, on the grounds that (1) Plaintiff’s cause of action is barred under the release and waiver she executed and (2) Defendant did not have actual or constructive notice of the purportedly defective condition of the subject door.

The elements of a cause of action for premises liability are the same as those for negligence: duty, breach, causation, and damages. (Castellon v. U.S. Bancorp (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 994, 998.) Those who own, possess, or control property generally have a duty to exercise ordinary care in managing the property to avoid exposing others to an unreasonable risk of harm. (Annocki v. Peterson Enterprises, LLC (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 32, 37.) If a dangerous condition exists, the property owner is “under a duty to exercise ordinary care either to make the condition reasonably safe for [customers’] their use or to give a warning adequate to enable them to avoid the harm.” (Bridgman v. Safeway Stores, Inc. (1960) 53 Cal.2d 443, 446.) The existence and scope of a property owner’s duty are legal questions for the court. (Annocki, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 36.)

Because the owner is not the insurer of the visitor’s personal safety…, the owner’s actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition is a key to establishing its liability.” (Ortega v. Kmart Corp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1200, 1206.) “[W]here the plaintiff relies on the failure to correct a dangerous condition to prove the owner’s negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of showing that the owner had notice of the defect in sufficient time to correct it.” (Ibid.) The party asserting the cause of action has the burden to prove that the owner had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition in sufficient time to correct it.¿ (Ortega, 26 Cal.4th at 1203, 1206.)

For an express release of liability to be enforceable against a plaintiff (1) the release agreement “must be clear, unambiguous and explicit in expressing the intent of the parties (citation omitted);” (2) the injury-producing act “must be reasonably related to the object or purpose for which the release is given (citation omitted); and (3) the release cannot contravene public policy.” (Sweat v. Big Time Auto Racing, Inc. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1304-5.) A release must not be buried in a lengthy document, hidden among other verbiage, or so encumbered with other provisions as to be difficult to find. (Leon v. Family Fitness Center (No. 107), Inc. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1227, 1232 (citing Bennett v. United States Cycling Federation (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 1485, 1489).)

Here, Defendant’s evidence shows that Plaintiff leased a storage unit from Defendant at a storage facility located at 404 Potrero Grande Dr. Monterrey Park, CA 91755. (UMF No. 2.) Plaintiff was holding open the door to the storage facility with her back against the door, walked towards the door opening, and injured her left Achilles heel on the door’s bottom edge. (UMF No. 5.)

Plaintiff signed the lease for the subject storage facility premises on January 6, 2020, which contained an exemption of liability provision. (UMF No. 9.) The lease for the storage facility premises contains an exemption of liability provision stating the following:

“12. RELEASE OF OWNER’S LIABILITY FOR BODILY INJURY: Owner, Manager and their respective agents, employees and affiliates shall not be liable to Occupant for injury or death as a result of Occupant’s use of the Leased Space or the Facility, even if such injury is caused by the active or passive acts or omissions or negligence of the Owner, Manager or any of their respective agents, employees or affiliates.” (UMF No. 8.)

The agreement is clear and unambiguous that the parties agreed that Plaintiff would waive any loss, damage, or cost due to Plaintiff’s use of the Leased Space or the Facility. It is not hidden in the agreement. Rather, it is clearly marked in bold lettering. Because Plaintiff was injured while entering the storage facility, the injury-causing act is related to the purpose of the release. Further, Defendant demonstrates the release is not contrary to public policy as almost identical exculpatory provisions have been previously upheld by the Court. (See Fritelli, Inc. v. 350 North Canon Drive, LP (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 35, 48; see also CAZA Drilling (California), Inc. v. TEG Oil & Gas U.S.A., Inc. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 453, 467.) Defendant has thus met its burden in establishing that Plaintiff has released Defendant’s liability for injuries arising from her use of the subject storage facility, such as the injuries at issue in the instant case, via the exculpatory clause in the lease agreement. The burden shifts to Plaintiff.

Plaintiff attempts to argue in opposition that she never signed the subject lease agreement. However, as Defendant notes in reply, Plaintiff admitted to signing the lease agreement in her responses to Requests for Admissions Nos. 1-3. Any matter admitted in response to a request for admission is conclusively established against the party making the admissions, unless the court has permitted withdrawal or amendment of the admission. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.410(a); Murillo v. Sup. Ct. (People) (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 730, 736.)

Plaintiff has otherwise failed to meet her burden in establishing any other deficiencies with the lease agreement, the language of the release, or the applicability of the release to her injuries. As such, Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden in creating triable issues of fact as to whether she has released Defendant of liability for injuries arising from her use of the subject storage facility, such as the injuries at issue here. Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant arising from the injuries at issue in her complaint are barred under the lease agreement/exculpatory clause as a matter of law.

The Court grants summary judgment on these grounds and as such does not need to reach Defendant’s remaining arguments in support of the instant motion.