Judge Lynne M. Hobbs, Case Number: 22STCV23266, Date: 2024-09-30 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Lynne M. Hobbs, Case: 22STCV23266, Date: 2024-09-30 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV23266 Hearing Date: September 30, 2024 Dept: 61

SCENIC EXPRESSIONS, INC., et al. vs RYAN PAUL LEVIHN-COON, et al.

TENTATIVE

Plaintiffs Scenic Expressions, Inc., Scenic Highlights, Inc., Consolidated Scenic Services, Inc., and Upstage Rentals, Inc.’s Motion to Enforce Settlement is CONTINUED to October 29, 2024, at 10:00 am.

The trial date is advanced and vacated. A trial readiness conference is scheduled for October 29, 2024, at 10:00 am.

Plaintiffs to give notice.

DISCUSSION

Code Civ. Proc. section 664.6, subd. (a), states that:

If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside of the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement.

“Section 664.6 permits the trial court judge to enter judgment on a settlement agreement without the need for a new lawsuit. [Citation.] It is for the trial court to determine in the first instance whether the parties have entered into an enforceable settlement. [Citation.] In making that determination, ‘the trial court acts as the trier of fact, determining whether the parties entered into a valid and binding settlement. [Citation.] Trial judges may consider oral testimony or may determine the motion upon declarations alone. [Citation.] When the same judge hears the settlement and the motion to enter judgment on the settlement, he or she may consult his [or her] memory. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Osumi v. Sutton (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1355, 1359–1360.)

Plaintiffs Scenic Expressions, Inc., Scenic Highlights, Inc., Consolidated Scenic Services, Inc., and Upstage Rentals, Inc. (Plaintiffs) move to enforce a settlement agreement entered at the conclusion of a mandatory settlement conference (MSC) on August 29, 2024, with Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club (Exchange), insurer for Defendants Lena Giron and Ryan Paul Levihn-Coon (Defendants). Defendants argue that since the settlement was agreed to orally before the court on August 29, 2024 (as reflected in the minute order for that date), the Exchange has failed to sign the written memorialization of that agreement, reasoning that the settlement may affect Defendants’ rights with respect to another action brought by them against certain Plaintiffs in LASC Case No. 24STCV05152.

Plaintiffs cite the case Greisman v. FCA US, LLC (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 1310, in which the court held that a court could enforce a settlement under Code of Civil Procedure § 664.6 where assent to settlement was made orally before the court by the parties’ attorneys, rather than the parties themselves: “[W]e hold that, as applied to oral settlements stipulated before the court, current section 664.6 does not require that the parties themselves orally stipulate, and instead allows counsel for the parties to orally stipulate on their behalf.” (Greisman, supra, 324 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 194.)

Much as that case involved an oral settlement for $100,000 between the parties’ counsel at an MSC, Plaintiffs here seek to enforce a settlement reached between their counsel and the counsel for Defendants appointed by their insurer, in which the insurer agrees to pay $100,000.00. (Raygor Decl. Exh. B.) Here, Defendants did not agree to the settlement, and it was apparently discussed at the MSC that they were opposed to settlement, but that their insurer was proceeding pursuant to a “no consent to settle” policy. (Raygor Decl. ¶ 12.) Defendants do not argue that the attorneys at the hearing lacked authority to settle.

Defendants in opposition argue that neither the parties nor the court at the MSC agreed to permit the enforcement of the settlement through Code of Civil Procedure § 664.6. (Opposition at p. 3.) But Code of Civil Procedure § 664.6 does not require the parties to agree, or the court to state, that it retains jurisdiction to enforce settlements under the statute. An agreement to retain jurisdiction under that statute is only necessary when a dismissal would otherwise upset the court’s ability to enforce the settlement. “[W]e infer that the request to retain jurisdiction mentioned in the second sentence of section 664.6, subdivision (a) is necessary only when the motion to enforce the settlement is filed after the trial court has lost jurisdiction. We will not interpret the statute to require an express retention of jurisdiction in situations where the court's jurisdiction has yet to be terminated because such a requirement would be redundant.” (Eagle Fire & Water Restoration, Inc. v. City of Dinuba (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 448, 459–460, italics in original.) No dismissal has yet been entered here, and the court maintains jurisdiction over the case, including the power to enforce settlements under section 664.6.

