Judge: Lynne M. Hobbs, Case: 22STCV27005, Date: 2024-03-15 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV27005    Hearing Date: April 4, 2024    Dept: 30

DEBRA ELISE MACPHERSON, et al. vs KATRINA MARIE HECHT, et al.

TENTATIVE

Plaintiffs’ motion to reopen discovery is DENIED without prejudice. Defendant is ordered to give notice.

Legal Standard

Except as otherwise provided, “any¿party shall be entitled as a matter of right to complete discovery proceedings on or before the 30th day, and to have motions concerning discovery heard on or before the 15th day, before the date initially set for trial of the action.”¿ (Code Civ. Proc., § 2024.020(a).)¿ “[A]¿continuance¿or postponement of the trial date does not operate to reopen discovery proceedings” unless a motion to reopen discovery is filed and granted pursuant to¿CCP¿section 2024.050.¿ (Code Civ. Proc., § 2024.020(b);¿Pelton-Shepherd Industries, Inc. v. Delta Packaging Products, Inc.¿(2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1568.)¿¿CCP¿section 2024.050 provides that “[o]n¿motion of any party, the court may grant leave to complete discovery proceedings, or to have a motion concerning discovery heard, closer to the initial trial date, or to reopen discovery after a new trial date has been set.”¿ (Code Civ. Proc., § 2024.050(a).)¿

The reopening of discovery is a matter that is committed to the trial court’s sound discretion.¿ (Code Civ. Proc., § 2024.050(a), (b).)¿ In exercising that discretion, the trial court considers “any matter relevant to the leave requested,” including:¿¿

1. The necessity and the reasons for the discovery.¿¿

2. The diligence or lack of diligence of the party seeking the discovery or the hearing of a discovery motion, and the reasons that the discovery was not completed or that the discovery motion was not heard earlier.¿¿

3. Any likelihood that permitting the discovery or hearing the discovery motion will prevent the case from going to trial on the date set, or otherwise interfere with the trial calendar, or result in prejudice to any other party.¿¿

4. The length of time that has elapsed between any¿date¿previously set, and the date presently set, for the trial of the action.¿¿

(Code Civ. Proc., § 2024.050(b).)¿¿

A motion to reopen discovery pursuant to¿CCP¿section 2024.050 must be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration demonstrating a good faith effort at informal resolution.¿ (Code Civ. Proc., § 2024.050(a).)¿

Discussion

Plaintiffs move to reopen discovery, for the limited purpose of allowing Plaintiffs to bring a motion to strike Defendant’s “improper second round of admissions and eliminate the improper objections in the first admissions for any post-trial motions that may become necessary.” Discovery closed on January 17, 2024.

On December 12, 2023, Plaintiffs served Request for Admissions on Defendants, seeking to have Defendants admit that the undisputed emergency trauma care was reasonable, necessary, and caused by the accident. (Kirby Decl., Exh. A.) This was done after Defendants’ expert, Dr. Peter-Brian Andersson, conceded these facts in deposition. In spite of the opinions of their own expert, Defendants have failed to admit the same and instead served objections, and denials on January 17, 2024. (Id., Exh. B.)

Plaintiffs’ counsel met and conferred with defense counsel and gave her a week to amend the responses and remove the objections. (Kirby Decl. at ¶ 5.) On Friday, January 26, 2024, Plaintiffs received the supplemental responses, which again included objections, and this time, without leave of the court, Defendant had removed her prior denials. (Kirby Decl., ¶ 6; Exh. D.)

I. Necessity and Reasons for the Discovery and Diligence

As noted above, Plaintiffs wish to bring a motion to strike Defendant’s “improper second round of admissions and eliminate the improper objections in the first admissions for any post-trial motions that may become necessary.” Plaintiffs argue that Defendants objections in her first set of responses to Request for Admissions were baseless and improper. Further, Plaintiffs argue Defendant’s removal of her prior denials without leave of court and continued objections in her second responses were improper as well. Plaintiffs contend that a party may withdraw or amend an admission on leave of the court granted after notice to all parties under Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.300(a). However, Plaintiffs argue that there has been no leave of Court allowing Defendants to amend their responses to withdraw the denials made in the initial responses on January 26, 2024.

Plaintiffs also contend they have been diligent. They sought this discovery after they deposed Defendants’ expert. Further, Plaintiffs’ sought this same discovery in 2022, and Defendants responded that it was premature. (Reply, Exh. A.)

The Court has reviewed the motion attached as Exhibit F and notes that no such motion to strike the supplemental discovery responses exists, and Plaintiffs have cited no section of the Code of Civil Procedure that would provide such relief. Plaintiffs also have stated that they do not wish to file a motion to compel further. As a result, the Court finds the discovery sought is not necessary because the motion would very likely be denied.

As Defendants point out in their surreply, none of the cases Plaintiff cited at the hearing support Plaintiffs’ argument that the Court may strike Defendants’ responses to the requests for admissions. As Defendant argues, the proper remedy would be for Plaintiffs to seek cost of proof sanctions pursuant to CCP § 2033.420.

II. The Likelihood that Permitting the Discovery Will Prevent the Case from Going to Trial on the Date Set, Prejudice, and the Length of Time Between the Date Previously Set for Trial and the Current Trial Date

Plaintiffs contend that allowing the parties additional time to complete discovery will not prevent the case from going to trial or otherwise prejudice Defendants. Plaintiffs argue the motion is complete and attached as Exhibit F.

While it is true that the case would not have to be continued in order to file this motion, the motion would likely be denied due to having no basis in the Code of Civil Procedure. As such, because the motion is not necessary, this factor does not come into play. 

Plaintiffs argue they will suffer prejudice should discovery not be reopened to Plaintiffs, as they will be forced to put on witnesses and introduce evidence unnecessarily in order to prove matters that Defendants could and should have admitted during discovery. Defendants argue they will suffer prejudice if discovery is reopened because their efforts to oppose that motion would distract significant resources from preparing for trial, causing significant prejudice to Defendants.

Neither party’s basis for prejudice is the kind of prejudice the Court will consider. Having to defend motions or putting on witnesses for trial is inherent to litigation. 
Nevertheless, because the motion to strike is not necessary because no such relief exists, the Court finds the motion to reopen discovery is without any foundation. The Court declines to add an ad hoc remedy to those that are statutorily permitted, and that encompass the issue presented.

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs’ motion to reopen discovery is DENIED without prejudice.