Judge Lynne M. Hobbs, Case Number: 22STCV14010, Date: 2025-01-08 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Lynne M. Hobbs, Case: 22STCV14010, Date: 2025-01-08 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV14010 Hearing Date: January 8, 2025 Dept: 61

THOMAS E. BELL vs STATE FARM GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.

TENTATIVE:

Defendants Corbacho Appraisals and Jaime Corbacho’s Motions for Approval of Settlement and Motion to Seal Settlement Agreement are CONTINUED. Corbacho is directed to either disclose the settlement agreement to State Farm or else withdraw its motions.

Defendant State Farm General Insurance Company’s Motion to Strike Plaintiff Thomas E. Bell’s Discovery Responses is GRANTED in part. Trial is continued, and discovery is reopened into the issue of Plaintiff’s claim for emotional distress. The motion is otherwise DENIED.

Defendant State Farm to give notice.

DISCUSSION:

I. GOOD-FAITH SETTLEMENT

Code of Civil Procedure § 877.6(a)(1) provides:

Any party to an action in which it is alleged that two or more parties are joint tortfeasors or co-obligors on a contract debt shall be entitled to a hearing on the issue of the good faith of a settlement entered into by the plaintiff or other claimant and one or more alleged tortfeasors or co-obligors, upon giving notice in the manner provided in subdivision (b) of Section 1005. Upon a showing of good cause, the court may shorten the time for giving the required notice to permit the determination of the issue to be made before the commencement of the trial of the action, or before the verdict or judgment if settlement is made after the trial has commenced.

Code of Civil Procedure § 877.6, subd. (c) in turn provides:

A determination by the court that the settlement was made in good faith shall bar any other joint tortfeasor or co-obligor from any further claims against the settling tortfeasor or co-obligor for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault.

Where a motion for determination of good faith settlement is uncontested, a "barebones" motion which sets forth the ground of good faith, accompanied by a declaration which sets forth a brief background of the case is sufficient to support a good faith determination. Where a motion for determination of good faith settlement is contested, the court must consider evidence related to the settlement in terms of the factors contemplated by Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal. 3d 488. (City of Grand Terrace v. Superior Court (1987) 192 Cal. App. 3d 1251, 1261.) These factors are: (1) a rough approximation of the plaintiff's total recovery and the settlor's proportionate liability; (2) the amount paid in settlement; (3) the allocation of settlement proceeds among plaintiffs; (4) a recognition that a settlor should pay less in settlement than he would if her were found liable after trial; (5) the financial condition and insurance policy limits of the settling defendants; and (6) the existence of collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interests of the non-settling defendants. (See Tech-Bilt, supra, 38 Cal.3d 488, 499.)

Defendants Corbacho Appraisals and Jaime Corbacho (collectively Corbacho) seek to file under seal and have approved a confidential settlement entered between themselves and Plaintiff Thomas E. Bell (Plaintiff). Defendant State Farm General Insurance Co. (State Farm) has submitted limited oppositions to both motions, stating that the settlement agreement has not been provided to them, and asking this court to defer ruling on either Corbacho’s motion to seal or their settlement approval application until the settlement has been disclosed to State Farm. (Opposition at p. 5; Bizzini Decl. ¶¶ 2–3.)

State Farm is correct that no approval of the settlement can be made until its terms are disclosed to nonsettling parties. In a contested case, the settling parties must “mak[e] available to nonsettlors and the court the details of the settlement.” (Mediplex of California, Inc. v. Superior Court (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 748, 752.) That the agreement is confidential does not affect the necessity of disclosure in these circumstances: “a party may not both seek confirmation of a settlement agreement and withhold it from nonsettling defendants on the grounds of confidentiality.” (Id. at p. 752.)

