Judge Lynne M. Hobbs, Case Number: 22STCV35368, Date: 2024-08-08 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Lynne M. Hobbs, Case: 22STCV35368, Date: 2024-08-08 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV35368 Hearing Date: August 8, 2024 Dept: 61

ANNALEE SANTOS vs RENAISSANCE IMAGING MEDICAL ASSOCIATES, INC.

TENTATIVE

Defendant Renaissance Imaging Medical Associates, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment or Adjudication is GRANTED as to the seventh and eighth causes of action and as to the prayer for punitive damages. The motion is otherwise DENIED.

Moving party to give notice.

DISCUSSION

A party may move for summary judgment “if it is contended that the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (a).) “[I]f all the evidence submitted, and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,” the moving party will be entitled to summary judgment. (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) A motion for summary adjudication may be made by itself or as an alternative to a motion for summary judgment and shall proceed in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (f)(2).)

The moving party bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact, and if he does so, the burden shifts to the opposing party to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850; accord Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)

Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at 850.) The plaintiff may not rely upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists but, instead, shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. (Ibid.) To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)

Defendant Renaissance Imaging Medical Associates, Inc. (Defendant) moves for summary judgment or adjudication in its favor on Plaintiff Annalee Santos’ (Plaintiff) Complaint on the following grounds. Defendant argues that each of Plaintiff’s FEHA claims fail because Plaintiff voluntarily resigned her position and suffered no adverse employment action. (Motion at pp. 7–12.) Defendant argues that Plaintiff can make no claim for FMLA or CFRA leave because she did not meet the minimum time requirements to be eligible for such leave. (Motion at p. 12.) Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claim for violation of Labor Code § 226, subd. (b), regarding the production of certain employee records, fails because Plaintiff did not request the records in the manner provided by Defendant’s employee handbook. (Motion at pp. 13–14.) Defendant finally argues that Plaintiff cannot obtain punitive damages because no malicious or oppressive conduct is alleged, and because the only employee against whom any wrongful conduct is alleged was not a managing agent of Defendant. (Motion at pp. 14–16.)

To start, there is merit to Defendant’s argument concerning the lack of basis for punitive damages. To obtain punitive damages against a corporate employer, like Defendant, a plaintiff must show malice, oppression, or fraud “on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.” (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (b).) The test for determining whether someone is a managing agent of a corporation is whether the agent objectively possessed “substantial discretionary authority over decisions that ultimately determine corporate policy.” (CRST, Inc. v. Superior Court (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 1255, 1273.) Plaintiff does not dispute that the supervisor who terminated her, Defendant’s Director of Operations Claudia Kazanjian (Kazanjian), had no involvement in policy making and did not influence any policy revisions at Defendant. (Plaintiff’s Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (PUMF) No. 40.) Plaintiff makes no argument for the viability of her claim for punitive damages in opposition. The motion is therefore GRANTED as to the prayer for punitive damages.

Defendant’s argument as to the eighth cause of action under Labor Code § 226 is also persuasive. That statute requires an employer to provide to an employee, upon request, certain documents related to the employee’s payroll and employment. (Lab. Code § 226, subd. (a), (b).) The statute states, however: “An employer may designate the person to whom a request under this subdivision will be made.” (Lab. Code § 226, subd. (c).) The person authorized to release documents relating to current and former employees, per the company handbook that Plaintiff acknowledged, was Defendant’s Director of Operations. (Motion Exh. 2; PUMF No. 1.) Plaintiff instead served the request upon Defendant’s agent for service of process. (PUMF No. 53.) Plaintiff thus served no request upon the person designed by Defendant under statute for the receipt of such requests. Although Plaintiff in opposition argues that this requirement is immaterial, Plaintiff provides no authority to support this position. (Opposition at pp. 10–11.) The motion is therefore GRANTED as to the eighth cause of action.

Defendant is also entitled to relief on the seventh cause of action for violation of CFRA and FMLA. These statutes require a 12-month period of work with the employer, and 1,250 hours of service for an employee to be eligible for leave. (Gov. Code § 12945.2, subd. (a); 29 U.S.C. § 2611, subd. (2)(A).) Critical here, the requirement of 1,250 hours of work refers to “hours of service with the employer during the previous 12-month period.” (Gov. Code § 12945.2, subd. (a); 29 U.S.C. § 2611, subd. (2)(A)(iii).) Defendant demonstrates that at the time of each of Plaintiff’s requests for leave — October 5, 2020, and February 16, 2021 — she had not completed 12 months of employment. (PUMF No. 20–23.) The motion is therefore GRANTED as to the seventh cause of action.

Notwithstanding the above, Defendant’s argument with respect to Plaintiff’s FEHA discrimination and retaliation claims are unpersuasive. Triable issues of fact exist as to whether Plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action or was constructively discharged. An “adverse employment action” is required to prevail on a FEHA discrimination claim. (Dinslage v. City and County of San Francisco (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 368, 378; Moore v. Regents of University of California (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 216, 244.)

