Judge Lynne M. Hobbs, Case Number: 22STCV02520, Date: 2023-12-13 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Lynne M. Hobbs, Case: 22STCV02520, Date: 2023-12-13 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV02520 Hearing Date: February 1, 2024 Dept: 30

ABIGAIL ZWAANS vs ARNOLD MONTEAGUDO PRESTON

TENTATIVE

Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication is DENIED. Moving party to give notice.

Legal Standard

The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) In analyzing motions for summary judgment, courts must apply a three-step analysis: “(1) identify the issues framed by the pleadings; (2) determine whether the moving party has negated the opponent's claims; and (3) determine whether the opposition has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material factual issue.” (Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294.) Thus, summary judgment is granted when, after the Court’s consideration of the evidence set forth in the papers and all reasonable inferences accordingly, no triable issues of fact exist, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (CCP § 437c(c); Villa v. McFarren (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 733, 741.)

As to each claim as framed by the Complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc.¿(2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.) A motion for summary judgment must be denied where the moving party's evidence does not prove all material facts, even in the absence of any opposition or where the opposition is weak. (Leyva v. Sup. Ct. (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 462, 475; Salesguevara v. Wyeth Labs., Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 379, 384, 387.)

A defendant has met its burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if it demonstrates the absence of any single essential element of plaintiff’s case or a complete defense to plaintiff’s action. (CCP § 437c(o)(2); Bacon v. Southern Cal. Edison Co. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 854, 858.) Once the defendant moving party has met the burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show via specific facts that a triable issue of material facts exists as to a cause of action or a defense thereto. (CCP § 437c(o)(2).)

Where a plaintiff cannot establish an essential element of a cause of action, or where a complete defense is shown, a court must grant a motion for summary adjudication. (CCP § 437c(o)(1)-(2).) A defendant meets its burden by showing that “one or more elements of a cause of action . . . cannot be established.” (Id.; Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 853.)

Discussion

Defendant moves for summary adjudication of the punitive damages claim, arguing it has no merit because there is no clear and convincing evidence of malice.

Civil Code § 3294 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

(a)¿In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.

“Malice” is defined in section 3294(c)(1) as “conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury” or “despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” “Oppression” is defined in section 3294(c)(2) as “despicable conduct subjecting a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.”

The term “despicable” has been defined in the case law as actions that are “base,” “vile,” or “contemptible.” (See, e.g., Shade Foods, Inc. v. Innovative Products Sales & Marketing, Inc. (2000) 78 Cal. App. 4th 847, 891.) To prove that a defendant acted with “willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others,” it is not enough to prove negligence, gross negligence or even recklessness. (Dawes v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal. App. 3d 82, 87.)

Further, “[t]here must be evidence that defendant acted with knowledge of the probable dangerous consequences to plaintiff’s interests and deliberately failed to avoid these consequences.” (Flyer’s Body Shop Profit Sharing Plan v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 185 Cal. App. 3d 1149, 1155 (1986); see also Angie M. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. App. 4th 1217, 1228 (1995) [“Conscious disregard for the safety of another may be sufficient where the defendant is aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his or her conduct and he or she willfully fails to avoid such consequences”].)

While “the ‘clear and convincing’ evidentiary standard is a stringent one, it does not impose on a plaintiff the obligation to ‘prove’ a case for punitive damages at summary judgment.” (Spinks v. Equity Residential Briarwood Apartments (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1053.) However, where the plaintiff's ultimate burden of proof will be by clear and convincing evidence, the higher standard of proof must be taken into account in ruling on a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication, since if a plaintiff is to prevail on a claim for punitive damages, it will be necessary that the evidence presented meet the higher evidentiary standard. (Basich v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1118–1120, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 153.) Further, summary judgment “on the issue of punitive damages is proper” only “when no reasonable jury could find the plaintiff’s evidence to be clear and convincing proof of malice, fraud or oppression.” (Id.)

Here, Plaintiff Dutton alleges that Defendant was well aware his brakes were inoperable. (Dutton Complaint, 3:12-14.) Plaintiff Dutton claims that Defendant admitted at the scene that several minutes before the subject collision occurred, he had almost crashed into another vehicle due to his brakes. (Dutton Complaint, 3:14-16.)

However, Defendant denies the collision with Plaintiffs was intentional and denies he intended to harm Plaintiffs. (UMF Nos. 6, 7.) Defendant was unable to avoid the collision despite his repeated efforts to pump the brakes. (Preston Decl., ¶ 6.) Defendant denies having any prior knowledge of any issues with his brakes. Defendant states the first time his brakes malfunctioned was at the time of the incident. (Preston Decl., ¶ 10-11.)

Defendant also argues that he denies he told Plaintiff Dutton he had almost crashed into another vehicle due to his brakes and continued driving. Defendant further argues his conduct cannot reasonably be characterized as despicable conduct. Although Defendant attempted to stop at a red light, his brakes failed.

Defendant has met his burden on summary adjudication to show that there are no triable issues of material fact as to whether he acted with malice, and whether there was any despicable conduct on his part as Defendant presents evidence that he had no prior knowledge of any issues with his brakes. The burden shifts to Plaintiff to present triable issues of material fact.

To meet his burden, Plaintiff presents evidence that Defendant admitted that earlier in the day, he had almost hit another car due to his brakes failing. (AMF No. 5.) Indeed, Plaintiff Dutton testified as follows: “[Defendant] had explained that he knew his brakes weren’t working and they were completely inoperable, and he had almost hit someone earlier in the day.” (Knopfler Decl., Ex. A – Dutton Depo. 17:17-20). Similarly, Plaintiff Zwaans testified as follows: “When -- after he hit us and everything happened, then he came over to speak to us. He said that his brakes didn’t work earlier that day and that he knew this....” (Knopfler Decl., Ex. B – Zwaans Depo. 35:5-7).

The Court finds there are triable issues of material fact as to whether Defendant’s conduct was despicable and carried on with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. The evidence shows that Defendant admitted to Plaintiffs that he almost crashed due to his inoperable breaks prior to the collision. Thus, the evidence that Defendant continued to drive even after knowing his brakes were inoperable shows his conduct was carried on with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others, and that he was aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his conduct because he almost crashed, yet he willfully failed to avoid such consequences by driving again. While Defendant denies making this statement, this presents a triable issue of fact because the Court cannot make any credible determinations or weigh the evidence in this motion. The fact that there is conflicting evidence shows the issue must be sent to the jury.

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication is DENIED.