Corbacho’s efforts to distinguish this authority are unconvincing. They argue that disclosure of settlement agreements for which approval is sought is only necessary in cases where there are “multiparty settlements.” (Opposition at pp. 3–4.) But Corbacho cites no holding for this argument. Its sole basis is the implied assertion that the holdings of Mediplex and other similar cases should be limited to their facts, rather than the rules of disclosure that they announce. There is little reason to embrace such a position here, because there is no indication in the case authority that the number of settling parties was dispositive in holding that disclosure was required. It would be unfair to hold State Farm to the burden of proving the absence of good faith under the Tech-Bilt factors while withholding the very settlement for which approval is sought.

Accordingly, ruling on the Corbacho’s motion to seal and for good faith settlement determination are CONTINUED. Corbacho is directed to either disclose the settlement agreement to State Farm or else withdraw its motions.

II. MOTION TO STRIKE DISCOVERY RESPONSES

Misuse of the discovery process may result in the imposition of a variety of sanctions. These include payment of costs, sanctions barring the introduction of certain evidence, sanctions deeming that certain issues are determined against the offending party, and sanctions terminating an action in favor of the aggrieved party. Misuse of the discovery process includes failing to respond or submit to authorized discovery, providing evasive discovery responses, disobeying a court order to provide discovery, unsuccessfully making or opposing discovery motions without substantial justification, and failing to meet and confer in good faith to resolve a discovery dispute when required by statute to do so. The court may impose sanctions to the extent authorized by the chapter governing any particular discovery method or any other provision of this title.

The trial court has broad discretion to impose sanctions for violations of court orders, including those intended to compel compliance with a party's disclosure and discovery obligations, subject to reversal only for arbitrary or capricious action. (In re Marriage of Eustice (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1291, 1308–1309, internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted.)

A court may impose issue, evidentiary, or monetary sanctions upon a party that has engaged in misuse of the discovery process. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2023.030.) “absent unusual circumstances, such as repeated and egregious discovery abuses, two facts are generally prerequisite to the imposition of a nonmonetary sanction. There must be a failure to comply with a court order and the failure must be willful.” (Lee v. Lee (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1553, 1559.)

Defendant State Farm General Insurance Company (State Farm) seeks an order striking Plaintiff Thomas E. Bell’s (Plaintiff) supplemental responses to Form Interrogatories No. 6.1 through 6.7, served after the discovery cutoff, in which Plaintiff amended a prior response denying any claim for damages based on emotional distress in order to newly seek such damages.

Trial in this matter was originally set for August 6, 2024, with a discovery cutoff of July 22, 2024. Plaintiff’s Complaint states that he is seeking “damages, including damages for mental and emotional distress, in amounts to be proven at trial.” (Complaint ¶ 37.) But when asked concerning his emotional distress, on September 6, 2022, Plaintiff served responses to Form Interrogatories, including Interrogatory No. 6.1, stating:

FORM INTERROGATORY 6.1

Do you attribute any physical, mental, or emotional injuries to the INCIDENT? (If the answer is “no,” do not answer interrogatories 6.2 through 6.7)

RESPONSE TO FORM INTERROGATORY NO. 6.1

No.

(Hummel Decl. Exh. A.)

State Farm propounded supplemental special interrogatories seeking all additional information responsive to its initial special interrogatories (though not its form interrogatories), asking Plaintiff to state all “facts that support the allegation in YOUR COMPLAINT that YOU have not been fully compensated by STATE FARM for ALL of YOUR damages,” to which Plaintiff propounded a supplemental response, not mentioning emotional distress. (Hummel Decl. Exh. B.)

On October 4, 2024, after the continuance of trial but not its associated discovery deadlines, Plaintiff’s counsel served by email amended responses to Form Interrogatories No. 6.1 through 6.7. (Bruchey Decl. Exh. 1.) The amended response to Form Interrogatory No. 6.1 stated:

Although he does not consider himself to have been “injured” by the INCIDENT, Plaintiff has, at times, experienced a range negative emotions that he attributes to State Farm’s handling of his insurance claim. Specifically, Plaintiff has felt outrage, frustration, anger and resentment. He is offended by the suggestion that his claim was fraudulent. He believes State Farm unnecessarily treated him with suspicion during the claim process and throughout litigation and this, too, offends him. These emotions have intensified over the course of the claim and subsequent litigation.

