Judge Lynne M. Hobbs, Case Number: 22STCV13433, Date: 2024-02-09 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Lynne M. Hobbs, Case: 22STCV13433, Date: 2024-02-09 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV13433 Hearing Date: February 9, 2024 Dept: 30

BOAZ WALKER, AN INDIVIDUAL vs LOS ANGELES COUNTY METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, A PUBLIC ENTITY, et al.

TENTATIVE

Defendant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority and Lawrence Gilbert Tubbs’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. Moving party to give notice.

Legal Standard

The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)

“On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facia showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.” (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(p)(2).) “Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Id.) “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)

“When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.” (Avivi, 159 Cal.App.4th at 467; Code Civ. Proc., §437c(c).)

Evidentiary Objections

Plaintiff’s Objections to Defendant’s Evidence:

The Court notes that Plaintiff skipped number 7 in his objections, and the Court will do the same.

· The following objections are OVERRULED: 3, 4, 5, 8, 16

· The following objections are SUSTAINED: 1, 2, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 only in part as follows: “The collision was caused by the SUV driver…”

Discussion

Defendant LACMTA moves for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s causes of action against it for motor vehicle negligence and negligence, arguing that it was not negligent and did not cause Plaintiff’s injuries.

Motor Vehicle Negligence and Negligence

To plead a cause of action for negligence, a plaintiff must allege facts showing: “(1)¿a¿legal¿duty¿of¿care¿toward¿the¿plaintiff; (2)¿a¿breach¿of that¿duty; (3)¿legal¿causation; and (4)¿damages.” (Century Surety Co. v. Crosby Insurance, Inc.¿(2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 116, 127.) However, the elements of breach of that duty and causation are ordinarily questions of fact for the jury's determination. [Citation.] Nevertheless, causation may be a question of law if on undisputed facts there can be no reasonable difference of opinion on causal nexus.” (Phillips v. TLC Plumbing, Inc. (2009) 172 Cal. App. 4th 1133, 1139.)

When operating a motor vehicle, a driver is “required to act as a reasonably prudent person under the same or similar circumstances.” (Watkins v. Ohman (1967) 251 Cal.App.2d 501, 502-503.) “All drivers of vehicles on a public highway are required by law to keep a vigilant lookout ahead so as to avoid, if reasonably possible, a collision with any other vehicle or person lawfully upon such highway. Failure to keep such lookout, or failure to see that which may be readily seen, if the driver is looking, would constitute negligence as a matter of law.” (Huetter v. Andrews (1949) 91 Cal.App.2d 142, 146.) However, “[n]o suggestion of negligence arises from the mere happening of an accident.” (Edwards v. California Sports, Inc. (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 1284, 1287.)

Government Code section 815.2, subd. (a), states that a public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment if the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee or his personal representative. (Government Code section 815.2(a).)

“A carrier of persons for reward must use the utmost care and diligence for their safe carriage, must provide everything necessary for that purpose, and must exercise to that end a reasonable degree of skill.” (Civ. Code section 2100.) A public rapid transit bus is a common carrier under Civil Code Section 2100. (See Acosta v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 19, 27; Lopez v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit District (1985) 40 Cal.3d 19.)

On May 9, 2021, at approximately 8:34:49 a.m., an LACMTA bus (No. 5869) operated by bus operator Lawrence Tubbs was travelling in the number 2 lane, approaching Myrrh Street on northbound Atlantic Boulevard, East Compton. The bus had a green light. (Defendant’s Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (“SSUF”) No. 2.) As the bus passed the crosswalk and entered the intersection, the bus continued to have a green light. The bus was travelling at approximately 30 mph. The speed limit of Atlantic Blvd. was 35 mph. (SSUF No. 3.) An SUV owned by Eluith Senter, that had been reported as stolen the day before was first seen at 8:34:52 a.m. travelling westbound on Myrrh St. (SSUF No. 4.) The SUV did not stop at the stoplight. It passed the crosswalk and entered the intersection at approximately 8:34:52 a.m. and collided into the middle of the bus. (SSUF No. 5.) At the time of the collision, the bus still had the green light. The SUV should have had the red light. (SSUF No. 6.) The driver of the SUV fled the scene by foot. (SSUF No. 7.)

Thus, Defendant argues its bus driver Tubbs met the standard by driving under the speed limit, and crossing the intersection at a green light, however, the driver of the SUV crashed into the middle of the bus, and Tubbs would not have seen the SUV with a sufficient amount of time prior to impact to have taken any action to avoid the impact given the bus’s position. Defendant presents evidence that the bus was already beyond the crosswalk and had entered the intersection along Atlantic Blvd. by the time the SUV reached and crossed the crosswalk on Myrrh St. (Kode Decl., ¶ 17.)

The Court finds that Defendant has met its initial burden on summary judgment to show that there is no triable issue of material fact as to whether Tubbs, Defendant’s employee, operated the bus negligently, as the evidence presented shows that Tubbs entered the intersection on Atlantic Boulevard, approaching Myrrh Street, on a green light and within the speed limit, and the driver of the SUV travelling on Myrrh collided into the middle of the bus in the intersection. This tends to show that Tubbs would not have had sufficient time to brake in order to avoid the collision because the bus was already midway through the intersection at the time of the collision. It further tends to show that Tubbs would not have been able to see the SUV approaching the intersection in time to take preventative action as the front of the bus (where Tubbs was operating the vehicle), had already passed the intersection. Thus, the burden shifts to Plaintiff to present triable issues of fact as to whether Tubbs was negligent.

To meet his burden, Plaintiff presents his testimony in deposition, stating that he saw the SUV stop at the red light and then restart to go again before the bus entered the intersection. (Defendant’s Exh. O, pg. 50-51.) Thus, he argues there is a triable issue as to whether Defendant Tubbs met the standard of care, by failing to see the SUV, and whether Defendant Tubbs had enough time to take any evasive action by either braking or swerving to avoid a collision with the SUV. Further, Plaintiff argues there is also a triable issue as to whether Defendant Tubbs was traveling under the speed limit as he claims, as the only admissible evidence presented that he was driving the speed limit is his own declaration.

Plaintiff has not met his burden to show triable issues of material fact exist as to whether Defendant was negligent. Plaintiff testified that he saw the SUV stop and restart again, however, it is normal for vehicles to creep up at a red light. This evidence, without more, does not present a triable issue of fact. Further, Defendant’s photographs and videos show that the SUV was far from the intersection a split second prior to the collision. Thus, whether the SUV was stopping and restarting at the location prior to the collision is not enough to show that it would have run the red light and collided into the bus, such that Defendant should have taken evasive action. Lastly, Plaintiff presents no argument why Tubbs’ declaration attesting to the speed he was traveling at the time of the collision is not persuasive. For example, Plaintiff does not say it contradicts his prior testimony and therefore should be excluded. Without more, the Court finds this evidence is sufficient.

The Court finds that since the Plaintiff has not met its burden in showing that a triable issue of material fact exists, the motion for summary judgment is granted.