Judge Lynne M. Hobbs, Case Number: 22STCV19134, Date: 2025-01-27 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Lynne M. Hobbs, Case: 22STCV19134, Date: 2025-01-27 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV19134 Hearing Date: January 27, 2025 Dept: 61

JOSE LUIS BOBADILLA vs SHELLPOINT MORTGAGE SERVICING, et al.

Tentative

Newrez, LLC dba Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing’s Demurrer to the Complaint is SUSTAINED without leave to amend.

Moving party to give notice.

Analysis

A demurrer should be sustained only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (Code Civ. Pro., §§ 430.30, et seq.) In particular, as is relevant here, a court should sustain a demurrer if a complaint does not allege facts that are legally sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (See id. § 430.10, subd. (e).) As the Supreme Court held in Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311: “We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. . . . Further, we give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.” (Id. at p. 318; see also Hahn. v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747 [“A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. [Citation.]”) “In determining whether the complaint is sufficient as against the demurrer … if on consideration of all the facts stated it appears the plaintiff is entitled to any relief at the hands of the court against the defendants the complaint will be held good although the facts may not be clearly stated.” (Gressley v. Williams (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 636, 639.)

“A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly’s of Cal., Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) Such demurrers “are disfavored, and are granted only if the pleading is so incomprehensible that a defendant cannot reasonably respond.” (Mahan v. Charles W. Chan Insurance Agency, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 841, 848.)

A demurrer should not be sustained without leave to amend if the complaint, liberally construed, can state a cause of action under any theory or if there is a reasonable possibility the defect can be cured by amendment. (Schifando v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1081.) The demurrer also may be sustained without leave to amend where the nature of the defects and previous unsuccessful attempts to plead render it probable plaintiff cannot state a cause of action. (Krawitz v. Rusch (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 957, 967.)

Defendant Newrez, LLC dba Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing (Defendant) demurrers to the Complaint of Plaintiff Jose Luis Bobadilla (Plaintiff) on three general grounds. First, Defendant argues that the claims are barred by judicial estoppel because Plaintiff failed to disclose them as assets in his bankruptcy schedule. (Demurrer at pp. 8–9.) Second, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion, and the dismissal with prejudice of similar claims Plaintiff previously filed in federal court. (Demurrer at pp. 10–11.) And third, Defendant argues that the claims fail to plead the facts requisite for any cause of action. (Demurrer at pp. 11–14.)

Defendant’s arguments are persuasive in each respect. The facts supporting each cause of action asserted in the Complaint consist of terse legal conclusions, offered without elaboration or even the allegation of supporting ultimate facts. Plaintiff alleges breach of fiduciary duty, without alleging the existence of a fiduciary duty (Complaint at pp. 4–5); breach of deed of trust, without pleading the substance of either the terms or the breach (Complaint at p. 5); theft of real property without specifying the manner of theft (Complaint at p. 5); fraud without alleging the misrepresentations relied upon (Complaint at p. 6); illegal trustee’s sale without alleging the basis for illegality (Complaint at p. 6); and intentional infliction of emotional distress without alleging either outrageous conduct or emotional distress. (Complaint at pp. 6–7.) The claims are plainly insufficient as alleged.

The claims are also foreclosed by the affirmative doctrines raised by Defendant. Specifically, Plaintiff is barred from prosecuting the present action by the failure to disclose the claims in his concurrent bankruptcy proceedings. “[O]ne seeking benefits under bankruptcy law must satisfy a companion duty to schedule, for the benefit of creditors, all his interests and property rights.” (Hamilton v. Greenwich Investors XXVI, LLC (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1602, 1609, internal quotation marks omitted.) “The result of a failure to disclose any litigation likely to arise in a nonbankruptcy context triggers application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel, operating against a subsequent attempt to prosecute the actions.” (Ibid., internal alterations omitted [applying the rule in a wrongful foreclosure case].) Plaintiff here filed for bankruptcy on June 7, 2022, a week before the present action was filed, and answered “No” to the question on his schedule as to whether he possessed any legal claims. (RJN Exh. J at p. 233.) The bankruptcy case was dismissed on October 18, 2022. (RJN Exh. I.) Because Plaintiff failed to disclose the present claims in his bankruptcy schedule, he is estopped from prosecuting them here.

The causes of action are also claim-precluded. “Res judicata, or claim preclusion, prevents relitigation of the same cause of action in a second suit between the same parties or parties in privity with them. Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, precludes relitigation of issues argued and decided in prior proceedings.” (Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 888, 896.) Plaintiff filed a prior lawsuit in federal court on June 25, 2020, Bobadilla v. Security National Mortgage Company, Case No. LACV20-05732-PD66-ADSX, against Shellpoint and other defendants. (RJN Exh. D.) Plaintiff alleged a complex theory by which he concluded the mortgage on his property had been rendered fraudulent, a theory that the trial court found “frivolous” in granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss. (RJN Exh. E.) Plaintiff’s present arguments related to Shellpoint’s alleged attempts to “collect on illegally conveyed property” and their having “stole[n] Plaintiff’s real property” via “fraudulent conveyance” as to the very same mortgage have thus already been adjudicated against him to a final judgment and cannot be relitigated here. (Complaint at pp. 5–6; RJN Exh. D.)

The demurrer is therefore SUSTAINED without leave to amend.