Judge Lynne M. Hobbs, Case Number: 22STCV10043, Date: 2023-08-08 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Lynne M. Hobbs, Case: 22STCV10043, Date: 2023-08-08 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV10043 Hearing Date: February 5, 2024 Dept: 30

STACEY JOEL HUNT, JR. vs TESLA MOTORS, INC., et al.

TENTATIVE

Plaintiff’s motions to quash are GRANTED. The subpoenas are limited to seek only requests 2 and 3. Plaintiff’s request for sanctions are GRANTED. Defendants are ordered to pay a total of $511.65 in sanctions to Plaintiff within 30 days. Moving party to give notice.

Legal Standard

When a subpoena has been issued requiring the attendance of a witness or the production of documents, electronically stored information, or other things before a court or at the taking of a deposition, the court, upon motion “reasonably made” by the party, the witness, or any consumer whose personal records are sought, or upon the court's own motion after giving counsel notice and an opportunity to be heard, may make an order quashing the subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon those terms and conditions as the court may specify. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 1987.1; Southern Pac. Co. v. Superior Court (1940) 15 Cal.2d 206.)

There is no requirement that the motion contain a meet-and-confer declaration demonstrating a good-faith attempt at informal resolution. (See id.)

The court can make an order quashing or modifying a subpoena as necessary to protect a person from “unreasonable or oppressive demands, including unreasonable violations of the right of privacy of the person.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.1, subd. (a).)

Discussion

Plaintiff moves to quash Defendants’ subpoenas for Plaintiff’s employment records, arguing that Defendants’ subpoena is impermissibly overbroad, and violates Plaintiff’s right to privacy.

As an initial matter, Defendant argues Plaintiff’s separate statement is non-compliant and Plaintiff failed to meet and confer.

However, Rule 3.1345 does not necessarily preclude an order in the absence of a separate statement. (See Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pac. Healthcare Consultants (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 390, 409 fn. 14.) As such, the Court overlooks the issues within the separate statement. Next, the Court notes that there is no meet and confer requirement in connection with this motion. The Court turns to the merits of the motion.

Specifically, Defendants seek the following records from Los Angeles Cooking School and Insomniac (Exchange LA):

1. All personnel records, application for employment, resumes, pre-employment exam records, incident reports, performance appraisals, awards, and any other documents which refer to the employment of the person named below, while an employee, an independent contractor, or in any other capacity.

2. Any and all payroll records, including but not limited to copies of W-2s, W-4s and/or 1099 and W-9 forms, paystubs, hours worked, total overtime earnings, holiday pay and/or vacation pay, bonus pay, deductions, sick pay, HSA/FSA amounts whether taxable or non- taxable, payment documents issued as salary, commission or other earned income payments and any other payroll documents which refer or relate to the within named individual, as an employee, independent contractor, or in any other capacity.

3. Any and all retirement records, including but not limited to any 401(K), 403(8), 457 or I.R.A retirement savings accounts, to include pension benefit records, and any and all documentation of other retirement benefits the individual has earned, accrued, or become entitled to.

(Rodriguez Decl., Exh. 1.)

Plaintiff offered to limit the scope the subpoenas to pay records and benefit information and retirement benefits which is the issue of loss income. (Rodriguez Decl., ¶¶ 10-15; Exh. 2.) Defendant did not respond.

Under Hill v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal. 4th 1, 35-37, the party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious. (Id.) The party seeking the information may raise in response whatever legitimate and important countervailing interests disclosure serves, while the party seeking protection may identify feasible alternatives that serve the same interests or protective measures that would diminish the loss of privacy. A court must then balance these competing considerations. (Id. at 37–40.)

California’s Constitutional right to privacy protects against the unwarranted, compelled disclosure of various private or sensitive information regarding one’s personal life. (Britt v. Superior Court (1978)20 Cal.3d 844, 855-856.) This includes employment records. (See Board of Trustees v. Superior Court (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 516, 526 (“It seems manifest, and we observe no contrary contention, that personnel, tenure, and promotion records and files relate to the private affairs of Dr. Lucas, and are maintained in confidence by the University.”); See also, id., at 526 (“It is manifest that the subject documents and communications of Dr. Dong's personnel, tenure, and promotion files, whether relating only to his initial employment, or also to his “promotion, additional compensation, or termination,” were communicated to the University in confidence, and were thus covered by the communicators' constitutional right of privacy.”); El Dorado Savings & Loan Assn. v. Superior Court (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 342, 345 (“plaintiffs acknowledge the personnel records of petitioner Morris are protected by the right of privacy.”).) “The public interest in preserving confidential, personnel information generally outweighs a private litigant's interest in obtaining that information.” (Life Technologies Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 640, 652, disapproved on different grounds by Williams v. Superior Court, supra, 3 Cal.5th 531.) An employee’s personnel records concerning when and why the employee was fired have a legally protected privacy interest, and disclosure of the records may implicate a threatened intrusion into privacy that is serious. (Id.) And a person is privileged to withhold disclosure of their taxpayer information. (Brown v. Superior Court (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 141, 142-144 [finding plaintiff’s W-2 tax forms were subject to privilege protecting taxpayer information from disclosure despite defendants’ claim they were relevant to lost wages].)

As cited above, Plaintiff’s employment records are protected by the right to privacy, and Plaintiff has an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances.

As to the next Hill factor, Defendant seeks this subpoena because Plaintiff is making a serious claim that are not related to orthopedic injuries, but rather his brain and his mind. He is claiming that he suffers major emotional difficulties including suicidal ideation, and though he has returned to work, he is claiming that he will lose work in the future,” a duration and amount that will be established by expert testimony.” Defendant argues the documents from Plaintiff’s employers may have far more information than simply financial material such as wages. When a Plaintiff claims a traumatic brain injury, and significant psychiatric damages, the defense of such claims include seeking other stressors or issues which may be contributing to their condition, and just as importantly, evidence that the Plaintiff is or is not functioning perfectly well in a work environment.

However, simply because Plaintiff is making a claim for traumatic brain injury does not mean Defendant can go on a fishing expedition into Plaintiff’s private employment records. “Mere speculation as to the possibility that some portion of the records might be relevant to some substantive issue does not suffice” for showing direct relevance as to private information sought in discovery. (Davis v. Superior Court (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1008, 1017-1020.) Defendant has failed to articulate any important countervailing interest disclosure would serve other than speculation as to where Plaintiff’s stressors stem from. Further, Plaintiff offered to limit the subpoena and therefore, has offered a less intrusive means to this discovery. As such, the Court finds that the subpoena is overbroad to the extent the scope of records includes non-wage related documents. Thus, the motion is granted and the subpoena is limited to what Plaintiff has proposed (Requests 2 and 3).

Sanctions

Plaintiff seeks sanctions against Defendant in connection with this motion. “[T]he court may in its discretion award the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in making or opposing the motion, including reasonable attorney's fees, if the court finds the motion was made or opposed in bad faith or without substantial justification or that one or more of the requirements of the subpoena was oppressive.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.2(a).)

The Court finds sanctions against Defendants are warranted as the requirements of the subpoena were oppressive, and Defendants opposed this motion without substantial justification. However, the amount requested is excessive. Thus, the Court imposes sanctions against Defendant in the amount of $511.65 ($450 per hour, for one hour, plus $61.65 filing fee), to be paid within 30 days of this order.