Termination of employment is of course an adverse employment action, and Plaintiff alleges that she was terminated in March 2021, while on leave to recover from a medical procedure. (Complaint ¶ 20.; St. Myers v. Dignity Health (2019) 44 Cal.App.5th 301, 315.) However, Defendant argues that Plaintiff was not terminated, but voluntarily resigned, as evidenced by two voluntary resignation forms filled out by Plaintiff on March 26, 2021, and a subsequent email reaffirming her resignation. (Motion Exhs. 14, 15, 17.)

But the circumstances of Plaintiff’s resignation, as she described them in her deposition, are not so straightforward. Plaintiff had come to Defendant’s office that day, not to work, but to undergo medical treatment, evidently a CT scan and lumbar puncture. (Motion Exh. 1 at pp. 90, 96.) Plaintiff first saw her supervisor, Kazanjian, that day in reception, and after her treatment — feeling “terrible,” and in “extreme pain”— she went to Kazanjian’s office. ((Id. at pp. 96, 99.) This was evidently at Kazanjian’s invitation, because when Plaintiff arrived, she asked “if we can do this another time,” because as she told Kazanjian, “I’m not feeling well, I’m in extreme pain. I have my son waiting for me. He’s my driver. I couldn’t drive.” (Id. at p. 99.) In interrogatory responses, Plaintiff stated that she was “still under the residual influence of anesthetics.” (Motion Exh. 9 at p. 5.) Kazanjian responded that “it shouldn’t take long.” (Ibid.)

Kazanjian told Plaintiff that “we need to open your spot.” (Motion Exh. 1 at p. 99.) In interrogatory responses, Plaintiff stated that Kazanjian told her “I’m not firing you, but we need to keep your spot open and look for someone else, telling Plaintiff that she needed to “voluntarily resign.” (Motion Exh 9 at p. 5.) Kazanjian said that Plaintiff was “a smart girl, that I can find a position for you in the office, whether it’s the receptionist area or going back to scheduling or doing referrals,” evidently upon Plaintiff’s post-resignation return. (Id. at p. 99.) During the conversation, Kazanjian asked Plaintiff if she had all her belongings or if she needed to pick up her belongings, which left Plaintiff “confused as [to] where she was getting at, and she was asking all these questions when I just – I wanted to go home.” (Id. at p. 99.)

Plaintiff signed a form on Defendant’s letterhead with the heading, “Notice to Employee as to Change in Relationship.” (Motion Exh. 15.) On this form, a check mark appears by the option for “Voluntary quit effective 3/26/21,” with the date handwritten in. (Ibid.) In the “comment” section is handwritten, “voluntary resignation due to health issues.” (Ibid.) Kazanjian signed the form in the space marked for the supervisor. (Ibid.) Plaintiff disputes whether she wrote the comment on the form. (Opposition Exh. A at p. 118.)1 However, Plaintiff also provided a handwritten note, stating, “Effective immediately I resign due to health issues.” (Motion Exh. 14.)

One day later, Plaintiff sent another resignation letter to Kazanjian via email. (Motion Exh. 17.) The opening paragraph states, “I am very sorry to be writing this letter to hand my resignation due to medical reasons. As you are aware, you have pointed out that I have more issues to deal with my health. I have been having medical problems over the past few months and I felt that I was rush on the resignation letter that was dictated to me and it has left me now with the uncertainty of not having a job when I get well.” (Motion Exh. 17.) Plaintiff went on to state that she would let Defendant know when she was well, and hoped that Kazanjian would find her a position when that happened. (Ibid.)

From the above account of the evidence, triable issues exist as to whether Plaintiff’s resignation was voluntary. Although memorialized as a voluntary resignation, Plaintiff testifies that the resignation was presented to her while she was present at the office for a medical appointment, under the effect of anesthetics and in extreme pain, of which she informed her supervisor. Plaintiff claims that she was confronted with questions as to whether she was coming to get her things, and then told that Defendant wanted her to resign in order to keep her position open.

It is unclear whether an employer’s direct demand for an employee’s resignation constitutes an adverse employment action if accepted. However, the above evidence creates triable issues of fact as to whether Plaintiff was actually or constructively terminated. Constructive discharge occurs when “employer's conduct “effectively forces an employee to resign,” (Vasquez v. Franklin Management Real Estate Fund, Inc. (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 819, 827.) To prevail on this theory, a plaintiff must show that a “reasonable person faced with the allegedly intolerable employer actions or conditions of employment would have no reasonable alternative except to quit.” (Id. at p. 827.) The above account of facts raises triable issues as to whether Plaintiff reasonably felt she had no reasonable alternative except to quit. Plaintiff here presents evidence that her supervisor directly requested her resignation in order to keep her position open, and that Plaintiff signed a resignation form dictated to her by her supervisor, while she was in the office for a medical appointment, in extreme pain and under the influence of anesthetics. Triable issues exist as to whether Plaintiff’s resignation was voluntary.

The motion is therefore DENIED as to the first through sixth causes of action.