Judge Lynne M. Hobbs, Case Number: 22STCV07878, Date: 2024-10-01 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Lynne M. Hobbs, Case: 22STCV07878, Date: 2024-10-01 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV07878 Hearing Date: October 1, 2024 Dept: 61

RAJ HAIR INTERNATIONAL PVT. LTD., AN INDIAN PRIVATE LIMITED COMPANY vs EXTENSIONS PLUS, INC., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al.

TENTATIVE

Plaintiff Raj Hair International, Pvt., Ltd’s Motion for Summary Adjudication of the Second Cause of Action for Breach of Contract is GRANTED.

Plaintiff to give notice.

DISCUSSION

I. OBJECTIONS

Plaintiff Raj Hair International (Plaintiff) offers objections to the evidence submitted by Defendant Extensions Plus, Inc. (Defendant) in opposition to the present motion for summary adjudication. Objections to paragraphs 3–8, 10, and 18 of the declaration of Defendant Helene Stahl are SUSTAINED, as Stahl undercuts her own foundation in personal knowledge for the quality of the hair products shipped. Plaintiff’s other objections are OVERRULED.

II. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT

A party may move for summary judgment “if it is contended that the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (a).) “[I]f all the evidence submitted, and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,” the moving party will be entitled to summary judgment. (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) A motion for summary adjudication may be made by itself or as an alternative to a motion for summary judgment and shall proceed in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (f)(2).)

The moving party bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact, and if he does so, the burden shifts to the opposing party to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850; accord Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) Plaintiffs moving for summary judgment may meet their initial burden by “prov[ing] each element of the cause of action entitling the party to judgment on the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(p)(1).)

Once the plaintiff has met that burden, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(p)(1).) The defendant may not rely upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists but, instead, shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(p)(1).) To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)

Plaintiff Raj Hair International Pvt. Ltd. (Plaintiff) seeks summary adjudication of its second cause of action for breach of contract. Plaintiff argues that there are no triable issues as to the existence of a 2018 payment agreement between itself and Defendant Extensions Plus, Inc. (Defendant), and Defendant’s failure to pay.

“[T]he elements of a cause of action for breach of contract are (1) the existence of the contract, (2) plaintiff's performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant's breach, and (4) the resulting damages to the plaintiff.” (Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 820.)

Plaintiff presents a contract executed between Plaintiff and Defendant in May 2024, whereby Defendant agreed to a payment plan for payment of the $1,575,065.50 Defendant owed to Plaintiff due to Plaintiff’s prior supplies of hair for Defendant’s use in the creation of hair extensions. (Motion at pp. 9–10, Exh. 16.) Defendant, however, made no payments required under the agreement. (Cherian Decl. ¶ 10.) Thus Plaintiff has been damaged in the full amount of the contractual debt. (Motion at p. 14.)

Plaintiff also argues that it is entitled to $1,060,615 in prejudgment interest under Civil Code § 3287, for damages that are certain or capable of being mad certain by calculation. (Motion at pp. 14–15.) This calculation is based on two different rates applied to two different payment amounts: (1) a 15% rate prescribed by the contract for a $1,212,739 payment, that was due by November 24, 2019; and (2) a statutory 10% rate (prescribed by Civil Code § 3289, subd. (b)) to be applied to a payment of 362,326.50, which was due by July 31, 2024. (Cherian Decl. ¶ 14.)

Defendant in opposition argues that Plaintiff has failed to rebut Defendant’s defenses of contractual duress or as to the ill quality of the goods that were supplied. (Opposition at pp. 2–4.)

Defendant’s opposition misconceives the parties’ respective burdens in a motion for summary adjudication. It is a plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate entitlement to adjudication of a claim by presenting evidence disclosing the absence of triable issues as to each element of that claim. The summary judgment statute “no longer requires a plaintiff moving for summary judgment to disprove any defense asserted by the defendant as well as prove each element of his own cause of action. . . . All that the plaintiff need do is to “prove[ ] each element of the cause of action.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 853.) Duress is an affirmative defense to breach of contract (CACI 332), and as such it is Defendant’s burden to present evidence supporting its defense.

Defendant presents no evidence creating a triable issue of fact as to duress. Statutory duress consists of the unlawful or fraudulent confinement of a person, their family, their property. (Civ. Code § 1569.) And economic duress may vitiate a contract where an act “is so coercive as to ‘cause a reasonably prudent person, faced with no reasonable alternative, to agree to an unfavorable contract.’” (Tarpy v. County of San Diego (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 267, 277.) Here, the only evidence as to duress that Defendant presents is the declaration of Defendant Helene Stahl, who declares that she signed the agreement at a meeting at her office on May 24, 2018, to discuss the terms of Defendant’s repayment, Plaintiff’s principals “kept telling me that they would not leave until I signed” the contract, and that one “was raising his voice and I became very intimidated and became very anxious.” (Stahl Decl. ¶¶ 14–16.) Defendant does not contend that she or her property were confined, and provides no evidence that she was faced with circumstances so coercive that she had no reasonable alternative but to sign.

Defendant argues that the quality of the hair supplied by Plaintiff was poor. (Stahl Decl. ¶¶ 7–8.) Implicitly, this appears to be an attempt to argue that Plaintiff did not perform on the agreement. However, the hair deliveries that Defendant identifies were not delivered as part of the agreement, but were delivered as part of the purchases, the debt from which was ratified in the agreement according to a certain payment plan. (Stahl Decl. ¶¶ 7–8.) Thus, even if Plaintiff delivered “bad hair,” their failure to do so does not vitiate their performance under the May 2018 agreement.*

Defendant finally argues that Plaintiff cannot obtain separate adjudication of liability and damages in a motion for summary judgment. (Opposition at pp. 4–5.) But Plaintiff does not seek adjudication of only liability here, but expressly seeks adjudication of the issue of damages ($1,575,065.50) and prejudgment interest ($1,050,615). (Motion at p. 16.) Defendant has properly raised and proved the absence of triable issues as to damages.

The motion is therefore GRANTED.

*Moreover, Defendant provides no foundation for the poor condition of the hair. Although Stahl arguably possesses personal knowledge of the quality of Plaintiff’s product delivered to her company, Stahl specifically states that she had no knowledge that Defendant was overpaying for bad hair until “shortly before the lawsuit.” (Stahl Decl. ¶ 10.)