Judge Lynne M. Hobbs, Case Number: 22STCV37149, Date: 2025-01-28 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Lynne M. Hobbs, Case: 22STCV37149, Date: 2025-01-28 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV37149 Hearing Date: January 28, 2025 Dept: 61

MIKE BARKER vs CITY OF LOS ANGELES

Tentative

Plaintiff Mike Barker’s Pitchess Motion for Officer Personnel Records is GRANTED as to Requests No. 1, 2, and 4, and DENIED as to the remaining categories. The court shall conduct an in-camera inspection to exclude irrelevant information and facts which are ‘so remote as to make disclosure of little or no practical benefit,' pursuant to Evidence Code § 1045. Records disclosed or discovered in this fashion “may not be used for any purpose other than a court proceeding pursuant to applicable law.” (Evid. Code § 1045, subd. (e).)

Judicial Assistant is to calendar the in-camera inspection.

Moving party to provide notice.

Analysis

Plaintiff Mike Barker (Plaintiff) seeks police personnel records from Defendant City of Los Angeles (Defendant). Evid. Code section 1043, subd. (a) requires that a party seeking disclosure of police officer “personnel records” file a particular motion, a Pitchess motion. (Cf. Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531.) “Personnel records” are defined as “primary records specific to each peace or custodial officer's employment, including evaluations, assignments, status changes, and imposed discipline.” (Pen. Code, § 832.5, subd (d)(1).) The Pitchess provisions “take precedence over the general discovery rules outlined in the Code of Civil Procedure.” (Davis v. City of Sacramento (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 393, 400.) Evid. Code section 1043, subd. (b) details what a Pitchess motion shall include:

(1) Identification of the proceeding in which discovery or disclosure is sought, the party seeking discovery or disclosure, the peace or custodial officer whose records are sought, the governmental agency which has custody and control of the records, and the time and place at which the motion for discovery or disclosure shall be heard. (2) A description of the type of records or information sought. [And] (3) Affidavits showing good cause for the discovery or disclosure sought, setting forth the materiality thereof to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation and stating upon reasonable belief that the governmental agency identified has the records or information from the records.

“A finding of ‘good cause’ under section 1043, subdivision (b) is only the first hurdle in the discovery process. Once good cause for discovery has been established, section 1045 provides that the court shall then examine the information ‘in chambers’ in conformity with section 915 (i.e., out of the presence of all persons except the person authorized to claim the privilege and such other persons as he or she is willing to have present), and shall exclude from disclosure several enumerated categories of information.” (City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court (“Santa Cruz”) (1989) 49 Cal.3d 74, 83.) The excluded categories of information include, in criminal proceedings, “the conclusions of any officer investigating a complaint filed pursuant to section 832.5 of the Penal Code,” and otherwise include “[f]acts sought to be disclosed that are so remote as to make disclosure of little or no practical benefit.” (Evid. Code § 1045, subd. (b).)

“Section 1043 clearly requires a showing of ‘good cause’ for discovery in two general categories: (1) the ‘materiality’ of the information or records sought to the “subject matter involved in the pending litigation,” and (2) a ‘reasonable belief’ that the governmental agency has the ‘type’ of information or records sought to be disclosed.” (Santa Cruz, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 83.) Courts have described that as a “relatively low threshold” for discovery, but have also noted that section 1045’s protective provisions offset that low threshold. (Id. at p. 83–84.)

Plaintiff Mike Barker (Plaintiff) seeks documents from Defendant via the procedures discussed above. Plaintiff divides these requests into Requests No. 1–8, which can

· Requests No. 1, 2, and 4: documents related to Defendant’s investigations in the allegations of Plaintiff’s complaint in this action, and that filed with the DFEH;

· Requests No. 3, 5–8: documents related to investigations of one Officer Marcus Gibbens as relate to allegations of disability discrimination and harassment and allegations of falsification of evidence and other wrongdoing.

(Motion at pp. 2–6.)

Plaintiff argues that the first category of documents is relevant to his claims for discrimination, as the materials uncovered can be compared to the testimony of percipient witnesses in the present action to assess their credibility, and to evaluate whether any proffered reason for Plaintiff’s being placed off work is pretext. (Motion at pp. 11–12.) And Plaintiff argues that the files relating particularly to third-party complaints against Gibbens are proper because they will show that Defendant had prior knowledge of Gibbens’ discriminatory behavior, and also to show the intent behind Gibbens’ actions in placing Plaintiff off-work. (Motion at pp. 12–15.)

Defendant in opposition argues that the requests for files related to the investigation of Plaintiff’s complaints is overbroad, as it seeks a variety of ancillary documents, including witness photos and investigator notes. (Opposition at pp. 6–7.) And defendant argues that the categories relating particularly to Gibbens seek private personnel materials not related to Plaintiff’s claims, particularly since Plaintiff alleges, he was placed off work due to a department-wide policy. (Opposition at pp. 7–9.)

Plaintiff has shown good cause for Requests No. 1, 2, and 4, which seek documents related particularly to the investigation of Plaintiff’s complaints, which form the subject matter for this litigation. The relevance of such materials to the present case is “self-evident,” as they concern the very matters at issue here. (Robinson v. Superior Court (1978) 76 Cal.App.3d 968, 977.) Defendant’s argument that the scope of documents sought encompasses “ancillary” matters beyond the scope of a Pitchess motion is unsupported. Defendant cites the case of Haggerty v. Superior Court (2004) 117 CalApp.4th 1079, in which the court of appeal concluded, after reviewing sealed documents subject to the second stage in camera review of the Pitchess process, that a trial court in a civil matter should not have disclosed portions of an investigative file that “contained the officer's subjective impressions of the facts found during the investigation.” (Haggerty v. Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1079, 1088.) But the court did not determine that such matters must be excluded as a matter of law, let alone prevented from disclosure at the first stage of a Pitchess analysis. It only found that the explicit prohibition on such disclosures in the criminal context under Evidence Code § 1045 did not make their disclosure automatic in the civil context. (Id.at p. 1088.) Here, not having the materials before it, the court cannot conclude at the present stage that such materials are irrelevant to the subject matter of this case.

However, Defendant is correct that those requests related particularly to Officer Gibbens are not supported by good cause. Gibbens is mentioned once in Plaintiff’s FAC, as the officer who “informed Plaintiff that the Department was going to enforce Special Order Number 7/Administrative Order Number 1,” i.e. that Plaintiff would be placed off-work after a set time on restricted duty. (FAC ¶ 17.) Plaintiff affirmatively alleges that his displacement was the product of LAPD Chief Michael Moore deciding to enforce Administrative Order Number 1 or Special Order Number 7, which required injured employees to be placed off work if they could not resume full duty after six months of restricted duty. (FAC ¶ 16.) It is thus unlikely that a probe into the personnel file and disciplinary record of Officer Gibbens would yield relevant information concerning the decision to enforce these orders. This analysis excludes Request No. 4, which concerns Gibbens only insofar as investigations were launched against him as a result of Plaintiff’s complaints, which address themselves to relevant information.

Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED as to Requests No. 1, 2, and 4, and DENIED as to the remaining categories. The court shall conduct an in-camera inspection to exclude irrelevant information and facts which are ‘so remote as to make disclosure of little or no practical benefit, pursuant to Evidence Code § 1045. Records disclosed or discovered in this fashion “may not be used for any purpose other than a court proceeding pursuant to applicable law.” (Evid. Code § 1045, subd. (e).)