Defendants further argue that the insurer has not signed the written agreement because following the oral agreement, they have learned that Plaintiffs intend to demurrer to Defendants’ claims on the grounds that they were compulsory cross-claims in the present action under Code of Civil Procedure § 426.30. (Opposition at p. 3.) Defendants have since filed a motion for leave to file a cross-complaint on September 18, 2024.

The parties were aware that the present settlement had potential implications for Defendants’ other action. The written memorialization of the settlement agreement includes specific language relating to that case:

Release By Plaintiffs In This Lawsuit Only: Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and their officers, directors, employees, agents, affiliates, successors, and assigns, hereby forever release, relieve and discharge Defendants from any and all claims, defenses, costs, damages, expenses, and attorneys’ fees as were asserted by Plaintiffs against Defendants in the Lawsuit. For the avoidance of doubt, the release contained in this agreement does not release any claims, cross-claims, defenses, costs, damages, expenses and attorneys’ fees that are asserted or that might be asserted in any other litigation (including but not limited to, in Ryan Levihn-Coon, Lena Giron v. Mark Larinto, Tyler Vincent Larinto, Scenic Expressions, Inc., Los Angeles County Superior Court Case No. 24STCV05152) other than the Lawsuit. In other words, this release and the dismissal below shall not operate as a retraxit in any litigation other than the Lawsuit.

(Raygor Decl. Exh. B.)

Defendants present evidence that they were only made aware that Plaintiffs would seek to dismiss the other action under Code of Civil Procedure § 426.30 in meet-and-confer discussions that occurred on September 3, 2024, regarding Plaintiffs’ proposed demurrer in the other action. (Levihn-Coon Decl. ¶ 3.) The complaint in that action alleges claims arising from Plaintiffs’ alleged self-help eviction of Defendants from an at-will tenancy on Defendants’ property. (See 24STCV15152 Complaint ¶¶ 51–142.)

Good cause exists to continue hearing on the present motion to enforce settlement to await resolution on Defendants’ motion for leave to file a cross-complaint, currently set for October 29, 2024. Although Plaintiffs contend that Exchange has not signed the settlement agreement, the agreement does not prescribe a time in which Exchange must sign, but only describes a time after signing in which Exchange must make the $100,000 payment (within 10 days of execution of the agreement) and in which Plaintiffs must dismiss the action (within three business days after the payment). (Raygor Decl. Exh. B.) Given Plaintiffs’ proposed demurrer to Defendants’ claims in the other actions under Code of Civil Procedure § 426.30, the policy of the State of California favors hearing Defendants’ motion: “The legislative mandate is clear. A policy of liberal construction of section 426.50 to avoid forfeiture of causes of action is imposed on the trial court. A motion to file a cross-complaint at any time during the course of the action must be granted unless bad faith of the moving party is demonstrated where forfeiture would otherwise result. Factors such as oversight, inadvertence, neglect, mistake or other cause, are insufficient grounds to deny the motion unless accompanied by bad faith.” (Silver Organizations Ltd. v. Frank (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 94, 98–99.) The policy against forfeiture thus favors permitting a hearing on Defendants’ motion before ordering the commencement of a process that will result in this case’s dismissal.

Although trial is currently set for October 8, 2024, no party proposes that they are ready or willing to proceed on the date scheduled. (Motion at p. 8; Opposition at pp. 2–3.) Accordingly, little prejudice is likely to result from a continuance.

The motion is therefore CONTINUED to October 29, 2024.