Judge: Lynne M. Hobbs, Case: 22STCV33453, Date: 2025-06-03 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV33453 Hearing Date: June 3, 2025 Dept: 61
RAFAEL MENDEZ vs MARK E. SWATIK, et al.
Tentative:
Defendants Mark E. Swatik, Mark E. Swatik APC, and Swatik Brandlin LLP’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
Moving party to provide notice.
Analysis:
I. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A party may move for summary judgment “if it is contended that the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (a).) “[I]f all the evidence submitted, and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,” the moving party will be entitled to summary judgment. (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) A motion for summary adjudication may be made by itself or as an alternative to a motion for summary judgment and shall proceed in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (f)(2).)
The moving party bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact, and if he does so, the burden shifts to the opposing party to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850; accord Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at 850.) The plaintiff may not rely upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists but, instead, shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. (Ibid.) To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)
Defendants Mark E. Swatik, Mark E. Swatik APC, and Swatik Brandlin LLP (Defendants) move for summary judgment on the claims of Plaintiff Rafael Mendez (Plaintiff), each of which arise from an alleged attorney-client relationship between Defendants and Plaintiff, on the grounds that no attorney-client relationship had ever been formed between Plaintiff and Defendants. (Motion at pp. 11–19.)
Plaintiff brings claims for legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duties associated with an attorney-client relationship, as well as for misrepresentations allegedly made in the course of that relationship. “Ordinarily, when a party seeks legal advice from a lawyer, and the lawyer provides such advice, an attorney-client relationship is formed. The formation of such a relationship imposes fiduciary duties, including a duty of care, on the attorney.” (Wood v. Superior Court (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 562, 581, internal citations omitted.)
California law is settled that a client's subjective belief that an attorney-client relationship exists, standing alone, cannot create such a relationship, or a duty of care owed by the attorney to that plaintiff. This is because a plaintiff cannot unilaterally establish an attorney-client relationship, and its hindsight “beliefs” that such a relationship existed are thus legally irrelevant. Instead, it is the intent and conduct of the parties that controls the question as to whether an attorney-client relationship has been created. (Zenith Ins. Co. v. O'Connor (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 998, 1010, internal citations omitted.)
Defendants here present the declaration of Swatik himself, who states that his estate-planning client Allen Bonner, brought Plaintiff to an estate planning meeting at Defendants’ office in April 2017. (Swatik Decl. ¶ 3.) During this meeting, Bonner executed a confidentiality waiver to permit Mendez to stay during an informal portion thereof, but Plaintiff was excused when discussions turned to Bonner’s estate plans. (Swatik Decl. ¶¶ 3–7.) Mendez was advised that Defendants only represented Bonner, and only Bonner executed a representation agreement and paid a fee. (Ibid.) Swatik denies that Plaintiff ever sought legal services from him, or that any such services were provided. (Swatik Decl. ¶ 7.) Swatik only provided Plaintiff with a form letter explaining the duties of a successor trustee. (Swatik Decl. ¶ 8.)
Although Plaintiff alleges that he spoke to Swatik in January 2018 regarding Bonner’s ability to drive, Swatik denies that he made any representations to Plaintiff concerning his status as successor trustee in contravention of the requirements of the trust documents, and would only have told Plaintiff that the DMV has a process for reporting drivers of diminished capacity. (Swatik Decl. ¶ 12.)
Swatik states that he made changes to Bonner’s estate planning documents to remove Plaintiff as successor trustee pursuant to Bonner’s request in September 2020. (Swatik Decl. ¶¶ 13–14.) When Plaintiff thereafter contacted Defendants to express concerns regarding Bonner’s cognitive decline, Swatik informed him that he would have to raise these concerns with Bonner himself and retain his own attorney, as Swatik could not reveal client confidences. (Swatik Decl. ¶¶ 16–18.)
Defendants also note Plaintiff’s testimony in a November 2020 declaration submitted in conservatorship proceedings related to Bonner, which ultimately concluded that no conservatorship was necessary, in which Plaintiff stated as follows:
On September 19, 2020, I emailed his [Bonner’s] estate planning attorney to communicate my concerns. Attached as Exhibit 15 is a true and correct copy of that email. I was not involved in the process of executing Bonner’s estate plan, except to the extent that I was told by his lawyer that I was the successor trustee to his estate. This occurred on April 20, 2017 after Bonner executed his estate plan at his lawyer’s office. Bonner asked me to be there, I drove there separately and met with his lawyer. I thought that was the person to communicate my concerns to. He did not give me guidance that I anticipated I would receive from him. (RJN Exh. 3, ¶ 15.)
Defendants have demonstrated from the above evidence the absence of triable issues of fact as to the existence of an attorney-client relationship between Plaintiff and Defendants. Swatik in his declaration denies the substance of any such relationship, avers the disclaimer that such a relationship existed during the time Plaintiff alleges it was initially formed, and presents evidence showing that as late as 2020 Plaintiff himself did not believe such a relationship to exist. Defendants also present evidence that Swatik did not make the representations attributed to him by Plaintiff in his Complaint. In rebutting the existence of an attorney-client relationship and the existence of false misrepresentations, Defendants have shown the absence of triable issues as to any of Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff has filed no opposition to the present motion.
Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.