(Humel Decl. Exh. C.)

In the same email stating, “If you’d like to depose our client on these amended responses, please let us know and we will make him available.” (Bruchey Decl. Exh. 1.) State Farm’s counsel responded with emails stating that it intended to move to strike the amended responses, as discovery had closed, and Plaintiff had previously denied any claim for emotional distress. (Ibid.)

Defendant in the present motion seeks an order striking Plaintiff’s amended response to Form Interrogatories No. 6.1 and 6.7, and precluding Plaintiff from presenting evidence of emotional distress at trial. Plaintiff in opposition contends that there is no statutory or case authority providing for an order striking an amended discovery response, and that a specific statutory provision allows parties to serve amended interrogatory responses, subject to motions that they be bound by earlier responses. (Motion at pp. 7–10.)

The operative statute permits a party “[w]ithout leave of court” to “serve an amended answer to any interrogatory that contains information subsequently discovered, inadvertently omitted, or mistakenly stated in the initial interrogatory,” subject to other parties’ right to use the initial answer at trial. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2030.310, subd. (a).) However, another party may bring a motion where admission of the initial answer would be inadequate at trial:

b) The party who propounded an interrogatory to which an amended answer has been served may move for an order that the initial answer to that interrogatory be deemed binding on the responding party for the purpose of the pending action. This motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.

(c) The court shall grant a motion under subdivision (b) if it determines that all of the following conditions are satisfied:

(1) The initial failure of the responding party to answer the interrogatory correctly has substantially prejudiced the party who propounded the interrogatory.

(2) The responding party has failed to show substantial justification for the initial answer to that interrogatory.

(3) The prejudice to the propounding party cannot be cured either by a continuance to permit further discovery or by the use of the initial answer under Section 2030.410.

(d) The court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to deem binding an initial answer to an interrogatory, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.

(Code Civ. Proc. § 2030.310, subd. (b)–(c).)

State Farm makes no mention of this statute in its motion or reply. Nor has it made a showing of entitlement to relief under this statute, as it acknowledges that a continuance of trial to address Plaintiff’s claim for emotional distress is an acceptable alternative to preclusion of evidence. (Motion at p. 6.)

But State Farm’s showing of gamesmanship is persuasive. Although Plaintiff relies upon Code of Civil Procedure § 2030.310, that statute permits only amendments to a response “that contains information subsequently discovered, inadvertently omitted, or mistakenly stated in the initial interrogatory,” subject to other parties’ right to use the initial answer at trial. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2030.310, subd. (a).) Here, Plaintiff’s counsel supports the post-cutoff assertion of an emotional distress claim only by his own declaration stating that he recommended the amendment of the interrogatory response after learning that “Mr. Bell had grown emotionally weary of his protracted insurance claim and State Farm’s continued adversarial position toward him.” (Bruchey Decl. ¶ 1.) Yet Plaintiff simultaneously contends that State Farm suffered no prejudice from the amended response because his own complaint, filed on April 27, 2022, alleged that he was suffering emotional distress. (Complaint ¶ 37.) Plaintiff contends that this allegation should have put State Farm on notice of his subjective emotional distress claims, even though he himself had no basis to claim distress until after the discovery cutoff. This is implausible.

Plaintiff’s amended response was therefore not warranted by newly discovered information, inadvertence, or mistake. However, any prejudice suffered by belated disclosure of the claim may be addressed by a continuance and limited reopening of discovery into Plaintiff’s emotional distress, which State Farm seeks in the alternative, and which Plaintiff in opposition is willing to accept. (Opposition at pp. 11–12.)

Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED in part. Trial is continued, and discovery is reopened into the issue of Plaintiff’s claim for emotional distress. The motion is otherwise DENIED.