Judge: Lynne M. Hobbs, Case: 22STCV01286, Date: 2024-02-09 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV01286    Hearing Date: February 9, 2024    Dept: 30

CATHY MASON vs CITY OF LOS ANGELES

TENTATIVE

Defendants George Anderson, individually and as Trustee of the Anderson Family Trust’s demurrer is OVERRULED. Plaintiff is ordered to give notice.

Legal Standard

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228.) The court “treat[s] the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law ….” (Berkley v. Dowds (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 518, 525).) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994).) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters; therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.30, 430.70.) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action. (Hahn, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at 747.)

Request for Judicial Notice

Defendants request judicial notice of the complaint and first amended complaint in this matter. The request is GRANTED.

Meet and Confer

The demurrer and motion to strike are accompanied by the declaration of Arianna K. Vanmeeteren which satisfies the meet and confer requirement. (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.41.)

Discussion

Defendants demur to the SAC, alleging that they were named as Does after the statute of limitations had run, and the amendment does not relate back to the filing of the complaint because Plaintiff knew their identity at the time of the filing of the original complaint.

CCP section 335.1 provides that an action for injury to, or for the death of, an individual caused by the neglect of another must be brought within two years. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 335.1.) The negligence claim accrues on the date of injury. (See Rodibaugh v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. (1964) 225 Cal.App.2d 570, 573.) Here, the date of the alleged injury is January 21, 2021. (SAC, ¶ 10.) Plaintiff substituted Does 1 and 2 for Defendants on September 26, 2023, more than two years after the cause of action accrued on January 21, 2021, i.e., the date the injury occurred. However, Plaintiff argues in opposition that the amendment relates back to the filing of the complaint.  

“When the plaintiff is ignorant of the name of a defendant, he must state that fact in the complaint, or the affidavit if the action is commenced by affidavit, and such defendant may be designated in any pleading or proceeding by any name, and when his true name is discovered, the pleading or proceeding must be amended accordingly . . . .” (CCP § 474.)

Where a complaint is amended after the statute of limitations has run to identify a fictitiously-named defendant, the amended complaint will “relate back” to and be deemed filed as of the date of the original complaint, if: (1) the original complaint stated a valid cause of action against the now-identified Doe defendant; (2) plaintiff was “genuinely ignorant” of the defendant’s identity; and (3) the amended complaint is based on the same general set of facts as the original. (Austin v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. (1961) 56 Cal.2d 596, 600-601.)

Relation back effect will be given only when plaintiff was genuinely ignorant of that person’s identity or liability when the action was commenced. (McClatchy v. Coblentz, Patch, Duffy & Bass, LLP (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 368, 371-372.) The requirement of good faith ignorance of the true name of a fictitiously designated defendant, as a prerequisite for amending the complaint to supply a name, after the running of statute of limitations, is designed to promote the policies supporting the statute of limitations. (McGee Street Productions v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (App. 2 Dist. 2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 717.) Ignorance of the name of a defendant has not been interpreted literally. (Optical Surplus, Inc. v. Superior Court (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 776, 783.) “Ignorance” may include situations where the plaintiff knew the identity of the person but was ignorant of the facts giving him a cause of action or knew the name and all the facts but was unaware that the law gave him a cause of action. (Ibid.) Ignorance of the facts is the critical issue. (Ibid.) The question of the plaintiff's good faith in this regard is for the determination of the trial court. (Ibid.)

Plaintiff alleges that she is ignorant of the true names and capacities of defendants sued as Does 1 to 50. (SAC, ¶ 5.) For the purpose of ruling on a demurrer, all facts pleading in the complaint are assumed to be true. (See Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966.) To defeat the amendment, the burden is on Defendant to prove plaintiff's earlier awareness of Defendant’s identity and facts creating its liability. (See Fara Estates Homeowners Ass’n v. Fara Estates, Ltd. (9th Cir. 1998) 134 F.3d 377, 377 (applying California law); Breceda v. Gamsby (1968) 267 Cal.App.2d 167, 179.) Defendants have failed to provide any judicially noticeable documents or point to any allegations within the SAC that prove Plaintiff had knowledge of Defendants’ identity or knowledge of the facts or law giving Plaintiff a cause of action at the time Plaintiff filed her complaint.

Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s initial complaint, and her first amended complaint only contained a cause of action for “Premises Liability -Dangerous Condition of Public Property,” which, according to Defendants, only relates only to public entities, not private landowners such as Defendant. Thus, Defendants argue that the original complaint did not state a valid cause of action against Defendants and the relation back doctrine does not apply. (See Austin v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., supra, 56 Cal.2d at 600-601.)

The Court disagrees. The elements of a cause of action for premises liability are the same as for negligence: duty, breach, causation, and damages. (Castellon v. U.S. Bancorp¿(2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 994, 998.) Those who own, possess, or control property generally have a duty to exercise ordinary care in managing the property¿to¿avoid exposing others to an unreasonable risk of harm. (Annocki¿v. Peterson Enterprises, LLC¿(2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 32, 37.) The existence and scope of duty are legal questions for the court. (Id. at p. 36.) If there is a condition that poses a danger to customers and others on the premises, the property owner is “under a duty to exercise ordinary care either to make the condition reasonably safe for their use or to give a warning adequate to enable them to avoid the harm.” (Bridgman v. Safeway Stores, Inc.¿(1960) 53 Cal.2d 443, 446.)

In turning to the allegations made in the original complaint, the Court finds negligence and/or premises liability is sufficiently alleged against Defendants. The complaint alleges that due to Defendant City and DOES 1 through 50’s failure to maintain the subject sidewalk, the subject sidewalk was cracked, uneven, and was in a dangerous condition. While Plaintiff was walking on the subject sidewalk, she tripped and fell on the ground incurring multiple serious injuries to her person. (Compl., ¶ 15.) Thus, because Defendants were substituted as Does 1 and 2, the Court finds these allegations are sufficient in alleging negligence and/or premises liability against them.

In sum, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that she was ignorant of Defendants’ identity at the time the Complaint was filed. Defendants have not met their burden to prove that Plaintiff knew of their identity or knew the facts or law that created liability. Therefore, Defendants’ demurrer is OVERRULED.